

MOPAN

2017-18 ASSESSMENTS

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**Office of the United Nations  
High Commissioner for Human  
Rights (OHCHR)**

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2017-18 Performance Assessment



# Preface

## ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) comprises 18 countries<sup>1</sup> that share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organisations they fund. These include United Nations agencies, international financial institutions and global funds. The Network generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant and credible information on their organisational and development effectiveness. This knowledge base is intended to contribute to organisational learning within and among the organisations, their direct clients and partners, and other stakeholders. Network members use the reports for their own accountability needs and as a source of input for strategic decision-making.

MOPAN 3.0, first applied in 2015-16, is the latest operational and methodological iteration of how the Network assesses organisations. It builds on the former version, the Common Approach, which the Network implemented from 2009 through 2014.

In 2017-18, MOPAN assessed 14 organisations, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The other 13 are:

- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- Global Environment Facility (GEF)
- Global Partnership for Education (GPE)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- World Health Organization (WHO).

### Operating principles

MOPAN generates assessments that are credible, fair and accurate. Credibility is ensured through an impartial, systematic and rigorous approach. MOPAN seeks an appropriate balance between coverage and depth of information from a variety of sources and through multiple streams of evidence. The Network gives priority to quality of information over quantity and uses structured tools for enquiry and analysis. An audit trail of findings ensures transparency. MOPAN applies efficient measures of assessment practice through building layers of data, with a view to limiting the burden on organisations assessed. A focus on organisational learning aims to ensure utility of the findings by multiple stakeholders.

### Objectives of the MOPAN methodology

MOPAN seeks to provide a diagnostic assessment, or snapshot, of an organisation. It tells the story of an organisation's current performance. MOPAN is guided by framing questions which serve to understand the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of multilateral organisations, while also garnering a sense of the sustainability of their results. The empirical design of MOPAN is based on a theory of change.

1. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. MOPAN also has two observers, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.

The methodology's key elements include a set of five performance areas against which the assessment takes place. The first four cover strategic, operational, relationship and performance management. The fifth area englobes the organisation's contribution to development, humanitarian and normative results. These areas are captured in the MOPAN indicator framework against which performance is measured using three evidence streams – a document review, surveys, and interviews and consultations – brought together in a combined approach.

A MOPAN assessment is not an external audit of an organisation, nor is it an institutional evaluation. MOPAN does not comprehensively assess all operations or all processes of an organisation, nor can it provide a definitive picture of all the organisation's achievements and performance during the time period of the assessment. Neither does MOPAN offer comprehensive documentation or analysis of ongoing organisational reform processes.

## Acknowledgements

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The MOPAN assessment was finalised under the overall strategic guidance of Suzanne Steensen, Head of the MOPAN Secretariat. It was prepared under the responsibility of Jolanda Profos, Policy Advisor. We are very grateful to Ann-Mari Fröberg and Eija Limnell from Finland for championing this assessment of OHCHR on behalf of the MOPAN membership.

The assessment was conducted with support from IOD PARC, an independent consultancy specialised in assessing performance and managing change in the field of international development. Mark Singleton served as Team Lead for the assessment of OHCHR, with support from Annalize Struwig, under the overall leadership of Julian Gayfer. Ipsos MORI administered the partner survey.

The report benefited from a peer review conducted within the MOPAN Secretariat and from the comments of a senior independent advisor, Paul Balogun. Jill Gaston edited the report, and Andrew Esson provided layout and graphic design.

MOPAN is grateful to its Steering Committee representatives for supporting the assessment of OHCHR. Finally, MOPAN would like to convey appreciation to OHCHR management and staff for their input and comments at various stages, in particular those staff members who internally co-ordinated the process and provided substantive feedback on the final draft report.

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>ASG</b>	Assistant Secretary-General	<b>OAS</b>	Organisation of American States
<b>AWP/CP</b>	Annual work and cost plan	<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Unity
<b>CCA</b>	Common Country Analysis	<b>OEAS</b>	Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organisation	<b>OEG</b>	Organisational Effectiveness Goals
<b>CTMD</b>	Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division	<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>DHC</b>	Deputy High Commissioner	<b>OIOS</b>	Office of Internal Oversight Services
<b>EA</b>	Expected accomplishment	<b>OMP</b>	OHCHR Management Plan
<b>ECOSOC</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Council	<b>OSCE</b>	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>EYR</b>	End-of-year review	<b>PBRB</b>	Programme Budget and Review Board
<b>FOTCD</b>	Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division	<b>PMS</b>	Performance monitoring system
<b>GMO</b>	Global Management Output	<b>PPMES</b>	Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Service
<b>HC</b>	High Commissioner	<b>PSMS</b>	Programme Support and Management Services
<b>HR</b>	Human rights	<b>QCPR</b>	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
<b>HRA</b>	Human rights advisor	<b>RB</b>	Regular budget
<b>HRC</b>	Human Rights Council	<b>RBM</b>	Results-based management
<b>HRCTM</b>	Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division	<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>HRM</b>	Human Resource Management	<b>RGA</b>	Regional Gender Advisor
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	<b>RO</b>	Regional office
<b>IATI</b>	International Aid Transparency Initiative	<b>ROCA</b>	Regional Office for Central Asia
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>ICT</b>	Information and communication technology	<b>SMT</b>	Senior Management Team
<b>IIHR</b>	Inter-American Institute of Human Rights	<b>TESPRD</b>	Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division
<b>ILANUD</b>	United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders	<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>IPAS</b>	International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing	<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
<b>IPSAS</b>	International Public Sector Accounting Standards	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>JIU</b>	Joint Investigative Unit	<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations country team
<b>KPI</b>	Key performance indicator	<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>LGBTI</b>	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex	<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>MI</b>	Micro-indicator	<b>UNEG</b>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<b>MOPAN</b>	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network	<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>MYR</b>	Mid-year review	<b>UNOG</b>	United Nations Office at Geneva
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation	<b>UN-SWAP</b>	United Nations System-wide Action Plan
<b>NHRI</b>	National human rights institution	<b>UPR</b>	Universal Periodic Review
		<b>USG</b>	Under-Secretary-General

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## Executive summary

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In 2017-18, MOPAN, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, assessed the performance of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The assessment looked at OHCHR's organisational effectiveness (strategic, operational, relationship and performance aspects) and the results it achieved against its objectives. This is the first MOPAN assessment of OHCHR.

### CONTEXT

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Human rights, as one of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the United Nations (UN) Charter, are a fundamental part of the multilateral system. Human rights also cut across the work of the other two pillars, namely development and peace and security. The non-binding Universal Declaration on Human Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and forms the basis of international human rights standards and agreements. Since 1948, the UN human rights architecture has grown considerably and now consists of ten treaty bodies (binding agreements between sovereign states) and the Human Rights Commission (established in 2006 as successor to the Committee on Human Rights) with its Special Procedures and Universal Periodic Review. In 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (UNGA Resolution 48/141), through which the position of the UN High Commissioner and OHCHR were created.

OHCHR is a relatively young organisation which forms part of the UN Secretariat. It has a politically challenging mandate, to "promote and protect all human rights for all", that is vast and expanding. This expansion is caused by the rapid development of its mandated normative and mainstreaming work within the UN system and by an increased demand to support the implementation and monitoring of human rights standards and obligations in member states. OHCHR remains a relatively small organisation with 1 300 staff (as of December 2017) and total funding in 2017 of around USD 250 million. Besides its headquarters in Geneva and a small office in New York, there are 12 regional offices, 14 country offices, 24 human rights advisors deployed in UN country teams, and almost 700 human rights officers who serve in 13 UN peace missions or political offices in the field. OHCHR has been quite successful in mainstreaming human rights in the mandates of other UN agencies.

The principle to promote and protect all human rights for all persons is seen as the shared responsibility of the entire UN system, including member states. Human rights and their contribution to development, peace and security are increasingly under threat. Natural and man-made disasters and challenges (e.g. conflicts, climate change and disruptive technology) bring increasing demands for a response from human rights organisations. Human rights are inherently political, and efforts to promote and protect them can be perceived as political statements or acts. Moreover, some UN member states take issue with the notion that respect for human rights is a critical enabler of development, peace and security. The politically charged external environment affects OHCHR's organisational performance across all five performance areas that MOPAN assesses.

### KEY FINDINGS

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OHCHR is making good progress on strengthening its organisational effectiveness. Its management and organisational processes are becoming more astute in dealing with the political, financial and institutional challenges it faces. Strategic leadership became more robust during the 2014-18 period, resulting in more coherent, transparent and results-focused business processes that have spurred achievements in key result areas. OHCHR's results-based management systems are well developed; they foster efficient and transparent decision-making, serving both as a tool for management information and accountability. Its knowledge products, including professional education and training materials and an online library collection, are highly valued by OHCHR staff and partners alike.

The results information relating to OHCHR's important and valued role as a normative agency is limited. The information available focuses exclusively on the field level. The assessment found no independent evaluations on OHCHR's achievements at the global level, including standard setting, monitoring and reporting activities carried out in the context of human rights mechanisms. Nevertheless, external evaluations, reviews and assessments all underscore the Office's relevance and conclude that its performance – in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability – is deemed as satisfactory.

There is a chronic mismatch between OHCHR's growing mandate and scope of operations on the one hand, and its human and financial resources on the other. OHCHR is funded from the UN regular budget (47%), as well as voluntary contributions (53%). Unless the regular budget contributions are increased to match the growing mandate and scope of operations – a highly unlikely scenario in the current political climate – OHCHR will continue to rely heavily on voluntary contributions, especially to fund its field operations. Because of its mandate and the global human rights context, which plays out in a complex dynamic among member states, resource mobilisation is not a straightforward matter for OHCHR. Predictability of funding remains a major challenge, and the risk of non-continuation of voluntary contributions by key donors is a recognised risk.

Overall, OHCHR has set a highly ambitious policy and institutional agenda for itself. Despite its many challenges, it is performing remarkably well, punching above its weight and finding innovative ways and entry points to deliver its challenging mandate in a difficult context. However, its reluctance to prioritise and its aspiration or obligation to take on more than it can realistically handle mean that it risks spreading its resources too thinly, thereby jeopardising its effectiveness.

This assessment identified several **strengths** of OHCHR:

**1. OHCHR has made important strides in further strengthening its strategic leadership and management and fostering an inclusive corporate identity.** Developed under the guidance of OHCHR's leadership, the OHCHR Management Plans demonstrate (i) a clear and coherent vision and roadmap for the organisation; (ii) how it positions itself vis-à-vis other stakeholders within the UN system and beyond, in particular the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; (iii) the results to which the Office intends to contribute; and (iv) the improvements needed to bolster its own effectiveness.

**2. OHCHR's longstanding commitment to gender equality and the empowerment of women is widely acknowledged and highly regarded.** The Office has worked hard to develop and improve tools to promote gender equality in all areas of its work. It advocated successfully for including Goal 5 in the 2030 Agenda and has identified gender equality as a main area of its future work across all its strategic pillars.

**3. OHCHR has made commendable progress in its operational and results-based management culture and systems.** It has a common framework for planning and reporting its activities that has reinforced the coherence among mandated responsibilities, priorities and actions at all levels. Corporate-level strategies are based on a sound results-based management focus and logic, and they guide lower-level planning and monitoring. OHCHR's bespoke monitoring systems are of a high quality and inform management decisions. This has enabled the Office to achieve results and to use scarce human and financial resources more efficiently.

The assessment also identified a number of **areas for improvement**:

**1. OHCHR's organisational architecture is not yet fully fit for purpose.** This is especially visible in the structural lack of resources from the UN's regular budget, both for mandated activities at headquarters level and (especially) in the field. Its position within the UN Secretariat also limits its agility and autonomy to deal with organisational bottlenecks and other challenges. This affects OHCHR's ability to respond to the growing demand from its various stakeholders for support in achieving compliance with international obligations. It also affects the extent to which OHCHR can contribute to mainstreaming a human rights-based approach in UN system-wide policies and strategies and beyond.

**2. Partnerships are inherent to OHCHR, but it does not yet have a corporate strategy laying out why, how and which partnerships are important for the present and the future.** OHCHR's efforts to expand its donor base have only been partly successful. The Office is vulnerable to unpredictable, earmarked funding, and the risk of non-continuation by one or more large donors is acknowledged by the organisation. OHCHR needs a more strategic and innovative perspective on the nexus between partnerships, external communications and fundraising.

**3. OHCHR'S human resource management is insufficiently aligned with the needs and requirements of the Office.** Besides the sometimes inefficient rules, regulations, systems and processes of the UN Secretariat that OHCHR has to follow, the Office itself has not kept pace with growing demands in areas such as recruitment, staff mobility, talent management, staff development, performance management and diversity. The Office needs to help staff develop their competencies, skills and knowledge to deliver on the OHCHR Management Plan's priorities.

**4. Although OHCHR's evaluation function is showing signs of improvement, it is under-resourced, both in terms of staff and funds.** The Office lacks an "evaluation culture"; while the number of centralised and decentralised evaluations is increasing, it remains low. Consequently, there are very few independent external evaluations, especially at the global level, of OHCHR's results performance, in areas like advocacy, or of the standard setting, monitoring and reporting activities carried out in the context of the UN human rights mechanisms. This makes it more difficult to communicate, internally and externally, how the organisation is advancing in the eyes of independent experts.




## METHODS OF ANALYSIS

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
The assessment of performance covers the OHCHR organisation (headquarters, regional offices and field presence). It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved during the period 2016 to mid-2018. It relies on three lines of evidence: a review of 131 documents, interviews with 79 staff members, and an online survey conducted among 126 partners in 12 countries.

The MOPAN 3.0 methodology entails a framework of 12 key performance indicators and associated micro-indicators. It comprises standards that characterise an effective multilateral organisation. MOPAN conducted the assessment with support from IOD PARC, a consulting company located in the United Kingdom that specialises in results-based performance assessment in international development. Finland acted as the institutional lead country, representing MOPAN members in this assessment process.

**OHCHR PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY (2017-18)**



# 1. INTRODUCTION



# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

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This report has three chapters and three annexes. Chapter 1 introduces the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the MOPAN 3.0 assessment process. Chapter 2 presents the main findings of the assessment in relation to each performance area. Chapter 3 provides the conclusions of the assessment. Annex 1 summarises the evidence gathered against each indicator with the detailed scores. Annex 2 lists the documents used for the analysis. Finally, Annex 3 provides an overview of the results of MOPAN's partner survey.

## 1.2. OHCHR AT A GLANCE

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**Mission and mandate:** Human rights, peace and security, and development are the three founding pillars of the United Nations (UN) system. The UN human rights programme has grown considerably over the years. Organisationally, it started as a small division at UN Headquarters in the 1940s. The division later moved to Geneva and was upgraded to the Centre for Human Rights in the 1980s. At the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the international community decided to establish a more robust human rights mandate. Accordingly, member states of the United Nations created the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) under General Assembly Resolution 48/141 in 1993.

OHCHR is mandated to promote and protect the enjoyment and full realisation, by all people, of all rights established in the Charter of the United Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties. OHCHR is guided in its work by the mandate provided by the General Assembly in Resolution 48/141, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

OHCHR works for the protection of all human rights for all people, to help empower people to realise their rights and to assist those responsible for upholding such rights in ensuring that they are implemented. The Office's mandate includes preventing human rights violations, securing respect for all human rights, promoting international co-operation to protect human rights, co-ordinating related activities throughout the United Nations, and strengthening and streamlining the UN system in the field of human rights. In recognition of the pivotal performance of the mandate of OHCHR, the High Commissioner became a member of all four executive committees established by the Secretary-General. In addition to its mandated responsibilities, the Office leads efforts to integrate a human rights-based approach within all work carried out by UN agencies.

**Governance:** As part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR does not have an executive board. Instead, it is directly accountable to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. The High Commissioner for Human Rights is the principal, independent human rights official of the United Nations and is appointed by the UN General Assembly for a fixed term of four years, with the possibility of an extension.

**Organisational structure:** The High Commissioner heads OHCHR and spearheads the UN's human rights efforts. OHCHR's main headquarters, located in Geneva, are headed by the High Commissioner. A smaller office is located in New York and is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, representing the High Commissioner. In addition, OHCHR has 11 regional offices, 15 country offices, 12 human rights components of peace missions and 27 human rights advisors in UN country teams/human rights mainstreaming projects. Of OHCHR's approximately 1 300 staff, the majority (57%) are based in the Geneva Executive Office and the New York office (53% and 4%, respectively). The remaining 43% of staff are based in the field.

As of 31 December 2017, the Office employed 1 302 staff, nearly half of whom were based in the field. In addition to its headquarters in Geneva, where 691 staff members are based (53% of total staff), UN Human Rights has an office at UN Headquarters in New York, where 53 (4%) of its staff are based. The remaining 558 staff members (43%) are based in the field. There are 12 regional offices,<sup>2</sup> 14 country or stand-alone offices,<sup>3</sup> 24 human rights advisors,<sup>4</sup> and 13 human rights components in UN peace operations and political missions.<sup>5</sup> Field offices are created or closed upon request by host nations. Local staff in OHCHR regional offices are administered by the UN Secretariat. Local staff in field offices are mostly administered by the United Nations Development Programme in-country. When field offices have to close, or when regional offices move or restructure, local staff can be vulnerable since it is not always possible to re-deploy them to other positions.

Dedicated sections of Executive Direction and Management are responsible for core administrative, programming, co-ordination and outreach functions. In addition to the Executive Office of the High Commissioner and a number of units that report to the Deputy High Commissioner, in 2018 OHCHR had three major divisions:

- Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division
- Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division
- Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division.

Operationally, OHCHR works with many partners to develop and strengthen capacity, particularly at the national level, for the protection of human rights in accordance with international norms. Partners include governments, legislatures, courts, national institutions, civil society, regional and international organisations, and the UN system.

**Strategy:** The Office's latest priorities, strategies and targets are set out in the OHCHR Management Plan (OMP) 2018-21. As the principal UN office mandated to promote and protect human rights for all, OHCHR leads global human rights efforts. It has six pillars:

- supporting the UN human rights system, in particular increasing the implementation of the outcomes of international human rights mechanisms
- advancing sustainable development through human rights
- preventing violations and strengthening protection of human rights, including in situations of conflict and insecurity
- enhancing equality and countering discrimination
- strengthening the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations
- enhancing participation and protecting civic space.

**Finances:** Over the years, OHCHR has experienced expanding demands for its services from the Human Rights Council and other legislative bodies, including the UN "Rights Up Front" Plan of Action, all of which come with a significant additional workload. Despite an upward trend in OHCHR funding from the UN regular budget since 2004, the Office's share of the budget has remained stable at around 3.5%, covering approximately 45% of OHCHR's overall funding. Because new responsibilities were assigned to OHCHR without commensurate additional resources, funding

2. Current regional offices include Central America (situated in Panama City), South America (situated in Santiago de Chile), Europe (situated in Brussels), Middle East and North Africa (situated in Beirut), Central Asia (situated in Bishkek), South-East Asia (situated in Bangkok), Pacific (situated in Suva), Southern Africa (situated in Pretoria), East Africa (situated in Addis Ababa), West Africa (situated in Dakar), and Central Africa (situated in Yaoundé). There is also a UN Human Rights Training and Documentation Centre for South-West Asia and the Arab Region situated in Doha.

3. Country/Stand-alone offices are situated in Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Mauritania, Mexico, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen. There is also an OHCHR field-base structure in the Republic of Korea.

4. Human rights advisers/officers are currently deployed in UN Country teams in Bangladesh, Barbados, Chad, the Dominican Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, the Republic of Moldova, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Caucasus (covering Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor Leste.

5. Human rights components of UN peace/political missions are currently deployed in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

gaps had to be filled through voluntary contributions. These account for 55% of OHCHR's funding, the bulk of which is earmarked for field operations. At least 10% of total voluntary funding is spent on mandated activities to cover shortfalls and delays in funding from the UN regular budget. Expenditure in 2017 was USD 110 million from the regular budget and USD 136 million from extrabudgetary funding.

**Organisational change initiatives:** During the implementation of the OMP 2014-17, the Geneva headquarters were restructured and a proposal for expansion was put forward to the General Assembly under the title "Change Initiative". The budget-neutral proposal involved expanding both OHCHR's field presence and the capacity of the New York office. After lengthy discussions between OHCHR and the General Assembly, a decision was deferred indefinitely.

As part of the development of the OMP 2018-21, the Office created nine interrelated organisational effectiveness action plans: (1) strategic leadership and direction; (2) human resources; (3) operations management; (4) resource mobilisation; (5) external communications; (6) partnerships; (7) knowledge management; (8) diversity and gender; and (9) innovation. They are based on critical self-assessments, lessons learned, and contextual analysis of emerging trends and developments. The action plans contain tangible outputs, indicators of success, resource needs, risk analysis, roles and responsibilities, as well as monitoring and evaluation arrangements. OHCHR has set aside some resources to implement them.

### Box 1: Preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment<sup>6</sup>

OHCHR has introduced extensive measures to ensure that it provides a workplace free from harassment of any kind and from the abuse of authority in any circumstances. In 2016, the Deputy High Commissioner held a series of "HARDtalks" – open to all staff at all levels and in all OHCHR offices – to help surface issues that staff may otherwise find difficult to raise. These open conversations revealed organisational dynamics that could lead to abuse of authority, discrimination and harassment.

In response, a staff Task Force on Strengthening Diversity at OHCHR was established to recommend to senior management steps that should be taken to enhance fairness, inclusion and accountability in the workplace. The majority of the Task Force's recommendations have been accepted and are being implemented, including the following:

- All senior staff, including heads of OHCHR field offices, underwent training on unconscious bias and inclusive leadership.
- Through the new Dignity@Work policy, short-term and longer-term measures will be introduced to prevent and remedy prohibited conduct as well as to generate further information on its prevalence and incidence.
- A campaign is being piloted to encourage staff to report concerns about possible prohibited conduct to a network of 20 trained "Dignity Contacts".
- As part of 360-degree feedback for all managers, staff assess how managers use their power as well as the steps that managers take to address prohibited conduct.
- OHCHR participated fully in the UN Leadership Dialogue 2017, which included Sexual Exploitation and Abuse as a discussion topic.

6. The 2017-18 MOPAN assessment does not cover the organisation's performance with regard to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH). This topic may become an area of assessment in future cycles. In the meantime, the assessment team simply collected key facts related to safeguarding against SEAH as self-reported by the organisation but did not verify the actual implementation of the instruments outlined by OHCHR.

- As part of its Diversity and Gender Action Plan (2018-21), OHCHR will implement staff surveys to monitor changes in staff perceptions of respect for diversity and of zero tolerance for discrimination, harassment and abuse of authority.

In addition to these organisational initiatives, OHCHR has been active in UN-wide efforts to address sexual harassment and abuse:

- The Deputy High Commissioner has been a co-champion against sexual harassment and abuse for the Inter Agency Standing Committee led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities.
- OHCHR is a member of the recently established Chief Executives Board Task Force on Addressing Sexual Harassment and is co-leading a working group on enhanced awareness and training, proposing minimum standards to the entire UN system in these areas.
- OHCHR has dedicated significant capacity and resources to strengthen mechanisms and increase awareness of reporting requirements for UN personnel and non-UN forces operating under a Security Council mandate. OHCHR has also reached out to other parts of the human rights system to maintain engagement against sexual exploitation and abuse by the UN human rights mechanisms.
- OHCHR is engaged in system-wide efforts led by the Special Coordinator on Improving United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
- OHCHR contributed to the development of the new strategy of the Secretary-General to protect against sexual exploitation and abuse, as elaborated in A/71/818 (February 2017).
- OHCHR is leading or co-leading several system-wide work streams related to sexual exploitation and abuse.
- In the context of the African Union-UN partnership on peace and security, OHCHR is supporting the development of a human rights compliance and accountability framework for African Union peace support operations that also addresses protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.

Future initiatives include plans to commission an external study to better understand the dynamics, beliefs, rituals and practices that support exclusion, prevent career progression for women, and expose individuals to abuse, harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Together with other partners, OHCHR is also seeking funds for a study to investigate the linkages between gender-based discrimination and sexual exploitation and abuse in some of the contexts where peace missions operate.

### 1.3. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

#### Assessment framework

This MOPAN 3.0 assessment covers the period from 2016 to mid-2018 in line with guidelines set out in the MOPAN 3.0 Methodology, which can be found on MOPAN's website. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved. The assessment focuses on five performance areas. The first four relate to organisational effectiveness, and each has two key performance indicators (KPIs). The fifth performance area (results), relating to development and humanitarian effectiveness, consists of four KPIs.

The MOPAN 3.0 indicator framework was developed by MOPAN's Technical Working Group, drawing on international standards and reference points, as described in Annex C of the Methodology Manual.

#### Box 2: Performance areas and key performance indicators

Aspect	Performance area	KPI
Organisational effectiveness	Strategic management	<b>KPI 1:</b> The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results
		<b>KPI 2:</b> Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels
	Operational management	<b>KPI 3:</b> The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility
		<b>KPI 4:</b> Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability
	Relationship management	<b>KPI 5:</b> Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships
		<b>KPI 6:</b> Partnership working is coherent and directed at ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources
	Performance management	<b>KPI 7:</b> The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function
		<b>KPI 8:</b> The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming
Development effectiveness	Results	<b>KPI 9:</b> Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals
		<b>KPI 10:</b> Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate
		<b>KPI 11:</b> Results are delivered efficiently
		<b>KPI 12:</b> Results are sustainable

### Applying the MOPAN methodology to OHCHR

The assessment of performance covers the OHCHR organisation (headquarters, regional offices and field operations). The timeframe spans two OHCHR strategic planning phases; the last two years of OMP 2014-17 and the start of the OMP 2018-21. The focus is on the Office's plans and achievements for the 2014-17 period. However, it recognises that a significant amount of effort during 2017 had gone into developing the OMP 2018-21, and steps taken to start implementing the OMP 2018-21 are an important aspect of OHCHR's performance journey.

The MOPAN 3.0 methodology was applied with some minor adjustments in indicator application or interpretation to reflect the realities of OHCHR's mandate and operating systems. These included (see also Annex 1):

- **MI 2.1d. Human Rights:** Given OHCHR's specific mission and mandate, human rights are at the heart of every policy, strategy and intervention. It was thus agreed not to consider this micro-indicator as part of the assessment, which looks at human rights as a cross-cutting issue. Consequently, elements related to human rights as a cross-cutting issue under MI 5.5., and MI 9.7, have also been omitted.
- **MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation on use of country systems:** It was not considered as relevant to OHCHR and thus was not applied. (This Busan commitment is to "[u]se country public financial management systems as the default option for development financing, and support the strengthening of these systems where necessary".)

### Lines of evidence

The MOPAN assessment of OHCHR was undertaken between May 2017 and July 2018. It covers OHCHR's headquarter operations, with insights on regional and country field presence. As part of the methodology, it relies on the following lines of evidence:

- **Document review:** 131 documents including management reports and evaluations (see Annex 2). Results documentation included only seven independent evaluations and one review.
- **Online survey:** 126 partners responded to an online partner survey between March and April 2018, conducted in 12 countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tunisia and Turkey). The survey was designed to gather both perception data and an understanding of practice from a diverse set of well-informed partners of OHCHR. More than half of the respondents came from non-governmental organisations; others included MOPAN donors, governments and other multilateral organisations (see Annex 3).
- **Interviews and consultations:** the team interviewed a total of 79 staff members in April 2018. The majority of the interviews and consultations were undertaken at OHCHR headquarters in Geneva, with calls to selected regional and country offices.


An information call to discuss key findings was held with the Institutional Lead representative from Finland during the final stages of drafting.


General information about the sequence and details related to these evidence lines, the overall analysis, and the scoring and rating process, as applied to OHCHR, can be found in the MOPAN 3.0 methodology.

### Limitations

This assessment spanned a fluid period during which the Office was drafting a new Management Plan through a highly consultative process. Hundreds of internal and external stakeholders participated in that process, which began in 2017. During the assessment period, a new High Commissioner was appointed. Also during the assessment period, the Geneva headquarters were restructured from four to three divisions. Moreover, an organisational change initiative, meant to strengthen OHCHR's presence at the New York office and regional levels, was deferred indefinitely after lengthy deliberations; as a result, the Sustainable Development Goals Section, that had been moved to the New York office, had to be relocated back to Geneva.

The evidence base for KPIs 9-12 on results was very limited in size, scope and quality. No independent evaluations on important components of OHCHR's mandate was available for analysis. The evidence base focused exclusively on the field level, and its value was limited in assessing results at the corporate level. No independent evaluations or reviews are available of, for example, the vast set of activities on standard setting, monitoring and reporting carried out in the context of UN human rights mechanisms. The scores do not cover all of OHCHR's results areas and therefore only partially reflect its current standing against all the requirements of an effective organisation. Consequently, the analysis and assessment of the Office's effectiveness, its efficiency and in particular its sustainability, based on independent evaluations, are necessarily shallow.





## **2. DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF OHCHR PERFORMANCE**

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## Chapter 2. Detailed assessment of OHCHR's performance

The performance is assessed on four dimensions of organisational effectiveness – strategic, operational, relationship and performance management – and on the results achieved by the organisation. These findings are constructed against the organisation's own strategic plan and performance indicators.

In this way, organisational effectiveness relates to a blended assessment of intent, effort and response. Organisational intent is expressed through commitments, strategies, policies and guidance. The organisational effort is that which the organisation puts behind a particular agenda for performance and improvement. The organisational response is its reaction to the effects of this effort in relation to changing organisational direction, practice and behaviour.


Organisational effectiveness is juxtaposed alongside development effectiveness. The latter refers to the extent to which the organisation is making a difference in ways that reflect its strategic objectives and mandate.

### 2.1. ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

#### PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

*Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.*

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has come a long way in improving its strategic direction despite significant challenges. Strategic leadership has improved, as demonstrated by OHCHR's coherent Management Plan (OMP) and corresponding organisational effectiveness action plans. The Office has initiated various internal change management processes, resulting in a more strategic outlook, enhanced transparency and accountability, and more integrated results-based management (RBM). The OMP, the product of extensive internal and external consultations, is owned and carried forward by all staff. Progress has been made in integrating cross-cutting issues, especially on gender equality and women's empowerment. OHCHR has a broad and expanding mandate that is not matched by a proportionate increase in resources. Its staff are overstretched, and the Office has become increasingly dependent on voluntary contributions. This and other structural challenges, resulting from its position within the United Nations (UN) system, hamper its ability to respond adequately and sustainably and to help strengthen implementation of human rights standards on the ground.



Challenges remain with internal alignment of a complicated strategic planning and reporting framework, and an organisational architecture that is out of sync with its strategic priorities.

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### **KPI 1: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results.**

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This KPI focuses on the extent to which OHCHR has articulated a coherent and strategic vision of how and for what purpose it has organised its human activity and capital assets to deliver both long and short-term results.

**OHCHR has a broad and expanding mandate.** It covers standard setting, monitoring, advocacy and mainstreaming of human rights. The mandate also provides for capacity building of member states' governments, agencies and civil society organisations to support the implementation of a fast-growing number of recommendations, human rights obligations of member states and strengthening of accountability. OHCHR is the main designated, principle-based UN entity on human rights. But it is often – incorrectly – regarded as the sole UN agency responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights for all or as only a standard-setting entity relevant to Geneva-based organisations.

**Although its framework for strategic planning, management and accountability is not straightforward, OHCHR has a clear strategic direction and long-term vision.** This was clearly demonstrated by the two OHCHR Management Plans and related organisational restructuring initiatives spanning the MOPAN review period. The OMPs are detailed, coherent and results-based four-year roadmaps. They are guided by the mostly static biennial Strategic Framework documents used for discussions within the UN system. Both OMPs are based on robust context analysis and broad consultations with many different stakeholders; they draw increasingly on past achievements and lessons learned, including from evaluations and audits. Both OMPs define ambitious targets across the same six thematic pillars. The latest OMP stresses the need for shifts across these pillars to adapt to the evolving context, including the UN Reform Agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Secretary-General's Prevention agenda, as well as political and technological developments.

**OHCHR's expanding mandate and corresponding ambitions are not matched by a proportionate growth in resources.** OHCHR's budget relies increasingly on voluntary contributions from Western donors, most of which are earmarked for field operations. Such contributions risk undermining OHCHR's perceived independence. Moreover, they are less predictable than regular budget contributions, which are mostly used to cover OHCHR's standard setting and monitoring functions. Mindful of its own resource limitations, OHCHR now increasingly emphasises the importance of mainstreaming human rights through partnerships and capacity building. As part of the OMP 2018-21, the Office has finally developed partnership, resource mobilisation and external communications strategies to bolster its delivery capability. De-prioritisation remains a constant challenge, however.

**OHCHR's strategy is increasingly anchored in both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustaining Peace Agenda.** Their success will ultimately depend on compliance with human rights. The OMP 2014-17 included detailed outlines of OHCHR's contributions (i.e. expected accomplishments) to relevant normative frameworks. In the OMP 2018-21, this focus is maintained. Across OHCHR's six thematic pillars, results and targets are linked to 15 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Performance monitoring systems exist to scrutinise progress.

**The organisational architecture is sub-optimal and risks undermining OHCHR's delivery capability.** OHCHR's contribution to mainstreaming human rights across the UN system is crucial, at a time when global policies, such as the 2030 Agenda, the Sustaining Peace Agenda and the Secretary-General's Reform Initiative, are being operationalised. With an increased emphasis on supporting implementation of human rights obligations in member states, both the Office itself and external evaluators have deemed that a stronger field presence is necessary. However, OHCHR is impeded in its ability to expand, as efforts to reallocate staff from Geneva to New York and to regional offices (the "Change Initiative") were deferred indefinitely by the General Assembly. OHCHR staff are overstretched and capacity shortfalls exist across the organisation, most notably in all four categories of field presences (regional offices, country offices, human rights

advisors and human rights components of peacekeeping missions). OHCHR is considering how best to mitigate these risks through measures that lie within its control.

## **KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels.**

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This KPI looks at the articulation and positioning within OHCHR's structures and mechanisms of the cross-cutting priorities to which the organisation is committed, in pursuit of its strategic objectives.

**OHCHR has a longstanding commitment to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women in its normative and country-facing work.** The Office has well-established, well-known and well-regarded policy and strategic frameworks to this end. Strong and high-level management leadership drives OHCHR's implementation of its strategic commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment, and its work in this area is relatively well resourced. OHCHR's strategic commitments to gender equality and the empowerment of women are monitored by the Programme Budget and Review Board and reported in UN Human Rights annual reports.

**OHCHR has worked hard – and continues to do so – to develop and improve a range of practical guidance, tools and checklists for integrating a gender perspective in all aspects of its work.** It has also invested substantially in strengthening the capability of OHCHR staff, special procedures mandate-holders and treaty body members to integrate a gender perspective into their daily work. These efforts have paid off, most notably in integrating a gender perspective into the programmes, processes and capacity of field offices in challenging locations such as Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Somalia.

**OHCHR's contributions to promote gender equality in all areas of its work are regarded highly by partners.** These contributions include advocating successfully for the inclusion of Goal 5 – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls – in the final 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Another example is the increase in annual work and cost plans and mini-strategies that had at least one activity with gender equality as the main objective from 72.0% in 2015 to 78.5% in 2016. OHCHR was also commended by the Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women for its leadership in dealing with gender equality and women's empowerment in evaluation.

The OMP 2018-21 identifies gender equality as one of the issues that OHCHR will be “shining a spotlight” on and identifies an intersectional focus on women as vital to its efforts in assisting states to implement the SDGs and the commitment to “leave no one behind”. More specifically, this aligns OHCHR's work in gender equality with SDG 5. It will also put OHCHR at the forefront of efforts to broaden the notion of gender equality and inclusiveness to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people.

**OHCHR's commitment to gender equality in its organisational structure was articulated in Global Management Output 3 of the OMP 2014-17.** Clear targets were set to ensure that “a gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes”. Furthermore, OHCHR has reached gender parity in its overall organisational structure, but women are still proportionately under-represented compared to men in senior-level positions. This imbalance is particularly entrenched in the field. The Gender and Diversity Action Plan 2018-21 commits OHCHR to achieving a target of 100% gender parity at all levels by 2021. It also aims to strengthen monitoring, reporting and accountability on gender equality in OHCHR's organisational composition, culture, structure and processes. It commits OHCHR to aligning its internal gender policy to the new UN System-wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) and foresees additional annual reporting to UN-SWAP.


**While good governance, as a thematical programmatic area, is fundamental to OHCHR’s vision and mission, the Office has no clear definition in place and no strategy for its normative and country-facing work on good governance.** No special human or financial resources are dedicated to it. Staff regard good governance as “everything we do”, with responsibility and accountability being simultaneously “everywhere and nowhere”. Nevertheless, OHCHR’s partners are knowledgeable about its approach to good governance and regard its work in this area highly, while annual reports provide clear evidence of OHCHR’s contributions to strengthening aspects of good governance in various areas of support to stakeholders.

The new OMP (2018-21) emphasises OHCHR’s role in empowering and enabling people to meaningfully shape or challenge policy decisions that affect their lives, as an element of ensuring accountability and good governance. It aligns OHCHR’s work in this area with SDG 16. It also identifies the fight against corruption, which is one of OHCHR’s governance focus areas, as a “frontier issue”. Frontier issues are emerging as human rights concerns in view of their negative impacts on the lives of people, putting at risk their rights to water and sanitation, housing, food, health, and education.

**OHCHR’s strategy for dealing with human rights issues related to environmental sustainability and climate change is evolving.** In December 2015, the adoption of the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change marked the first time that a universal, binding climate agreement explicitly referenced human rights. Most of its partners still know relatively little about OHCHR’s strategy in this domain.

**The OMP 2018-21 commits OHCHR to explore climate change as another frontier issue.** By mainstreaming climate change in all its work, the Office aims to better understand the connections between climate change and human rights. The OMP aligns OHCHR’s work on environmental sustainability and climate change with relevant SDGs (13, 14 and 15). An intergovernmental working group, chaired by OHCHR, will create indicators to measure progress on the implementation of the right to development. These indicators will capture OHCHR’s contribution to the relevant SDGs.

**Figure 1: Survey response – CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**




**The OMP 2014-17 committed OHCHR to becoming a “greener” organisation.** OHCHR has reduced its carbon footprint, and its headquarters’ footprint is now lower than the UN average. Information requirements and additional resources have so far deterred OHCHR from implementing further greening initiatives, such as including all OHCHR field presences in the greenhouse gas footprint, developing an environmental management system, buying carbon offsets and calculating waste.

**OHCHR staff expressed concerns that the Office currently does not have the strategies, tools, capacity and financial resources to meet all the expectations associated with its commitments to mainstreaming priority issues in the OMP 2018-21.** Most of the staff positions for this work, as well as the work itself, are funded through extrabudgetary resources. This poses challenges for the continuity of staff and working capital to implement OHCHR's strategic priorities in these areas. The reliance on extrabudgetary support also means that OHCHR's work on cross-cutting priorities could become increasingly "projectised", based on donors' priorities and requirements.

#### PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

*Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability.*

OMP 2018-21 recognises that its operating model is constrained by OHCHR's limited authority over strategic direction and by the underlying human and financial resource management. OHCHR must comply with UN Secretariat-wide administrative systems, procedures and guidelines that reduce agility, and it is subject to uncertain and constrained funding volumes that limit effective resource allocation. In the political context in which OHCHR operates, it is challenging to systematically build "better" systems for the costing of management and development results. However, OHCHR has made progress towards transparency including in integrated work planning and budgeting and in reporting. It does not yet have a policy for criteria for allocating resources to partners and relies on a limited number of donors for voluntary contributions. Strengthening organisational governance, results-based management and accountability are key components of the OMP 2018-21. To address funding shortfalls, OHCHR is aiming to diversify funding sources through a recently developed fundraising strategy.



The operating model is not yet optimal. Efforts to re-align the organisational structure with strategic objectives have been ongoing since 2009 but have been impeded by cumbersome UN administrative systems and politicised decision-making. While OHCHR has a relatively centralised decision-making structure, it has stated its intent to increase decentralisation to support effectiveness in the field. OHCHR's staff are its main asset and are highly regarded by OHCHR's partners. Nearly half of staff are based in the field. One of the Office's key challenges lies in strengthening its staff presence at regional and country levels. Until recently, the approach to human resource management has not been systematic. For instance, while all posts are subjected to the same UN Secretariat rules in terms of recruitment, the process of establishing posts varies depending on the funding source. The OMP 2018-21 addresses this as one of nine organisational effectiveness priorities.

### KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility.

This KPI focuses on how key operational functions (e.g. human resources, resource generation and programming) are continuously geared to support strategic direction and deliver results.

**Resource availability for operational management is uncertain and constrained.** OHCHR receives funding from two sources: the UN regular budget and fundraising through donors. In 2017, the regular budget contribution constituted about 47% of OHCHR's total funding, with the remaining 53% raised directly from donors. UN regular budget funds are allocated for two-year periods. The human rights allocation from the regular budget is politicised, and there have been a number of reductions resulting from General Assembly decisions recently, including across-the-board reductions of between 5% and 25% in several budget lines. Non-continuation of voluntary contributions is a real and acknowledged risk, and OHCHR is also vulnerable to some member states' pushback against the human rights agenda and the associated objections to funding OHCHR from the UN regular budget. Compared to the other two pillars of the UN system (development and peace and security), OHCHR receives only a small percentage of funding from the UN regular budget. These funds are allocated to OHCHR's mandated functions. For 2018-19, its appropriation from the regular budget is USD 201.6 million, which amounts to 3.7% of the total UN regular budget. As a consequence, about 10% of OHCHR's officially mandated activities, which should be financed through its regular budget appropriation, are funded through voluntary contributions. Compared to its regular funding, OHCHR has far more authority for managing the pursuit of extrabudgetary resources.

OHCHR launches annual appeals to raise voluntary contributions from donors. However, the Office's fundraising efforts have struggled in a politically charged context, and its current resource mobilisation approach is regarded as insufficient. It has not been very successful in expanding its donor base beyond its "top 20 donors" – mainly UN member states, principally from the Western Group – that contribute more than 90% of all OHCHR's extrabudgetary funding. Recently, it has also seen a decrease in member states that become first-time donors, while 13 member states discontinued their funding in 2017. In 2016, support from private donors represented less than USD 1 million (0.8%) of its total income.

The *UN Human Rights Report 2017* acknowledges that "additional efforts will need to be deployed to establish additional partnerships with the private sector, foundations and individuals". Funding generated through humanitarian appeal processes decreased from USD 1.3 million in 2016 to USD 752,332 in 2017. OHCHR's fundraising aims to increase extrabudgetary funding – preferably multi-year, unearmarked funding. In reality, although the proportion of unearmarked funding in 2017 (43% of the total USD 142.8 million that was raised) increased compared to 2016 (38%), it was the fourth time since 2008 that the proportion of earmarked donor contributions surpassed unearmarked contributions.

**By OHCHR's own assessment, fundraising efforts are not well co-ordinated or coherent.** This often causes confusion for donors, particularly those who sometimes receive multiple requests for resources and without a clear sense of the Office's priorities. OHCHR acknowledges that its communication, overall, is not sufficiently crafted to "market" its work and that its core messages, for the most part, do not convey a compelling case for support. Discussions with member states on the regular budget are not systematically and consistently conducted at the global, regional and country levels, which may affect some member states' political support for the Office when regular budget resources are being decided. At the same time, OHCHR's internal processes are not sufficiently geared to take full advantage of decentralised resource mobilisation.

OHCHR's Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Resource Mobilisation (2018-21) outlines a concerted effort to address these challenges. It does so through extensive consultations and learning from past experience and in accordance with the recommendations from an audit by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) of OHCHR's

Fundraising Activities (June 2016). Through the Action Plan, OHCHR aims to increase voluntary contributions from non-traditional donors from 0.5% in 2017 to 15% in 2020. Over the same four-year period, it aims to increase the number of member states who make voluntary contributions from 63 to 100, and the number of “other (non-traditional) donors” from 14 to 30.

**OHCHR’s ability to allocate resources across agency functions, in line with its organisational priorities and goals, is constrained by various factors.** As part of the UN Secretariat, the Office has limited authority over human and financial resource management. In general, funding from the regular budget is not keeping pace with increases in the number and scope of new mandates adopted by the Human Rights Council. Also, the presentation of approved funding requirements for new mandates to the General Assembly are often delayed. OHCHR therefore has to rely on existing resources to cover new mandated activities until regular budget funding is released. Moreover, disruptions are caused by (1) UN Secretariat-wide reforms, including reform of the staff selection system and mandatory mobility (UN Mobility – now on hold); (2) the implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards; and (3) the roll-out of the UN Secretariat’s new enterprise resource planning system (Umoja).

**Initiatives to restructure the Office have been impeded by cumbersome UN administrative systems and politicised decision-making.** Efforts to align the organisational structure with strategic objectives started as early as 2009 but have only partly been implemented. OHCHR is finding it challenging to identify the right structure to manage and co-ordinate its activities across headquarters and its increasing field presence, in a situation where funding is constrained and where it has limited authority over the management of its resources. In 2013, motivated by the Secretary-General’s Change Plan, OHCHR adopted a programme of implementation to address internal alignment, operational effectiveness and the ability to respond flexibly to changing priorities. An Office-wide functional review was undertaken in 2014 to inform, among other things, the establishment of an improved organisational structure. In March 2015, OHCHR announced the High Commissioner’s “Change Initiative”, meant to make the Office better suited to contemporary challenges, more flexible, adaptable and responsive to member states’ requests and directives, and more relevant to the shifting opportunities for – and threats to – the advancement of human rights. It also aimed at addressing the finding of an OIOS evaluation that OHCHR representatives in the field have an inadequate grade level compared to other parts of the UN system, which limits their access in the context of policy-making and decision-making processes.

Some of the organisational restructuring initiatives proposed under the “Change Initiative” have been implemented. Geneva headquarters was re-structured from four divisions (Research and Right to Development Division, Human Rights Treaty Division, Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division, and Human Rights Council and Special Procedures Division) to three. The Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division was retained, and the remaining divisions were consolidated into the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division and the Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division. Other changes proposed under the “Change Initiative”, however, did not materialise. In particular, the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee has deferred the decision on bolstering OHCHR’s capacity in New York and in regional offices indefinitely. With no additional capacity at the New York office, OHCHR’s capability to mainstream human rights throughout the UN system will likely be affected negatively. Also, OHCHR’s regional offices will now likely remain small – and smaller than most country offices.

**OHCHR has a relatively centralised decision-making structure.** Compared to other entities of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR has limited delegation of authority for managing the funding it receives from the regular budget, as well as for managing staff positions funded through the regular budget. However, it has full delegated authority for the management of its trust funds, through which funding from extrabudgetary sources is channeled. Decision-making authorities and responsibilities pertaining to budgeting and financial resources management are spelled out in various internal documents. In 2016, the Terms of Reference of the Office’s main decision-making body on these matters, the Programme Budget and Review Board, which is chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner,


were revised. The revisions included adjustments to some of the processes and thresholds applicable to delegated authority, including increasing the authority of division directors and heads of managing entities to re-allocate and redeploy resources.

**Centralised financial management authority is partly the result of limited administrative capacity in OHCHR field offices.** OHCHR staff in the field regard the “administrative relationship” with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as relatively responsive and supportive, with OHCHR paying UNDP per-transaction fees based on the Universal Price List(s). But they also experience frustrations around the centralised financial management system within OHCHR, saying it discourages them from raising funds locally. Interestingly, the majority of OHCHR’s partners are very positive about the extent to which staff can make critical strategic or programming decisions at a local level.

**OHCHR has stated its intention to continue to delegate more authority to the field.** The OMP 2018-21 undertakes to bring “decision making closer to the point of delivery”. The OMP 2018-21 acknowledges that OHCHR needs to realign and reinforce its internal organisational arrangements to successfully deliver its commitments. Among other objectives, it undertakes to “enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of internal decision making to elevate further our focus on field operations, and bring decision making closer to the point of delivery”; and “enhance administrative and programmatic support to the entire Office, including field presences”. The OMP provides no further details.

**OHCHR’s recruitment processes for all posts follow UN Secretariat rules.** For staff positions funded through the regular budget, the UN Secretary-General’s initiative (ST/SGB/2016/2) to introduce a new staff selection process and a managed mobility system has been put on hold. This gives the High Commissioner greater authority over staff recruitment, while managers can also conduct recruitment. OHCHR manages the recruitment of temporary staff (appointments of up to 12 months) funded through the regular budget. Regular staff positions cover periods of more than 12 months (mostly one-year fixed-term positions that can be extended). The Office can recruit and select staff for such positions up to a D2 level, subject to the Secretary-General’s approval. All other administrative human resource management responsibilities are handled by the Secretariat, through the UN Office at Geneva. At the time of writing, it is unclear how the roll-out of the Global Service Delivery Model for the UN Secretariat will affect OHCHR’s authority over the management of its extrabudgetary resources and staff recruitment.

**Figure 2: Survey response – STAFF PERFORMANCE**



**OHCHR's human resource management is governed by UN Secretariat rules and procedures.** This limits OHCHR's ability to "benchmark organisational performance and set clear goals for its largest and most valuable resource: its people". Staff understand that OHCHR's position as part of the UN Secretariat comes with an administrative burden that limits the Office's ability to improve its human resource management, and they criticise the inefficient use of OHCHR's human resources and loss of expertise. They cited various examples: different contractual entitlements for contracted and temporary staff, although they do the same work and have the same responsibility; an enforced three-month "break" for temporary staff after two years in a position, during which time they are not allowed to work for OHCHR; the staff mobility system that "prevents new blood from coming in"; and a complicated, inequitable career advancement pathway for staff who enter OHCHR via a very competitive Young Professional Programme. These could further hinder plans to increase diversity, flexibility and efficiency in OHCHR's workforce.

**Improving human resource management, and talent management in particular, is one of nine organisational effectiveness action plans of the OMP 2018-21.** A major challenge lies in strengthening staff presence at regional and country levels – a key requirement for meeting OHCHR's strategic objectives across all six thematic pillars. OHCHR's partners generally have a very high regard for the expertise and continuity of staff, which dictate its capacity to work effectively at country level. However, in-country staff are overstretched and unable to respond to the growing demand for OHCHR's services and support from governments and other stakeholders.

#### **KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability.**

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
This KPI examines how OHCHR uses its external and internal control mechanisms to meet the standards it sets on financial management and transparency.

**Through its previous and current OMP development processes, OHCHR has made significant progress in establishing a common framework for planning and reporting its activities.** This has created greater coherence among its broad mandate, thematic priorities and field presences. There is a clear relationship between inputs (funding) and results, articulated and monitored through the Office's performance monitoring system. In its 2017 evaluation of OHCHR, OIOS found that "all of the 17 field presences reviewed had logical frameworks, most of which (14) were assessed as being of high quality". Some of the constructive features noted in such frameworks included clear and explicit links between resources, activities, outputs and expected accomplishments, and their alignment with broader organisational thematic priorities. In addition, most staff members who were interviewed believed such processes had improved, as all field offices now planned against a global set of expected accomplishments and results. They also regarded the performance monitoring system as a generally good planning and programming tool.

**OHCHR has made some progress in ensuring accountability.** One of the Global Management Outputs in the OMP 2014-17 articulated a commitment to the efficient management of the Office's financial (and human) resources. Systems have since been put in place to ensure integrated planning and budgeting (annual work plans and cost plans), as well as reporting. Strengthening organisational governance, results-based management and accountability is a key component of the OMP 2018-21 Organisational Effectiveness Action Plans.

**OHCHR is faced with unpredictable funding.** UN Human Rights appeal documents provide detailed breakdowns of costs to deliver on the OHCHR Management Plan. Because of the unpredictability and earmarking of extrabudgetary funding, OHCHR distinguishes between a core budget and a needs-based budget. The core budget outlines the resources the Office must have in order to implement its operating cost plans. The needs-based budget comprises the core budget plus funds OHCHR would need for new activities arising from requests and demands – including responding to emerging human rights priorities and emergencies. In the politicised context within which OHCHR operates, it is challenging to systematically build "better" systems for the costing of management and development results.

**Figure 3: Survey response – FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**



**OHCHR does not yet have a coherent and up-to-date statement or policy that articulates its criteria for allocating resources to partners.** These resources are allocated from different trust funds which are managed by OHCHR and fully funded from extrabudgetary resources. General guidance stipulates that grant funding must be used to support implementation of OHCHR’s approved work programme. Internally, criteria for allocating resources to partners are set out in OHCHR’s Field Administrative Manual and the Standard Operating Procedure for processing requests for the payment of grants and support to the Grants Committee (OHCHR/PSMS/13/07). This Standard Operating Procedure was last reviewed in 2012 and OHCHR has requested further amendments on two occasions.

**Grant funding criteria for partners are not always clear.** For partners, funding criteria are set out on OHCHR’s website in two guidance notes, as well as on different fund-specific pages and links. Not all the trust funds that are dealt with in the guidance notes are still active, and newer trust funds are not mentioned. The majority of OHCHR’s partners are not familiar with OHCHR’s criteria for allocating financial resources, or they regard them as inadequate. They have the same opinion of OHCHR’s provision of reliable information on the timing and amounts of financial allocations and disbursement.

**As part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR is subject to annual external audits by the UN Board of Auditors (BoA). The Annual BoA audit report is published for Volume 1 of the UN Secretariat Financial Statements, and OHCHR is included in that report.** OHCHR’s internal audits are conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing and with OHCHR’s Standard Operating Procedure (OHCHR/PSMS/13/07) to the Grants Committee for processing requests for the payment of grants and support. Reports of these internal audits of various OHCHR functions and management units are available on the website of OIOS, which “owns” the audit reports and decides on their publication.

**OHCHR takes audits seriously and follows up on them.** The focal point for all audits is the Chief of Programme Support and Management Services who updates the Programme Budget and Review Board if appropriate. All OIOS audits and evaluations that were reviewed included a management response and a clear assignment of responsibility to an individual, as well as a date for implementing recommendations. The level of priority for dealing with recommendations was also indicated. During the 2014-17 period, OHCHR implemented over 85% of critical and important audit recommendations.

**OHCHR has taken measures to raise staff awareness on anti-fraud and anti-corruption.** The UN Secretariat Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework applies to OHCHR. It states clearly that combating fraud and corruption is a primary responsibility of staff, including management, as well as a responsibility that the Secretariat also applies to its

relationships with third parties. Guidance for staff to report issues of concern is set out in the UN Secretariat document “Unsatisfactory conduct, investigations and the disciplinary process”, as well as in the Secretariat’s Guidebook on Ethics. OIOS has a dedicated hotline where cases may be reported in a confidential manner. The UN Secretariat is obliged to protect the confidentiality of those reporting alleged cases of fraudulent acts, and it has a policy in place to protect “whistleblowers”. Staff training and awareness raising on the UN Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework is done through its human resources portal Inspira.

In addition, in 2016 the UN Ethics Office’s Leadership Dialogues focused on fraud awareness and prevention. All managers in the Secretariat were required to host a one-hour dialogue session with staff who report directly to them. The dialogues cascaded down from heads of departments and missions through direct reports until all managers had engaged their staff in a Leadership Dialogue. Final staff participation statistics had to be submitted to the Ethics Office.


Every year, executive or administrative officers must report all cases of presumed fraud, in writing and in confidence, to the Department of Management for onward reporting to the UN Board of Auditors. This process is in accordance with the UN Standard Operating Procedure on Reporting of Cases of Fraud and Presumption Fraud to the Board of Audits (2016). These annual reports must include updates on all pending cases that were conveyed in the previous year, as well as actions taken.

OHCHR sends information about suspicions of financial or procurement fraud to OIOS for appropriate action. The verified details from OIOS are given to the Department of Management. A report on presumptive fraud from OHCHR’s Chief of Programme Support and Management Service to the Department of Management was reviewed for this assessment.

## PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results.*

OHCHR’s expanding mandate is very comprehensive, and its workload is growing rapidly. Its resources do not keep pace with growing demands at headquarters and in the field. OHCHR works in partnership with a wide range of stakeholders both as an objective in itself and as a means to an end. Partnerships are core to the UN agenda and also an effective way to build a stronger constituency to protect and promote human rights, and to avoid the Office being perceived as an outlier. The notion of working in partnership is engrained in the Office’s and staff’s culture. Many of the existing partnerships have grown organically and pragmatically. However, not all are equally strategic, and new partnerships will become necessary in view of the emerging challenges. The Office does not yet have a partnership strategy but will develop one in the context of the OMP 2018-21.



In terms of programming, OHCHR's activities are closely aligned with national priorities and informed by thorough and ongoing analysis of the local context. Gender equality is a longstanding priority, and the Office has developed guidance and templates to support gender-sensitive programming. A "good governance" perspective is more implicitly applied. Environmental sustainability is not a core competence, but may become one in view of the effects of climate change on the human rights of beneficiaries. Institutional bottlenecks exist and affect the speed of delivery. Some of these bottlenecks emanate from OHCHR's membership of the UN Secretariat and are beyond the organisation's control; others are internal and have been or continue to be dealt with from within.

#### **KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships.**


This KPI focuses on the scope and robustness of OHCHR's processes and practice in support of timely, flexible and responsive planning and intervention design for partnerships.

**OHCHR works with international human rights mechanisms and bodies in developing and monitoring human rights standards, while contributing to national efforts to bring about the legislative, institutional and behavioural changes required to implement those standards on the ground.** The OMP 2018-21 aims to strengthen the link between the results and activities of human rights mechanisms to support their implementation in the field. To that effect, OHCHR seeks to further expand its field presence, especially its own stand-alone offices. It also aims to further engage locally in technical co-operation programmes with a variety of stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other international organisations including non-government organisations). OHCHR sees the role of civil society as both a contributor and a monitor of progress as crucial. Expanding civic space, one of the Office's six thematic pillars, is therefore pivotal to the successful implementation of the human rights mechanisms' recommendations.

Establishing and maintaining an OHCHR country presence is contingent on an explicit request from member states' governments, UN Resident Coordinators and/or peace operations. The Office deliberately aims to align its priorities with national strategies and policies as much as possible. Most field presences are small in terms of staffing and budget. OHCHR works closely with national and international stakeholders to bolster human rights mainstreaming and to strengthen in-country human rights capacity, as well as also for pragmatic purposes.

**All types of OHCHR interventions are informed by a deep analysis of human rights conditions and their deeper-lying causes and effects.** Until recently, guidelines for operations and interventions in the field seemed to lack the necessary robustness. OHCHR's regional and country programmes appear to be well-rooted in context analysis; however, risk management is perceived mostly in terms of contextual trends and developments and of their impact on the human rights conditions, and less so in terms of risks to OHCHR itself (i.e. political, reputational and institutional risks). The Office has not always routinely undertaken thorough capacity analyses of partner organisations (or itself), nor has it always developed appropriate mitigation strategies. Capacity assessments and risk management have only recently been included in corporate guidance for country and regional programming.

**Of the cross-cutting issues listed in KPI 2, gender equality has been a longstanding priority for OHCHR.** The Office has developed various forms of guidance and templates to support staff in analysis, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Gender equality is the only cross-cutting issue that is mentioned explicitly in OHCHR's planning guidelines and templates and for which an analysis is required as part of the programming cycle. In 2014, OHCHR issued its Gender Equality Strategic Plan to be used by all staff members at headquarters and in field presences. This plan coincides with the Global Management Output 3 of the OMP for 2014-17: "A gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes". OHCHR has also developed a tool for integrating gender analysis into human rights monitoring. In the latest iterations of corporate guidance for planning

**Figure 4: Survey response – OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND INTERVENTION DESIGN**

and reporting at activity level, staff must indicate whether or not gender equality is the main objective of the activity. This compulsory action is part of the design and approval procedure.

**Intervention designs do not explicitly require an analysis of good governance or environmental sustainability issues.** However, it can be argued that compliance with protection of human rights, including prevention of human rights abuses, is a core good governance issue and justifies OHCHR interventions to strengthen the institutional human rights capacity of government and civil society stakeholders. Environmental sustainability is not among the Office's core competencies. However, in the OMP 2018-21, environmental degradation and climate change now feature as one of the so-called frontier issues.

**Sustainability of results lies at the heart of OHCHR's programme.** Both OMPs are geared towards strengthening national and international protection systems for human rights. The results framework is based on goals and objectives to which the Office contributes, in order to address gaps in national protection systems identified by human rights mechanisms. OHCHR's pillar strategies in the OMP 2018-21 identify priority areas where sustainable results are sought. These include increasing compliance by member states with international human rights standards and improving the adoption of a human rights-based approach in development in the context of the SDGs and peacekeeping. In this sense, sustainability is a cross-cutting objective in all OHCHR's operations. Regional and country offices aim to build lasting capacity of institutions – governmental as well as non-governmental. They carry out capacity-building technical assistance programmes and other interventions to improve and protect all human rights for all.

OHCHR's contributions to UNCTs and peacekeeping operations are more indirect. They seek in the first instance to contribute to the inclusion and development of human rights-based approaches in a given country. However, the limited evidence available from external evaluations suggests that critical aspects of sustainability of the intervention are not always explicitly included in the design stages. External evaluations also point to the challenges involved, such as (1) the complex and oftentimes challenging realities on the ground; (2) the fact that progress in the field of human rights is a long-term matter; (3) the lack of adequate human and financial resources to sustain an intervention (most projects and programmes in the field are covered by unpredictable extrabudgetary funding); and (4) inadequate intervention design.

**Institutional bottlenecks exist, some of which are beyond the Office's control.** A large part of OHCHR's headquarters-based activities and interventions involves ongoing support of the Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, special procedures mandate holders and more. The workload and "implementation speed" are determined by the growing demand from and the meeting calendar of the human rights bodies, member states, the UN Secretariat and General Assembly. The agenda is not set by OHCHR, and there are no pre-determined benchmarks or operating standards for any of these activities and interventions. As far as field interventions are concerned, the Office benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation against the originally approved plans, monitors implementation progress monthly and makes whatever corrections the situation requires. In its annual reports, OHCHR captures progress against expected accomplishments. Some expected accomplishments listed in the four-year OMP have been adjusted to meet new realities. The assessment team perceives the overall performance against stated objectives as satisfactory.

**In 2014, the Office identified eight Global Management Objectives to improve its organisational efficiency and effectiveness, and it claims to have made great strides since then.** According to corporate annual reports, OHCHR has met between 80% and 97% of its objectives. This seems to suggest that internal institutional bottlenecks hindering the speed of implementation have to a large extent been overcome. Besides OHCHR's self-reporting, there is little external evidence available to either support or challenge these findings.

**External assessments pointed to institutional bottlenecks, including slow deployment of staff, Secretariat rules and regulations that are not fit-for-purpose, and the prerequisite to work via the UN Office at Geneva and UNDP.** Few external assessments addressed the timeliness of delivery, and those that did showed mixed results. The Regional Office for Central Asia evaluation was positive about OHCHR's speedy deployment in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province, through which it was able to play a critical role in conflict management and prevention. In contrast, the human rights advisors (HRAs) evaluation was very critical of the long period between demand and supply of HRAs to join UN country teams (up to 24 months), a concern shared by the OIOS. The UN Joint Investigative Unit also highlighted constraints in human and financial management, and resource constraints, that negatively affect the development and use of a rapid response and deployment mechanism.

#### **KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources.**

This KPI looks at how OHCHR engages in partnerships to maximise the effect of its investment resources and its wider engagement.

**Partnerships are fundamental to the delivery of OHCHR's mandate.** As part of its mission statement, OHCHR commits itself to working in close partnership with numerous stakeholders at the global, regional, national and local levels, within and outside both the UN system and government. Partnership work is spread throughout the Office, and its operational staff regularly work with a range of partners on a day-to-day basis. OHCHR's unique mandate could bring significant value to its partnerships, but it is a politicised mandate which requires considerable prudence and diplomacy in the Office's engagement with partners.

**OHCHR engages in different and dynamic ways with a wide range of partners.** OHCHR's mandated partners are the governments of the countries where it operates and national human rights institutions. Other partners include UN member states, civil society organisations, the private sector, foundations, regional and international organisations, UN Secretariat departments, and UN peace missions, agencies, funds and programmes.

Among these, the private sector, foundations and philanthropists are emerging as potentially important OHCHR partners, mainly as donors. However, OHCHR also brings value to private sector partnerships by helping address industry-related human rights issues, for example digital human rights in the information and communication technology sector.

**OHCHR has found innovative ways to work with the private sector, foundations and philanthropists.** The Office engages in collaborative working relationships with these organisations and funds a relatively small number of organisations and individuals for specific purposes. These funds come from extrabudgetary resources, which gives OHCHR more authority to manage partnerships established in this way, compared to partnerships related to its mandated work.

In addition, the Office co-operates with the international human rights machinery to address global human rights issues. The Office contributes to developing, strengthening and monitoring standards and capacity for the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with international norms. The Office participates in inter-agency networks, co-leads several thematic inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms, chairs and leads the work of the Working Group on Protecting Human Rights and the Rule of Law While Countering Terrorism and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism, and co-chaired the UNDG in 2014.

Outside the United Nations, OHCHR collaborates with many other partners. These include the Organisation of African Unity, the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation of American States, the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, the United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, and the Andean Commission of Jurists. As an example of such collaboration, OHCHR and the OSCE have a joint office in Abkhazia (Georgia) for the purpose, among other things, of implementing a technical co-operation project.

**OHCHR's relationship with other UN agencies is particularly important at global, regional and country levels.**


At the global level, OHCHR's relationship with some of these other agencies has at times proven sensitive, with agencies hesitant to champion human rights for fear of jeopardising their relationship with host governments. Due to the power dynamics that play out in the General Assembly, it struggles to get traction compared to the other two UN pillars. Not all member states – or UN agencies – see OHCHR's work as helpful to their agendas. Moreover, even within the UN system, OHCHR is not always present at the table in important committees, either because of limited staff capacity or because it is not invited or allowed to participate.

At the country level, OHCHR works with UN country teams and peacekeeping and special political missions to meet their human rights responsibilities. Close co-operation is particularly significant with UNDP, based on the memorandum of understanding in force between the two agencies. According to the OHCHR website, the Office is currently undertaking an Office-wide assessment to determine how to enhance its operational support to UN country teams that are integrating human rights into their Common Country Analysis and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

**OHCHR's close working relationships with UN agencies are not without challenges.** These relationships can become strained due to competition for limited donor support. In addition, some UN agencies do not want to be seen to be working closely with OHCHR because it could affect their access to governments and interfere in their relationships with donors.

**Despite the prominence of partnerships in OHCHR's daily work, and being acclaimed for the unique and critical role it plays in the field, until recently the Office did not have an overarching partnership strategy clearly conveying its value proposition to partners.** The Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan on Partnerships (2018-21) that was developed as part of the current OMP (2018-21) provides timely guidance to address this gap and allows the Office to take greater advantage of potential synergies with existing and new partners in a systematic and strategic manner. This is complemented by the Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan on External Communications (2018-21).

**Figure 5: Survey response – PARTNERSHIPS**



**OHCHR's systems enable agile responses to contextual developments.** OHCHR has systems and institutional procedures in place that enable managers at all Office levels to make programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change. All Country Plans must include risk assessment and management plans, which require staff to monitor the context and keep track of changes. During the 2014-17 planning period, OHCHR strengthened the effectiveness of rapid response operations, humanitarian planning processes, the allocation of grants to implementing partners on the ground and the streamlining of administrative processes. This resulted in 75% of grants and funds being allocated to local organisations within two weeks of submitting their applications.

**OHCHR's partners highly value its ability to adapt or amend interventions swiftly in response to contextual changes.** OHCHR staff generally believe that current systems and procedures are robust and allow sufficient – if not always swift enough – flexibility to re-prioritise and plan its work and engagement with partners. Anything more stringent could interfere with how they implement OHCHR's mandate. The Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Partnerships (2018-21) commits OHCHR to developing “friendly” rules and procedures by which to identify and manage partnerships.

**OHCHR makes significant investments in strengthening country systems.** These include justice systems, child welfare systems and national protection systems. Due to its unique mandate, it cannot work through or use country systems in ways that other development agencies would be encouraged to do. It monitors the contribution of its investments to strengthening country systems, as demonstrated by reporting against the expected accomplishments in its OMP 2014-17.

**OHCHR currently has not announced how it will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment and Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review statement, but this should be seen in the context of its unique mandate and the ways of working this requires.** At the country level, OHCHR's close relationships with UNDP and UN country teams provide opportunities for leveraging and influencing both national planning and joint country-level planning

processes through participating in UNDAFs, as well as the Common Country Analyses that inform UNDAFs. OHCHR's participation and inputs to these processes help to co-ordinate its work with that of other UN agencies. However, independent evaluations identify challenges around OHCHR's reluctance to prioritise; they express concerns that the Office often spreads its resources too thinly and duplicates what other organisations are already doing. OHCHR's partners highly value its ability to prioritise working in partnerships as part of its business practice. However, being bound by UN Secretary regulations, OHCHR does not have the authority to commit funds to a joint programme, to use joint work plans instead of separate agency work plans or to substitute the joint UN report for its annual country report. For the same reason, it can only subscribe partially to the UNDG Standing Operating Procedures for "Delivering as One".

**OHCHR is transparent in terms of public access to accurate information on its strategies, planning documents, budgeting and management information.** OHCHR is not a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). It is not clear whether the Office's mandate and the nature of its work exempt it from membership.

**OHCHR considers accountability as a key obligation of duty bearers.** OHCHR does not have explicit standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries in ways development and humanitarian agencies do, but this should also be seen from the perspective of its unique mandate. Its end beneficiaries are all rights-holders. It works with governments, civil society and citizens or affected populations (as beneficiaries) to establish human rights compliant institutional frameworks that strengthen the accountability of those who have obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law towards rights-holders. As such, all OHCHR's work, guidance, training and tools aim to strengthen governments' accountability to uphold, protect and promote the rights of citizens and of any specific affected groups, as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

**OHCHR is mandated to provide support to the systematic monitoring of and reporting on compliance by member states with their human rights obligations.** It supports the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process which involves reviewing the human rights records of all UN member states. The UPR is a co-operative, state-driven process under the auspices of the Human Rights Council. It provides the opportunity for each state to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations. Currently, no other universal mechanism of this kind exists.


**OHCHR sees knowledge generation as a core responsibility.** It produces an extensive range of information, training and education materials on a variety of topics related to human rights (including the Professional Education and Training Materials Series). These are designed for its staff, as well as for external audiences such as governments, HRIs, civil society, the general public and the media. These materials are available at the OHCHR Library in Geneva, as well as through an online library. OHCHR staff also distribute a large amount of documents and materials in the field. According to OHCHR's 2016 annual report, 250 000 publications and materials promoting human rights were distributed around the world from headquarters and field presences. The majority of OHCHR's staff and partners regard OHCHR's knowledge products as excellent and highly useful for their work.

The 2016 Joint Investigation Unit's report on knowledge management recommended that OHCHR develop a knowledge management strategy and take incremental steps to embed knowledge management skills and knowledge-sharing abilities in staff performance. In response, Dynamic Knowledge is now one of the nine organisational effectiveness action plans of the OMP 2018-21. It focuses mainly on strengthening knowledge management within OHCHR.

**PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and to using performance information, including evaluation and lesson learning.*

OHCHR is strongly committed to a results culture, driven from the top down by its leadership and applied consistently within the Office. Resources have been invested to develop and upgrade OHCHR’s own bespoke corporate results-based management (RBM) system, which is more fit-for-purpose than the UN Secretariat systems. Corporate-level strategies are based on a sound RBM focus and logic; they guide lower-level planning, reporting and RBM approaches. Past performance data, generated internally through monitoring mechanisms and externally through external reviews and evaluations, inform planning and decision-making. Progress to professionalise the evaluation function has been made, following the release of OHCHR’s first evaluation policy in 2014. The number and quality of evaluations is gradually increasing, and mechanisms are in place to ensure that results are shared within the Office. However, the evaluation function does not yet meet all United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) standards and has few staff, and the available budget for centralised evaluations is still low.




**KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function.**

This KPI looks at how OHCHR transparently interprets and delivers an organisation-wide focus on results.

OHCHR’s online performance monitoring system (PMS) forms the basis for strategic and operational decision-making and is updated and refined regularly. Use of the PMS software is compulsory and applied consistently. Decisions on resource allocation are informed by, and made contingent on, compliance with RBM processes.

**The new OMP reiterates the strategic importance of a strong results focus for OHCHR.** Although the PMS is well-regarded by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), further work is needed. The Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan 2018-21 states that OHCHR will keep on developing and improving its RBM tools, continue investing in monitoring and evaluation functions, revamp its RBM capacity development strategy, and reinforce learning and accountability.

**OHCHR’s RBM system is principally designed to link planning, monitoring and budgeting of annual work and cost plans to the overarching four-year OMP strategy’s expected accomplishments at the outcome level, and to global management objectives.** In doing so, it informs the biennial strategic framework planning and reporting process. It also allows for consistent evidence-based monitoring and reporting on the achievement of results, from project to country and corporate levels. The data generated through the PMS in turn inform mid-term reviews at all levels, including OMP adjustments where necessary. Conversely, the Strategic Framework planning and reporting process does not allow for such flexibility.

**Figure 6: Survey response – RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT**

**Corporate-level strategies are guided by an overarching theory of change, which forms the basis for all corporate-level outcomes.** At the time of the MOPAN review, the theory of change in the OMP 2018-21 was less explicit than its predecessor about how the activities carried out under the six thematic pillars will contribute to the results. Given OHCHR's mandate, size and reach, as well as the type of activities it undertakes, many of the performance indicators identified are necessarily qualitative and focus on contribution, not attribution. The selected indicators at corporate and operational levels are relevant to the expected results. They have been formulated in ways that enable qualitative and quantitative progress measurement and cost-effectiveness. Given the oftentimes political context, agility to respond to changing circumstances is necessary, and this is reflected in the RBM.

**OHCHR's monitoring systems are of a high quality and are effectively used to inform management decisions.** Reporting structures are coherent, time-bound and include field-level monthly monitoring reports, six-monthly mid-year reports, end of cycle reports and end-of-year progress reports. These present achieved global targets, planned vs. achieved results, implementation status, activities performed, mid-year expenditure and other financial data. At headquarters level, various staff ensure data quality when reviewing plans and reports, checking for consistency and logic, as well as for substantive quality. The end-of-year progress report guidelines include an element of quality assurance by integrating a review process. The reporting structures constitute an integral part of OHCHR's management information system. They inform changes to plans and budgets, provide details on subsequent planning and budgeting cycles, and enable decision-making throughout the Office.

**Significant efforts have been made to base planning and programming on performance data.** Assessments of past performance are an obligatory part of the RBM process. Equally important is the fact that planning, costing and reporting are integrated components. Projected targets (at activity, output and outcome levels) are presented in the mid-year and annual reports; updates, revisions and deletions are required in subsequent annual work and cost plans on the basis of actual performance against those targets. The performance monitoring system is designed in such a way that actual performance informs mid-year and mid-term reviews, as well as the next planning and budgeting cycle(s). OHCHR Management reviews corporate performance data at least once every six months. A full review and/or revision of the OMP takes place every two years, based on progress against corporate objectives, context analysis and financial resources data. Partners realise the complexity in which OHCHR operates; however, despite the high quality of OHCHR's RBM and performance monitoring systems, the Office faces challenges to convince some partners how it contributes to higher-level results. Results are seldom clear-cut and are prone to interpretation.


**KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming.**

This KPI focuses on the evaluation function, its positioning within OHCHR structures, attention to quality, accountability and putting learning into practice.

**OHCHR has only recently begun to build an evaluation function of its own.** This is partly because, as a member of the UN Secretariat, in the past the Office would rely on the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services. The OIOS’ capacity was limited and placed more emphasis on reviews and audits than on evaluations. In 2014, OHCHR established its own evaluation unit as part of the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Service (PPMES). That same year, it published its first evaluation policy, drawing on common UNEG principles and approaches. The evaluation function’s financial and human resources are modest, with only one full-time evaluation officer and 0.5 full-time equivalent senior monitoring and evaluation officer; the biennial budget in 2014-15 was approximately USD 1 million. The evaluation function is not yet fully independent from other management functions.

**The launch of OHCHR’s evaluation policy marks an important step forward.** Based on international standards and norms, the policy sets out implementation guidance to ensure that evaluation becomes an integral part of (field) operations and that findings inform decision-making at the policy and strategy levels. The biennial evaluation plans concur with the principles set out in the policy, and distinguish between strategic and decentralised evaluations, in accordance with overall priorities. Judging by the evaluations undertaken, the policy guidelines are being applied, with increasingly active engagement of PPMES evaluation staff in all phases of the evaluation cycle. Quality assurance is carried out, although a formal quality assurance process has not yet been established.

**Figure 7: Survey response – IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF EVALUATIONS**



**Still, OHCHR does not yet have an “evaluation culture”.** Although the number of centralised and decentralised evaluations commissioned by OHCHR itself during the period under review increased, it remains low. In order to build a constituency within the Office in favour of learning and reflection, PPMES has adopted a highly consultative approach. The evaluation function does not yet enjoy full structural independence, as the Senior Management Team has more than its intended custodianship responsibility. Evaluation staff provide methodological guidance to ad hoc “quasi-audits” of field offices.

**Serious efforts are being made to foster a learning culture internally.** Increasingly, evaluation results are shared and discussed with directors and staff at the senior and operational levels and fed into new policy and programming cycles. Management responses are obligatory and dealt with professionally, although not all are published on the website. PPMES monitors implementation of the action plans flowing from these management responses on a six-monthly basis and reports to senior management on progress.

**Lessons learned from evaluations have been pulled together to inform the development of the OMP 2018-21 and country programmes, whereas tracking of poor performance of operational activities is carried out through the PMS system.** Most evaluations have been published on OHCHR and UNEG websites. However, OHCHR does not yet disseminate evaluation findings systematically and consistently among its donors, peers and stakeholders.

## 2.2. DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

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### PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS


*Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way.*

There is only a limited body of evidence available to assess OHCHR's performance on results. Consequently, the assessment and analysis of the Office's effectiveness, efficiency and in particular its sustainability, based on independent evaluations, is necessarily shallow.

All evaluations underscored OHCHR's relevance and its critical and unique role in protecting and promoting human rights. They pointed out the importance of its field presences in supporting member states to fulfil their commitments to meet and report on progress against international human rights standards and mechanisms. Notably, OHCHR's strategies to strengthen gender equality were evaluated positively.

At the same time, the combination of a broad and expanding mandate with only limited resources obliges OHCHR to continually strike a balance between direct and indirect interventions, working with and through partners to mainstream human rights and empower others to incorporate human rights into their policies, strategies and activities. In such a situation, measuring and attributing results – or the lack thereof – to OHCHR, whether at the global, national or local level, is both difficult and contentious considering the many other variables and dynamics involved.

OHCHR's self-reporting of its achievements against global corporate objectives demonstrates satisfactory to highly satisfactory levels of results performance. The 2017 Annual Report provides an overview of achievements against targets for each of the 11 global expected accomplishments, for the entire implementation period of the OMP 2014-17. These results were generated through OHCHR's performance monitoring system, which the review team assessed as an effective system. Although it was not possible to validate these on the basis of independent evaluations, the review team is confident that the results are based on sound, internally generated evidence.



**KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals.**

This KPI examines the nature and scale of the results OHCHR is achieving against the targets it sets and its expectations on making a difference.

**Evaluations highlighted the following key achievements in this area:**

- strong support of field presences in relation to standards and mechanisms
- enhanced engagement of civil society organisations and UN country teams in human rights mechanisms
- modest increase in ratification of human rights treaties by member states
- extremely effective and timely performance of the Regional Office for Central Asia in the country of residence, with a positive influence on the creation of national human rights structures
- effective achievement of results in assistance to national human rights institutions
- effective in-country implementation with direct, tangible results
- effective contribution to global and national objectives through the work of human rights advisors
- achievement of regional-level results on gender equality.

**Evaluations also separately raised concerns.** Some related to inadequate human resource management, an inability to secure timely funding and insufficient support from Resident Coordinators for mainstreaming human rights. They all point to gaps in the geographical coverage of OHCHR field presences and the delivery of its protection mandate, which impact negatively the Office's ability to deliver results effectively.

**The evidence base on the achievement of results for OHCHR's intended target groups is limited to field-level evaluations.** According to the evaluations undertaken, OHCHR succeeded in meeting the needs and expectations of the target groups, at the national as well as local levels, with one exception: the evaluation of the impact of technical assistance and capacity building on the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded that it was unclear how and to what extent OHCHR's substantial human rights programme had contributed to better protection of target groups. Considering the local complexities and challenges, this is not surprising.

**The extent to which OHCHR's interventions contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes could not be ascertained.** Only in the evaluation of National Human Rights Institutions was this issue addressed. The evaluators recognised that national human rights institutions are often the weakest in countries where change is most needed – and where political support and adherence to human rights protection is lacking. This was the case of the evaluation of OHCHR's support to national human rights institutions.

**Gender equality is an integral part of OHCHR's thematic priority to enhance equality and counter discrimination.** The Office has also made gender equality an important part of external and self-evaluations. Evaluations are positive about the Office's efforts to integrate gender perspectives in its work and that of its partners. They also point to a lack of overarching strategic direction and clarity, of impact measurement, and of adequate resourcing. More is needed to effectively and more systematically mainstream gender equality. The evidence on the contribution of OHCHR's interventions to good governance shows a mixed picture: on the one hand, well-calibrated support to national institutions; on the other, a need for a more strategic orientation and stronger presence on the ground. Evidence on OHCHR's contribution to environmental stability is too limited to draw any conclusions.

#### **KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate.**

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This KPI centres on the relevance of OHCHR's engagement given the needs and priorities of its partner countries and its results focus.

**All evaluations covered in this performance assessment consider OHCHR's performance and independence as highly relevant.** They state that the Office adds value with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights in the countries and regions in which it operates and that it demonstrates its relevance by largely meeting the needs and expectations of its stakeholders in the field. The Office has effectively supported countries in fulfilling their commitments to international human rights standards and mechanisms but has provided more limited support to member states in following up on recommendations. National human rights institutions are seen as a fundamental pillar in national human rights protection mechanisms, and OHCHR is credited with having contributed to their growth and influence. The same is said about OHCHR's effort to further the mainstreaming of human rights and gender equality.

**Various factors – internal and external – are said to hamper OHCHR's delivery capabilities.** The evaluations point to the long-term nature of human rights promotion and protection. They identify various factors that hamper the Office's ability to implement its mandate independently and sustainably. These include its governance structure, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and gaps in coverage of field offices and in funding. But external factors also play a role, such as the level of commitment and support from other UN agencies and country teams.

**Comprehensive independent evaluations or reviews of the relevance of all aspects of OHCHR's work are lacking.** Although OHCHR publishes information about the outputs and outcomes of its support to human rights mechanisms in its annual reports, independent external evaluations thereof are lacking. The evaluations available are either thematic, sectorial or project-based.

#### **KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently.**

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This KPI looks at the extent to which OHCHR is meeting its own aims and standards on delivering results efficiently.

**Despite noticeable progress in strategic and operational leadership, in results-based management and in performance monitoring, inefficiency remains a structural challenge for the Office.** Evaluations find that inefficiencies originate from various sources, including the following:

- the UN Secretariat's bureaucratic systems and structures (as part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR is subject to its accountability, governance and oversight structure, including its human resource and administrative processes)
- centralised decision-making as opposed to delegation of authority to field offices
- lack of project implementation experience
- co-ordination shortcomings
- inconsistent decision-making
- the use of two parallel planning processes, strategy documents and performance monitoring systems.

**In its management responses OHCHR acknowledges these shortcomings** and has addressed some of them in the areas it controls, as it continues to plan for improved organisational efficiency, including regional restructuring.

#### **KPI 12: Results are sustainable.**

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
This KPI looks at the degree to which OHCHR successfully delivers results that are sustainable in the longer term.

**Based on the few independent external evaluations, assessing OHCHR's overall contribution to sustainable improvements in the promotion and protection of all human rights for all is not feasible.** There is a lack of robust evidence, and even interim conclusions about the sustainability of the results to which the Office has contributed cannot yet be drawn from the evidence available. Although a key part of OHCHR's mandate and programmes concern long-term capacity building for implementation, independent evidence is scant.

**At the institutional level, OHCHR is seen as having contributed positively to the sustainability of national human rights institutions.** It has done so by deepening partnerships with UNDP and the tripartite relationship between UNDP, OHCHR and the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, by productively engaging with civil society organisations, by encouraging national human rights institutions and by contributing to international human rights mechanisms. OHCHR has developed a conceptual and methodological framework for human rights indicators. This supports the adoption of a structured and consistent approach for translating universal human rights standards into indicators that are useful at country level.

**The evaluation of the Regional Gender Advisor structure cautions that institutional sustainability will suffer should short-term budget planning by donors and OHCHR itself continue to be the norm.** OHCHR should develop contingency plans during periods of unstable funding and staffing to ensure continuity.

**OHCHR positions itself as a key contributor to sustainable development.** Integral to OHCHR’s mandate and its overarching theory of change, described in the OMP 2014-17, is the assumption that all its work is meant to strengthen an enabling environment for equitable development: As the entity in charge of implementing the human rights programme, the Office “plays a crucial role in safeguarding the integrity of the three interconnected pillars of the United Nations – peace and security, human rights, and development” (Annual Report 2015). This is illustrated in global, regional, and national plans and programmes, e.g. Human Rights Appeals 2016 and 2017, which include key references to OHCHR’s support to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Compared with its predecessor, the OMP 2018-21 is even more explicitly linked to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals set out in the 2030 Agenda. Nevertheless, none of the available external evaluations or assessments have considered these broader effects.





# 3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF OHCHR

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## Chapter 3. Overall performance of OHCHR

The performance conclusions first consider four key attributes of an effective organisation: (i) whether it understands future needs and demands; (ii) whether it is organised and makes use of its assets and comparative advantages; (iii) whether it has mandate-oriented systems, planning and operations; and (iv) whether it makes consistent developments according to its resource level and operational context.

Lastly, the assessment report presents the key findings: the observed strengths and areas for improvement.

### 3.1. CURRENT STANDING AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION

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#### Is OHCHR future facing?

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has demonstrated a strong commitment to its normative mandate as well as a proven ability to respond and adapt to emerging political, technological and socio-economic trends and policy developments. It has a clear and realistic understanding of the needs and demands it faces. Based on a comprehensive analysis of context, achievements, lessons learned, internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as broad consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, the Office has developed a clear and coherent strategy for the next four years. OHCHR has a strong corporate identity and sense of direction: it knows what it seeks to be and has set a clear course on how to get there. Its strategy is firmly anchored in the mandate of the organisation and is closely tied to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sustaining Peace Agenda and the UN Secretary-General's Reform Initiative.

The Office has set out a highly ambitious policy agenda, while appreciating that in the current political and organisational climate, circumstances have become more challenging. Politically, there is a growing tendency towards what the Office calls "antagonistic nationalism". The "security state" is back, and fundamental freedoms – i.e. the principles underpinning OHCHR's mandate – are in retreat. In this external environment, the space for the High Commissioner for Human Rights to voice and address concerns is at risk of shrinking. Its normative stance is not always well received by governments in member states, nor by some members in the international community; the latter fear that raising concerns about human rights violations might jeopardise their relationship with the member state governments. Others, especially advocacy groups, criticise OHCHR for not being vocal enough and for succumbing to the interests of others.

Thus, OHCHR faces perhaps a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, increasing demands to service the human rights mechanisms in Geneva and the mainstreaming of human rights at the corporate level in New York are absorbing most of its predictable funding. On the other hand, its role in supporting compliance with normative standards at the national and regional levels is increasingly perceived as a political issue. This has had consequences for the level of predictable resources it receives and for General Assembly involvement with practical, operational matters. Its status as a body of the UN Secretariat has also circumscribed its ability to make decisions on internal administrative and human resources systems and procedures that would enhance organisational efficiency and effectiveness.

#### Is OHCHR making best use of what it has?

An integral part of the two OHCHR management plans is an ambitious organisational effectiveness agenda. The Office spent four years investing in areas such as strategic leadership, results-based management and operations management and establishing an internal evaluation function. Its new strategy seeks to consolidate achievements in these areas while simultaneously improving on others, such as human resource management, external partnerships, resource mobilisation, knowledge management and innovation.

OHCHR's main asset is its staff, based in Geneva, New York and the field. Comprising more than half of the entire workforce, the headquarters in Geneva set policy, support Geneva-based human rights mechanisms, are the main interlocutor for external partners and field presences, and bear the ultimate responsibility for operations management. The much smaller office in New York is where most of the advocacy and mainstreaming of human rights protection and promotion within the UN system at the corporate level takes place. The remaining 45% of staff are spread across OHCHR's 12 regional offices, 14 country offices, 13 human rights components of peace missions, and 24 human rights advisors in UN country teams/human rights mainstreaming projects. With the exception of a few country offices (such as Colombia), OHCHR's field presences are relatively small in size and undergraded, compared to other UN agencies' field offices.

OHCHR's technical expertise is highly regarded within the UN system and beyond. The quality and depth of support provided to the human rights mechanisms is one example. Other examples often cited as adding unique value are the support both to member states in their efforts to comply with and implement international human rights standards and to national human rights institutions and civil society organisations, as well as the Office's knowledge products. They bring comparative advantages to the table that no other UN entity can offer in terms of detailed knowledge, convening power, broad networks and partnerships. OHCHR is widely acknowledged and respected as the lead agency on human rights globally. That said, successes are rarely interpreted positively by all stakeholders, and anecdotal examples were given where success eventually backfired on the organisation.

Being part of the UN Secretariat is an important asset. However, it also poses certain disadvantages, including what are considered heavy administrative procedures (e.g. relating to human resources, legal affairs, financial control, procurement and information technology). These limit OHCHR's agility, responsiveness and "partnership-friendliness" and are said to have fostered a risk-averse culture within the Office.

An important development has been the engendering of a corporate culture of learning and adapting. The process of developing the substantial organisational priorities and actions came about through a lengthy (12-month) process of consultations. These involved a large number of OHCHR's staff, over 100 member states, and 140 external partners from civil society, the private sector, philanthropists and the UN system. This has helped to foster staff ownership of the OHCHR Management Plan (OMP), as well as to strengthen transparency and accountability towards stakeholders.

Critically, OHCHR's organisational structure is insufficiently aligned with its corporate goals and strategies. A disproportionately high share of OHCHR's scarce staff and management resources are spent on the "production line" of Geneva-based activities in support of human rights mechanisms. While this is clearly a very important component of OHCHR's core mandate, the capacity needed to support the increased workload of treaty bodies and the Human Rights Council is eating into the Office's capability to support member states and other stakeholders to meet their obligations as duty bearers vis-à-vis rights holders in other ways. What is more, the number and size of field presences cannot keep pace with the growing needs and demands for OHCHR's expertise and support. There is a real risk that the results of OHCHR's valuable work in Geneva are insufficiently mainstreamed into policy and practice elsewhere, including the UN Headquarters in New York and UN country teams deployed in the field.

With a stronger focus on supporting and encouraging in-country compliance of human rights obligations, strengthening OHCHR's capacity in terms of both field presences and the Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division (FOTCD) at Geneva headquarters would seem logical. However, modest attempts to reallocate human resources from Geneva to regional offices and the office in New York have been stifled by the General Assembly, thereby hampering OHCHR's ability to contribute to meaningful results in important mandated areas.

### Is OHCHR a well-oiled machine?

OHCHR has made considerable effort to improve its internal systems, planning and operations. The Office has institutionalised contextual analysis as a prerequisite for planning and resource allocation decisions. There is a clear relationship between inputs and results, articulated and monitored through the Office's own performance monitoring system. Its bespoke results-based management (RBM) systems are robust and are implemented across the organisation. They serve as effective management information systems and inform decision-making at all levels, on a daily basis. The RBM systems are well-appreciated by staff and management and were credited by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for their quality and consistent use.

Areas for improvement remain, especially in relation to the following:

- streamlining accountability frameworks to overcome the onerous parallel planning and reporting systems
- managing human resources
- matching policy expectations and ambitions with operational capabilities (e.g. towards frontier issues like climate change and disruptive technology)
- delegating more responsibility to lower levels within the organisation
- strengthening project management (including enhanced capacity assessments of partner organisations, reputational risk management and sustainability aspects)
- clarifying the criteria for trust fund resource allocations for partners
- enabling decentralised resource mobilisation.

OHCHR acknowledges the need for improvement and has developed organisational effectiveness action plans to address some of these institutional bottlenecks. In doing so, OHCHR can become more creative, in part by making better use of opportunities that stem from being part of the UN Secretariat, such as the use of professional expert rosters. For others, it will need to stay closely aligned with ongoing UN system-wide reforms, feeding into these proactively and constructively, in order to influence relevant decisions.

The growing gap between its expanding mandate and stagnant funding hinders OHCHR's delivery capabilities. Its annual budget has remained more or less stable for some years now, although the mandate and corresponding responsibilities keep expanding. Contributions from the UN's regular budget are inadequate, and it is highly unlikely that these will increase, thus making the Office increasingly dependent on voluntary contributions. Funds for operational purposes are modest, often earmarked and for short periods, and quite unpredictable.

Partnerships are very much seen as core to the United Nations (UN) agenda, and as critical to OHCHR's delivery of results. Numerous examples were given to demonstrate this. Partnerships appear to have emerged organically, from the bottom up. The Office has now expressed a need for an overarching framework: a shared vision clarifying why, when and how the Office should partner with external actors, under what circumstances, and the messages it wants to convey internally and externally regarding its overall strategic intent with respect to partnerships. This corporate partnership framework is expected to allow the Office to take greater advantage of potential synergies with existing as well as new partners across the organisation. Developing and implementing a "partnership strategy" is one of the nine OMP 2018-21 organisational effectiveness action plans.

### Is OHCHR making a difference?

Determining to what extent OHCHR is actually delivering and demonstrating relevant and sustainable results in a cost-efficient way is particularly challenging for two reasons. First, the human rights conditions in a given context are both dynamic and systemic, determined as they are by a wide array of issues and political choices that lie well beyond OHCHR's limited sphere of influence. How can the impact of OHCHR's targeted interventions be determined, when so many other interventions occur simultaneously, especially in conflict situations where human rights suffer the most?

It would be unrealistic and unfair even to attribute changes in human rights conditions – positive and negative – to OHCHR's interventions. However, the effects of OHCHR's interventions (i.e. contributions to a desired outcome), not the outputs per se, are mostly long-term, intangible and qualitative, rather than short-term, quantitative and visible.

Second, the assessment team had at its disposal only seven evaluations and one review, of varying quality and scope, to assess OHCHR's performance on results during the period covered under this assessment. Furthermore, the available evidence focused exclusively on the field level, with only limited value for the assessment of results at a corporate level. OHCHR's own evaluation function and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) have not yet generated sufficient evidence to measure results at the corporate level. At the time of the MOPAN review, no independent evaluations could be found on OHCHR's achievements at the global level. This means that no independent evaluations or reviews are available of, for example, the vast set of activities on standard setting, monitoring and reporting carried out in the context of human rights mechanisms. Also, no independent analysis had yet been undertaken of OHCHR's contributions to the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals set out in the 2030 Agenda, despite this being a central part of the Office's strategy. Therefore, the independent analysis and assessment of the Office's effectiveness, efficiency and in particular its sustainability are unconvincing.

Still, the evaluations that are available do make a number of relevant observations. All independent evaluations underscored OHCHR's relevance and its critical and unique role in protecting and promoting human rights. They also cited the importance of its field presences in supporting member states to fulfil their commitments to meet and report on progress against international human rights standards and mechanisms and other results areas. Notably, OHCHR's strategies and contributions to strengthen gender equality were positively regarded, although shortfalls in resources were also highlighted. At the same time, the combination of a broad and expanding mandate with only limited resources obliges OHCHR to strike a balance between direct and indirect interventions. The Office works with and through partners to mainstream human rights and to empower others to incorporate human rights into their policies, strategies and activities.

All independent evaluations underscore the need for a robust field presence, with adequate coverage of all continents. They raise concerns about inadequate human resource management, an inability to secure timely funding and insufficient support from Resident Coordinators for mainstreaming. They also point to gaps in the geographical coverage of OHCHR field presences and the delivery of its protection mandate, which impact negatively on the Office's ability to deliver results effectively. Robust programmes on the ground are seen as critical for delivery of results but are hindered by OHCHR's lack of resources for field operations.

Competition for public and private resources between UN entities and other agencies, including human rights non-governmental organisations, is growing. This is a time when donors are increasingly demanding value for money and calling for tangible, visible results. Protecting and promoting human rights does not lend itself easily to this, making human rights a more challenging "sell" than other areas, e.g. humanitarian relief or vaccination campaigns. Because OHCHR often operates in challenging environments where its contributions do not always meet with approval, it may not achieve all of its intended outcomes. For some benefactors, this result may not be appealing enough, prompting their decision to stop funding the Office.

The Office's mandate prompts it to lead actions, often in emergencies, even if resources will not always permit it to do so. Moreover, success in one area requires follow-up actions in others. For example, endorsing country-level recommendations emanating from the Universal Periodic Review process necessitates supporting their implementation through capacity building, research and advocacy; these recommendations are often in their hundreds or even thousands (e.g. Mexico received more than 2 500 recommendations). Too often, OHCHR lacks the financial and human resources required to provide that much-needed support. In this regard, the proliferation of the mandate, while welcomed in principle, can also draw attention away from other, potentially more strategic, areas. These issues are

structural, and unless the UN and member states increase their contributions meaningfully, the Office will continue to be exposed in this regard.

### 3.2. PERFORMANCE JOURNEY

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This is the first time a MOPAN performance assessment of OHCHR was undertaken. Accordingly, without an appropriate and equally comprehensive baseline, it is difficult to give an accurate description of where the organisation stood across all five performance areas a few years ago. However, drawing from the OHCHR Management Plan (OMP) 2014-17, we can at least discern where the organisation wanted to be by the end of 2017, both in terms of corporate objectives (the expected accomplishments) and global management outputs. Building on the evidence obtained, we can therefore draw an impression of OHCHR's journey – thus far – on organisational performance.

Since its creation in 1993, the mandates and operational activities of OHCHR have grown rapidly. Consequently, its workload has evolved and now (1) comprises a broad range of secretariat, technical and analytical support and servicing to the multiple and complex institutional tiers of the UN human rights machinery; (2) identifies and responds to human rights challenges and emergencies; (3) acts as the principal focal point of human rights research, education, public information and advocacy; and (4) assists governments, civil society, other agencies (both UN and non-UN) and the private sector to help implement international human rights standards on the ground. In doing so, OHCHR has considerably expanded its field presence and its operational technical co-operation activities.

The increase in OHCHR's workload has not coincided with a proportionate growth in resources. Consequently, almost half of the Office's activities are now supported by voluntary contributions, the majority of which are earmarked for field-level operations. The expansion of OHCHR's mandate and activities have had obvious consequences in terms of its organisational structure, internal processes, resource requirements and positioning, as part of the UN Secretariat and vis-a-vis the General Assembly, other members of the UN system and external partnerships. Over the years, adjustments have been made, mostly organically.

A 2002 OIOS management review of OHCHR found a number of concerns practically identical to those highlighted in this MOPAN assessment. The review underscored the challenges involved in the multidimensional expansion of both the normative and operational elements of OHCHR's mandate. It also cited what was then deemed "the cardinal problem of a holistic implementation of the universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated doctrine of human rights". OIOS underlined three key priorities: first, reinforcing strategic direction to guide priority choices; second, aligning the organisational structure with the Office's priorities; and third, strengthening the capacity of executive management.

Since 2004, OHCHR's regular budget has almost tripled, from USD 67 million for the biennium 2004-05 to USD 215 million for 2016-17. Because of the shortfalls in regular budget allocations, voluntary funding allocations have increased considerably, peaking at USD 142.8 million in 2017. The share of unearmarked voluntary contributions grew steadily from 2002 until 2009, when it reached a maximum of 56% of total contributions received. In 2017, 43% of voluntary contributions were unearmarked.

#### **The OHCHR Management Plan 2014-17**

The OMP 2014-17 was OHCHR's first four-year corporate strategy document. The strategy, grounded in OHCHR's mandate and mission, envisioned OHCHR as "being a strong global leader and principled advocate for the full realisation of all the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". The OMP articulated the Office's priorities for 2014-17, based on a coherent organisation-wide theory of change. The theory of change, grounded in the UN human rights-based approach, articulated the Office's long-term goals and intermediate objectives, the strategic interventions, and the means through which those interventions would be taken.

Translating the OHCHR mandate into programmatic terms, the OMP identified 11 results, or global expected accomplishments, across six thematic priorities to which it sought to contribute and defined these in results-based management terms. For each expected accomplishment, global indicators and targets were determined, to enhance the accountability of the Office to member states and rights holders. The OMP distinguished four core activities: supporting standard setting, monitoring and reporting on human rights, providing advisory services and implementing technical co-operation programmes in collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level, and applying global and national-level advocacy strategies.

With a view to effectively delivering on global expected accomplishments, OHCHR defined eight Global Management Outputs (GMOs) in the OMP. The GMOs were based on the Office's first two-year management plans (2010-11 and 2012-13) and included Office-wide strategies, consisting of baselines, targets and indicators.

In its annual reports, OHCHR self-reported on the progress made in each of these eight areas, describing the kinds of activities carried out by various units of the Office. The 2017 Annual Report provides an overview of achievements for the four-year period, although its contents do not always coincide with the previously identified targets in the OMP 2014-17. The self-reporting mentions that most of the GMO targets had been met, with success rates ranging from 84% for GMOs 4 and 7 to 97% for GMO 8.

### **The OHCHR Management Plan 2018-21**

The OMP 2018-21 goes a step further. It is built on (1) extensive internal and external consultations, and critical self-assessments; (2) in-depth analysis of the political, technological and institutional context, including the changing policy landscape and an assessment of new threats and opportunities to human rights; and (3) an analysis of the achievements of and lessons learned from the OMP 2014-17. Compared with the first OMP, the Management Plan 2018-21 is more concise and strategic with less detailed descriptions of the expected accomplishments and thematic pillar strategies. While OHCHR's core mandate, thematic pillars and activities have not changed, the theory of change was articulated more simply, in less detail, and the OMP itself is now much more strategically connected to the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

The eight GMOs have been replaced by nine organisational effectiveness action plans, reflecting both ongoing and new organisational priorities. These nine are Strategic leadership and direction; Partnerships; External communications; Resource mobilisation; Diversity and gender; Operations management; Knowledge management; Human resources, in particular talent and career management; and Innovation. The organisational effectiveness action plans are not yet available online; but judging by the versions that were shared with the assessment team, we note that each action plan follows a similar approach. Starting with an analysis of the relevant context, they then take stock of the current situation, including problems, causes, lessons learned and existing commitments. This is followed by a tailored theory of change, from which priority results, outputs and action, targets, and indicators are identified, as well as the capacities needed to implement the action plans. They then describe opportunities and risks, and how progress will be monitored and evaluated. At the time of the MOPAN assessment, only a summary of the OMP was available. A detailed version is set to be published in 2019.

Taken together, the organisational effectiveness action plans represent a coherent set of priorities and actions, tailored to the needs and opportunities of the Office. However, at the time of the MOPAN review, it was not yet clear how these action plans would be resourced. OHCHR executive management has set aside some funds, but it will need a considerable amount more if it is to achieve its objectives.

Boxes 3 and 4 present the strengths and weaknesses identified in the current 2018 assessment. The assessment concludes that, overall, OHCHR's organisational performance has over time shown considerable progress in the areas of strategic management, operations management, relationship management and results-based management. As regards the achievements of results (KPIs 9-12), the assessment team is less confident, given the limited body of evidence available.

### Box 3: Main strengths identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

- OHCHR has made important strides in further strengthening its strategic leadership and management. The Office has a clear and transparent sense of direction and has succeeded in fostering an inclusive corporate identity.
- OHCHR's longstanding commitment to gender equality and the empowerment of women is widely acknowledged and highly regarded. The Office has effectively contributed to the promotion of these issues.
- The Office applies a strongly developed, outward-looking partnership focus in all its work streams and engages pro-actively with governments, civil society and the private sector to align its priorities with national policies and strategies.
- The Office has developed strong, effective and integrated results-based management systems, including an integrated, common framework for planning and reporting.
- OHCHR produces excellent knowledge materials, including education and training manuals that are highly regarded by its partners.

### Box 4: Main areas for improvement identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

- OHCHR's organisational architecture is not yet fully fit for purpose. To fulfil its mandate, align its organisational structure with its strategic priorities and meet expectations from member states and rights-holders, the Office will need to strengthen the capabilities of its New York office and other presences in a structural manner. In that regard, the Office would benefit greatly from more predictable resourcing to deliver against its expanding mandate and strategy.
- OHCHR'S human resource management is insufficiently aligned with the needs and requirements of the Office. The Office has not kept pace with the growing demands in areas such as recruitment, staff mobility, talent management, staff development, performance management and diversity. The Office has acknowledged this issue and is committed to professionalising its human resource management policies and actions.
- Partnerships are at the core of the work of the Office and of all staff, but the Office does not yet have a corporate strategy laying out why, how and which partnerships are important, now and in the future. OHCHR needs a more strategic and innovative perspective on the nexus between partnerships, external communications and fundraising.
- The Office lacks an "evaluation culture"; as a consequence, the evidence base on results is still weak. Although the evaluation function is showing signs of improvement, it is under-resourced, both in terms of staff and funds, and not fully independent.
- Despite recent progress to assess and manage risk, there is still room for improvement to strengthen the Office's corporate risk management policy and strategy.
- OHCHR has a relatively centralised decision-making structure, which is partly due to limited administrative capacity in field offices. OHCHR has stated its intention to delegate more authority to the field but has yet to operationalise this.

During the period under review, especially compared with the situation in 2008 the Office has come a long way, despite the fact that its relatively limited resources are constantly stretched – across functions, themes and regions. Today, human rights violations are on the rise, and the fundamental principles that underpin their universality, indivisibility, interdependency and interrelations are being contested by UN member states themselves. Furthermore, the gap between the Office’s mandate and resourcing is increasing, and funding is becoming less predictable. Nonetheless, OHCHR’s organisational performance has, paradoxically, never been better.

Recent achievements are being consolidated and deepened, while further improvements are being made in other performance areas. The Office has initiated various internal change management processes, resulting in a more strategic outlook, stronger coherence between performance areas, integrated results-based management, and enhanced transparency and accountability. Areas for improvement remain, especially in terms of (1) strategic partnerships as a means to mainstream human rights and achieve effective compliance with human rights standards; (2) a stronger field presence to meet the demands of member states and other stakeholders on the ground; and (3) strengthening of the independent evaluation function.

All this needs to be viewed in the context of how the human rights agenda has continued to grow, both in scope and complexity. The architecture of human rights mechanisms has evolved concurrently, most notably with the creation of the Human Rights Council in 2006, with its Special Procedures and Universal Periodic Review, as well as with the increase in the number of UN human rights treaty bodies. All human rights mechanisms receive significant support from OHCHR, and the more work they generate, the more support they require.

The relatively small Office of the High Commissioner is punching above its weight. This situation was created by the combination of (1) a corporate culture that sees as its mission to protect rights-holders, to set ambitious goals and targets for itself and to weather the storm if necessary and (2) its dynamic inspirational leadership. However, when the Office’s mandate and its own ambitions do not keep pace with its financial and human resources, and partners are unwilling or unable to engage more heavily themselves, this raises pertinent questions about the Office’s future sustainability.



# ANNEXES



## Annex 1. Evidence table

### Methodology for scoring and rating

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.0 draws from the OECD *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide* (OECD/EU/JRC, 2008). Each of the MOPAN 3.0 key performance indicators (KPIs) contains a number of micro-indicators (MIs) which vary in number. The MIs, in turn, contain elements representing international best practice; their numbers also vary.

The approach is as follows:

#### a) Micro-indicator level

Scores ranging from 0 to 4 are assigned per **element**, according to the extent to which an organisation implements the element.

For **KPIs 1-8**, the following criteria frame the scores:

- 4 = Element is fully implemented/implemented in all cases
- 3 = Element is substantially implemented/implemented in the majority of cases
- 2 = Element is partially implemented/implemented in some cases
- 1 = Element is present, but not implemented/implemented in zero cases
- 0 = Element is not present

Taking the average of the constituent elements' scores, a rating is then calculated per MI. The rating scale applied is as follows:

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory

The ratings scale for **KPIs 9-12** applies the same thresholds as for KPIs 1-8, for consistency, but pitches scores to the middle of the threshold value (to guard against skewing in favour of higher ratings).

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory

A score of zero (0) for an element means the assessment team had expected to find evidence but did not find any. A score of zero counts towards the MI score.

A score of “N/E” means “no evidence” indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not there was evidence to be found. The team assumes that “no evidence” does not necessarily equal a zero score. Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation (see the Limitations section at the beginning of the report).

A note indicating “N/A” means that an element is considered to be “not applicable”. This usually owes to the organisation’s specific nature.


*b) Aggregation to the KPI level*

The same logic is pursued at aggregation to the KPI level to ensure a consistent approach. Taking the average of the constituent scores per MI, a rating is then calculated per KPI.


The calculation for KPIs is the same as for the MIs above, namely:

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory


## Key




## Strategic management



## Operational management



## Relationship management



## Performance management

### KPI 7: Results focus

7.1 BRM applied	■	●
7.2 RBM in strategies	■	●
7.3 Evidence-based targets	■	●
7.4 Effective monitoring systems	■	●
7.5 Performance data applied	■	●

### KPI 8: Evidence-based planning

8.1 Evaluation function	■	●
8.2 Evaluation coverage	■	●
8.3 Evaluation quality	■	●
8.4 Evidence-based design	■	●
8.5 Poor performance tracked	■	●
8.6 Follow-up systems	■	●
8.7 Uptake of lessons	■	●

## Results

### KPI 9: Achievement of results

9.1 Results deemed attained	■
9.2 Benefits for target groups	■
9.3 Policy/capacity impact	■
9.4 Gender equity results	■
9.5 Environment results	■
9.6 Governance results	■
9.7 Human rights results	■

### KPI 10: Relevance to partners

10.1 Target groups	■
10.2 National objectives	■
10.3 Coherence	■

### KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

11.1 Cost efficiency	■
11.2 Timeliness	■

### KPI 12: Sustainability of results

12.1 Sustainable benefits	■
12.2 Sustainable capacity	■
12.3 Enabling environment	■

## STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

*Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities*

<b>KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.14</b>

Protection and promotion of 'All Human Rights for All' are one of the three pillars of the United Nations as a whole. OHCHR was established in 1993 and is the main designated, principle-based United Nations entity on Human Rights. Its mandate stems from a wide range of charters, declarations, agendas, and commitments. The independence of its High Commissioner places OHCHR in a unique position.

The Office's framework for strategic planning, management and accountability is not straightforward. OHCHR has two strategic documents: the two-year recurrent Strategic Framework (SF) of the UN Secretary General and, since 2014, the more detailed 4-year Organisational Management Plan (OMP). The Strategic Framework is a static, high-level document based on four strategic areas, reflecting the organisation's inter-governmental normative, monitoring and operational mandates. In contrast, the OMP is a detailed, coherent, results-based, ambitious 4-year 'roadmap'. Both the OMP 2014-17 and its successor the OMP 2018-21 contain a clearly articulated long-term vision of the organisation. They are based on sound context analysis, and broad consultations with many different stakeholders, and also draw increasingly on past achievements and lessons learned, including from evaluations and audits. Both OMPs define ambitious targets across the same six thematic pillars, with the latest OMP stressing the need for shifts across these pillars to adapt to the evolving context. Although the four-year OMPs are guided by and seek to implement the Strategic Framework, the linkages between the documents are not always clear. Over the years, OHCHR has purposefully and visibly strengthened its results focus. The OMP, rather than the Strategic Framework, guides the Office's focus on results.

OHCHR is funded from the UN regular budget (45%), as well as voluntary contributions received from donors - mainly UN member states (55%). In fulfilling its broad and growing mandate, OHCHR depends largely on voluntary contributions from member states. However, the growing mandate is not matched by a proportionate growth in resources, and as a consequence, its staff are overstretched, which hinders OHCHR's delivery capabilities. Earmarked voluntary contributions reduce OHCHR's ability to resource all priority areas adequately. Resourcing of core HQ functions (including external relations and external communication) and the functioning of Human Rights Advisors has been inadequate, something the new OMP 2018-21 is now trying to address.

Voluntary contributions from donors are a sensitive issue for OHCHR, as it could potentially harm OHCHR's independence. In practice though, unless the Regular Budget contributions are increased to match the growing mandate and scope of operations, OHCHR will continue to rely heavily on voluntary contributions. It is succeeding in attracting more flexible funds from a larger number of donors. Predictability of funding, however, remains a challenge, since only few donors provide multi-year funding, while pledges do not necessarily convert to payments. OHCHR is currently strengthening its resource mobilisation capabilities, including a formal corporate Resource Mobilisation Strategy, as part of the new OMP.

OHCHR staff are overstretched and capacity shortfalls exist across the organisation, most notably in all four categories of field presences (regional offices, country offices, human rights advisors, and human rights components of peacekeeping missions). Efforts to budget-neutrally reallocate staff from Geneva to New York and regional offices (the "Change Initiative") were deferred indefinitely by the General Assembly to 2019. This decision risks weakening OHCHR's organisational coherence and cooperation, as well as its strategic partnerships with key stakeholders such as member states and the UN System. Field capacity to engage with local stakeholders on human rights challenges and needs, either directly or indirectly, is insufficient.

OHCHR's current organisational structure is insufficiently fit-for-purpose. Since its creation in 1993, OHCHR grew organically, to the point where it had to strategically review its organisational architecture in order to deliver on its broad mandate more effectively. It has been facing long-standing challenges to ensure its organisational architecture is fit-for-purpose to deliver on the increasing demands around its normative, monitoring, and operational work. Organisational effectiveness reviews are undertaken regularly, both internally and by OIOS. Changes in OHCHR's working procedures, internal workflow, organisational structures, field presences, operations, resource mobilisation, outreach and human resources management were formalised in the 2014-17 OMP. In preparing the 2018-21 OMP, OHCHR developed nine interrelated Organisational Effectiveness Action Plans, (OEAPs) meant to align the organisation with thematic priorities and targets. These OEAPs reflect an increasingly strategic leadership that is results-based, transparent and accountable. Still, field presences in particular are inadequately resourced to carry out all their tasks. Despite on-going efforts to strengthen cooperation between different headquarters divisions and between headquarters and the field, cross-office coordination, cooperation, and communication remain challenging.

As a normative agency and building on its mandate to 'promote and protect all human rights for all', OHCHR has made important contributions to the development of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. In the OMP 2018-21, OHCHR has made the strategic decision to increasingly anchor its work in both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 'Sustaining Peace' Prevention Agenda, whose success will ultimately depend significantly on human rights' compliance. Accountability for contributing to normative results, particularly those related to the post-2015 Development Agenda, is being strengthened in the 2018-19 Strategic Framework and will be further strengthened as part of the OMP 2018-21.

Within the framework of the OMP, the Senior Management Team (SMT) and Policy and Budget Review Board (PBRB) agree annual priority areas. Regular budget contributions are largely designated to standard setting and monitoring functions. The PBRB is responsible for allocating extra-budgetary resources in line with the OMP, through the annual integrated planning and costing process; the flexibility to respond to new and changing priorities comes mostly from unearmarked voluntary contributions, to the extent available. The implementation of OHCHR's OMPs is subject to monitoring through the internal Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that was developed by OHCHR in response to shortcomings in the Secretariat-wide monitoring system. Accountability for the achievement of normative results is embedded in relevant Expected Accomplishments in the OMPs, and the associated internal monitoring and reporting processes.

OHCHR has made progress in ensuring transparency. One of the Global Management Outputs in the OMP 2014-17 articulated a commitment to the efficient management of the Office's financial (and human) resources. Systems have been put in place to ensure integrated planning and budgeting (annual work plans and cost plans), as well as reporting. Further improvements are envisaged in the OMP 2018-21. The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies.

<b>MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.75</b>
Element 1: A publicly available Strategic Plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision	4
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	4
Element 3: A strategic plan operationalises the vision, including defining intended results	3
Element 4: The Strategic Plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4

MI 1.1 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR has two strategic documents: the two-year recurrent Strategic Framework of the UN Secretary General and, since 2014, the more detailed four-year Organisational Management Plan. The SF is a static, high-level generic document based on four strategic areas, reflecting the organisation's inter-governmental normative, monitoring and operational mandates. Both the OMP 2014-17 and its successor, the OMP 2018-21, contain a clearly articulated long-term vision of the organisation.</p> <p>Protection and promotion of 'All Human Rights for All' are one of three pillars of the United Nations as a whole. OHCHR is the main designated, principle-based United Nations entity on human rights. The independence of the High Commissioner places OHCHR in a unique position, playing a role no other actor can play in terms of standard setting, monitoring and advocacy, and supporting human rights compliance by member states globally. Mindful of its own resource limitations, OHCHR continues to emphasise the importance of mainstreaming through partnerships and capacity building. Increasingly, OHCHR's vision is tied to the 2030 Global Agenda. De-prioritisation, however, remains a constant challenge.</p> <p>The OMP is a detailed, coherent, results-based, ambitious four-year 'roadmap' that is guided by and operationalises the largely static biennial SF. Both OMPs are based on sound context analysis, and broad consultations with many different stakeholders, and also draw increasingly on past achievements and lessons learned, including from evaluations and audits. Both OMPs define ambitious targets across the same six thematic pillars, with the latest OMP stressing the need for shifts across these pillars to adapt to the evolving context.</p> <p>Thematic strategies in the OMP are reviewed annually, taking account of new mandates and decisions of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, as well as possible changes made to the Strategic Framework. In addition, OHCHR undertook a mid-term review of the 2014-17 OMP, which led to adjustments of policy targets and reallocation of resources for the remaining period. In preparing the new OMP, OHCHR conducted detailed analyses of its organisational effectiveness across nine areas.</p>	1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 19, 24, 25, 88, 89, 90, 91, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113
<b>MI 1.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan	2
Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan	2
Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	3
Element 4: The operating model allows for strong cooperation across the organisation and with other agencies	3
Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results	3
<b>MI 1.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>

OHCHR was established in 1993. It grew organically, to the point where it had to strategically review its organisational architecture in order to deliver on its broad mandate more effectively. The strategic plans increasingly emphasise mainstreaming of human rights within the UN and implementation of human rights in member states. However, OHCHR's presence in New York and on the ground are insufficient and too thinly spread to achieve its stated objectives.

In fulfilling its broad and growing mandate, OHCHR depends largely on voluntary contributions from member states. However, the growing mandate is not matched by a proportionate growth in resources. As a consequence, OHCHR staff are overstretched and capacity shortfalls exist across the organisation, most notably in all four categories of field presences (regional offices, country offices, human rights advisors and human rights components of peacekeeping missions). Efforts to budget-neutrally reallocate staff from Geneva to New York and regional offices (the "Change Initiative") were deferred indefinitely by the General Assembly.

Organisational effectiveness reviews are undertaken regularly, both internally and by OIOS. Changes in OHCHR's working procedures, internal workflow, organisational structures, field presences, operations, resource mobilisation, outreach and human resources management were formalised in the 2014-17 OMP. In preparing the 2018-21 OMP, OHCHR developed nine interrelated Organisational Effectiveness Action Plans, (OEAPs) meant to align the organisation with thematic priorities and targets. These OEAPs reflect an increasingly strategic leadership that is results-based, transparent and accountable.

Despite on-going efforts to strengthen cooperation between different headquarters divisions and between headquarters (HQ) and the field, cross-office coordination, cooperation, and communication remain challenging. Partnerships are a critical dimension of OHCHR's operating model and visible at all levels, but until recently, the organisation lacked a Partnership Strategy. Deferral of OHCHR's Change Initiative plans risks weakening OHCHR's organisational coherence and cooperation, as well as its strategic partnerships with key stakeholders such as member states and the UN System. Field capacity to engage with local stakeholders on human rights challenges and needs, either directly or indirectly, is insufficient.

Over the years, OHCHR has purposefully and visibly strengthened its results focus. The OMP, rather than the SF, guides the Office's focus on results. At the Geneva HQ, roles and responsibilities of senior leadership are adjusted regularly to improve results delivery. Division directors and heads of sections are responsible and accountable for delivering results that better reflect the work of the entire Office. The New York HQ is predominantly focused on mainstreaming human rights within the UN system at the policy level. Human Rights Advisors and Human Rights Sections in Peacekeeping Operations are dual-hatted and subject to parallel operating systems. Although this complicates internal management for results, it fosters opportunities for mainstreaming human rights within the UN system.

1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16,  
19, 24, 25, 29, 30, 88,  
89, 90, 91, 100, 101,  
102, 103, 104, 105,  
106, 107, 108, 109,  
110, 111, 112, 113

#### MI 1.2 Evidence confidence

High confidence

<b>MI 1.3: The strategic plan supports the implementation of wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030 and others where applicable (e.g. the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR), Grand Bargain, replenishment commitments, or other resource and results reviews)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.4</b>
Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	4
Element 2: The strategic plan includes clear results for normative frameworks, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	3
Element 3: A system to track normative results is in place for Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	3
Element 4: The organisation's accountability for achieving normative results, including those of Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the SDGs and their targets and indicators, the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable), is clearly established	3
Element 5: Progress on implementation on an aggregated level is published at least annually	4
<b>MI 1.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>As a normative agency and building on its mandate to “promote and protect all human rights for all”, OHCHR has made important contributions to the development of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. At the strategic level, OHCHR has made the strategic decision to increasingly anchor its work in both the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the ‘Sustaining Peace’ Prevention Agenda, whose success will depend significantly on human rights’ compliance. Thus, the decision in 2016 to relocate staff from Geneva to New York and support the development of HR-sensitive UN-wide policies and strategies, proved effective. Its reversal will negatively impact OHCHR’s capacity to mainstream human rights within the UN system, a concern voiced by staff during interviews.</p> <p>The biennial SFs include references to the normative frameworks, while the OMP 2014-17 included detailed outlines of OHCHR’s contributions (expected accomplishments, or EAs) to relevant normative frameworks. For example; EA4 is about increasing compliance of national legislation, policies, programmes and institutions with international human rights standards to combat discrimination, particularly against women; and EA6 is about increasing compliance and engagement by States with UN human rights mechanisms and bodies. In the OMP 2018-21, this focus is maintained: across the 6 thematic pillars, results and targets are linked to 15 of the 17 SDGs, but less detailed than before.</p> <p>The implementation of OHCHR’s OMP is subject to monitoring through the internal Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that was developed by OHCHR in response to shortcomings with the Secretariat-wide monitoring system. Contributions to the SDGs are monitored to the extent that they are incorporated in Expected Accomplishments and indicators of the OMP Results Framework. How and to what extent, will depend on the detailed annual workplan and cost plan process. OHCHR is actively involved in the development of UMOJA, the UN-wide tracking system. OHCHR’s internal work processes, including the PMS, will be adjusted where necessary to align with these.</p> <p>Internally, accountability for the achievement of normative results is embedded in relevant Expected Accomplishments in the OMPs, and the associated internal monitoring and reporting processes. Externally, OHCHR’s accountability for achieving normative results are articulated in Expected Accomplishments in its biennial Strategic Frameworks. As such, accountability, monitoring, and reporting around normative results are not dealt with separately.</p>	1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 24, 25, 29, 35, 88, 89, 90, 91, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113

<p>Accountability for contributing to normative results, particularly those related to the post-2015 Development Agenda, is being strengthened in the 2018-19 Strategic Framework and will be further strengthened as part of the 2018-21 OMP. Internally, accountability for the achievement of normative results is embedded in relevant Expected Accomplishments in the OMPs, and the associated internal monitoring and reporting processes. Externally, OHCHR's accountability for achieving normative results are articulated in Expected Accomplishments in its biennial Strategic Frameworks. As such, accountability, monitoring and reporting around normative results are not dealt with separately. Accountability for contributing to normative results, particularly those related to the post-2015 Development Agenda, is being strengthened in the 2018-19 Strategic Framework and will be further strengthened as part of the implementation of the OMP 2018-21 and its respective Organisational Effectiveness Action Plans.</p> <p>In its publicly available annual reports, OHCHR publishes progress in implementation against aggregate corporate level targets. The High Commissioner also reports to the General Assembly about progress against the Strategic Framework at least once a year.</p>	<p>1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 24, 25, 29, 35, 88, 89, 90, 91, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113</p>
<p><b>MI 1.3 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 1.4: Financial Framework (e.g. division between core and non-core resources) supports mandate implementation</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI rating</b></p>	<p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>2.8</b></p>
<p>Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas</p>	<p>3</p>
<p><b>MI 1.4 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>Despite significant growth in voluntary contributions since 2007, OHCHR's broad and growing mandate suffers from chronic funding shortfalls. OHCHR is funded from the UN regular budget (45%), as well as voluntary contributions received from donors (55%, mainly UN member states, largely spent on field operations). Earmarked voluntary contributions reduce OHCHR's ability to resource all priority areas adequately. Resourcing of core HQ functions (including external relations and external communication) and the functioning of Human Rights Advisors has been inadequate, something the new OMP 2018-21 is now trying to address.</p> <p>OHCHR's financial resources fall into two categories: regular budget and extrabudgetary. In 2016, regular budget expenditure amounted to USD 101 million, and extrabudgetary expenditure to USD 122 million. In 2017, these were USD 110 million and USD 136 million, respectively. The table below illustrates the relatively high share of expenditures for HQ-based activities and support, compared to field interventions. This also points to OHCHR's mandate as the key agency for standard setting, monitoring, and advocacy on human rights protection and promotion. The increased workload in the realms of the human rights treaties and Human Rights Council mechanisms is covered through the regular budget. The expansion of field-level activities (and staff) is covered largely through extra-budgetary sources. In 2016, OHCHR had a working budget of USD 23 million per year to mainstream human rights in partnership with others.</p>	<p>1, 5, 7, 10, 16, 18, 25, 31, 35, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 122</p>

The combined expenditure by main activity in 2016 and 2017 (x USD000) by source, was as follows:

Category	RB 2016	XB 2016	RB 2017	XB 2017
Executive direction and management	8 101.5	12 428.8	8 559.5	14 288.8
Polymaking organs	8 101.5	–	8 226.1	
Human rights mainstreaming, right to development, research and analysis	12 467.0	10 439.9	13 988.1	12 032.7
Supporting human rights treaty bodies	15 548.8	2 457.7	15 830.1	1 751.3
Advisory services and technical cooperation	19 005.7	8 574.8	21 897.1	11 798.1
Supporting Human Rights Council and its special procedures	20 720.1	8 892.6	21 418.7	8 746.3
OHCHR in the field	11 636.8	62 175.0	14 718.4	70 021.2
Programme support and management services	5 476.6	6 852.8	5 840.3	7 779.4
Other trust funds	–	10 898.6	–	10 354.4
Other income/expenditure not reported for		0.4		0.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>101 058.0</b>	<b>122 283.0</b>	<b>110 487.3</b>	<b>136 181.5</b>

OHCHR has made progress in ensuring transparency. One of the Global Management Outputs in the OMP 2014-17 articulated a commitment to the efficient management of the Office's financial (and human) resources. Systems have been put in place to ensure integrated planning and budgeting (annual work plans and cost plans), as well as reporting. Further improvements are envisaged in the OMP 2018-21.

The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies. Voluntary contributions from donors are a sensitive issue for OHCHR, as it could potentially harm OHCHR's independence. In practice though, unless the Regular Budget contributions are increased to match the growing mandate and scope of operations, OHCHR will continue to rely heavily on voluntary contributions. It is succeeding in attracting more flexible funds from a larger number of donors. Predictability of funding, however, is a challenge, since only few donors provide multi-year funding, while pledges do not necessarily convert to payments. OHCHR is currently strengthening its resource mobilisation capabilities, including a formal corporate Resource Mobilisation Strategy, as part of the new OMP. The focus therein lies on increasing the amount of unearmarked voluntary contributions from a larger number of donors, both public and private. In its 2018-21 organisational effectiveness action plan on resource mobilisation, various reasons for shortfalls in resource mobilisation were identified, on the basis of which a coherent set of objectives and actions were selected to stimulate donors to provide more unearmarked voluntary contributions. These are yet to be implemented.

Within the framework of the OMP, the Senior Management Team and Policy and Budget Review Board (PBRB) agree on annual priority areas. Regular budget contributions are largely designated to standard setting and monitoring functions. The PBRB is responsible for allocating extra-budgetary resources in line with the OMP, through the annual integrated planning and costing process. The flexibility to respond to new and changing priorities comes mostly from unearmarked voluntary contributions, to the extent they are available.

1, 5, 7, 10, 16, 18, 25, 31, 35, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 122

**MI 1.4 Evidence confidence**

**High confidence**

<b>KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.17</b>
<p>The assessment considers OHCHR's work and capacity in the cross-cutting areas of gender equality and the empowerment of women, as well as environmental sustainability and climate change, and good governance, at the levels of its normative and country-facing work, as well as organisationally. OHCHR has a wide-ranging mandate to promote the realisation of all human rights for all. As such, human rights is not considered a cross cutting element of OHCHR's work. Rather, it is at the core of OHCHR's mandate and is therefore addressed across all KPIs.</p> <p>OHCHR has a long-standing commitment to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women in its normative and country-facing work. It has well-established, well-known and well-regarded policy and strategic frameworks for this. There is strong and high-level management leadership driving OHCHR's implementation of its strategic commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment and its work in this area is relatively well-resourced. OHCHR's strategic commitments to gender equality and the empowerment of women is monitored by the PBRB and reported in UN Human Rights annual reports.</p> <p>OHCHR has worked hard - and continues to do so - to develop and improve a range of practical guidance, tools and checklists for integrating a gender perspective in all aspects of its work. It has also invested substantially in strengthening the capability of OHCHR staff, special procedures mandate-holders and Treaty Body Members to integrate a gender perspective in their daily work. These efforts have paid off, most notably in integrating a gender perspective into the programmers, processes and capacity of field offices in challenging locations such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Somalia.</p> <p>OHCHR's contributions to promote gender equality in all areas of its work are regarded highly by partners. These contributions range from advocating successfully for the inclusion of Goal 5 on gender equality in the final 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to increasing the percentage of AWP/CPs and mini strategies that had at least one activity with gender equality as the main objective from 72% in 2015 to 78.5% in 2016, and to being commended by the Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women for its leadership in dealing with gender equality and women's empowerment in evaluation.</p> <p>The OMP 2018-21 identifies gender equality as one of the issues OHCHR will be 'shining a spotlight' on and identifies an intersectional focus on women as vital to its efforts in assisting States to implement the SDGs and the commitment to 'leave no one behind'. More specifically, it aligns OHCHR's work in gender equality with SDG 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls). It will also put OHCHR at the forefront of broadening the notion of gender equality and inclusiveness to LGBTI people.</p> <p>While good governance is fundamental to OHCHR's vision and mission, it has no clear definition for good governance, and there is no strategy for its normative and country-facing work in good governance. No 'special' human or financial resources are dedicated to it. Staff regard it as "everything we do", with responsibility and accountability being "everywhere and nowhere" at the same time. Nevertheless, OHCHR's partners are knowledgeable about its approach to good governance and regard its work in this area highly, while annual reports provide clear evidence of OHCHR's contributions to strengthening various aspects of good governance in various areas of support.</p> <p>The new OMP (2018-21) emphasises OHCHR's role in empowering and enabling people to meaningfully shape or challenge policy decisions that affect their lives, as an element of ensuring accountability and good governance. It aligns OHCHR's work in this area with SDG 16. It also identifies the fight against corruption, which is one of OHCHR's Governance focus areas, as a frontier issue - that is an emerging area with often unseen, but critical, human rights dimensions.</p> <p>In December 2015, the adoption of the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change marked the first time that a universal, binding climate agreement explicitly referenced human rights. OHCHR's strategy for dealing with human rights issues related to environmental sustainability and climate change is evolving and most of its partners still know relatively little about it.</p>	

The OMP 2018-21 commits OHCHR to explore climate change as another ‘frontier issue’. Through mainstreaming climate change in all its work, it aims to understand the connections between climate change and human rights better. The OMP aligns OHCHR’s work on environmental sustainability and climate change with relevant SDGs (13, 14 and 15). An intergovernmental working group on the right to development, chaired by OHCHR, will be developing indicators to measure progress with implementation of the right to development. These indicators will capture OHCHR’s contribution to the relevant SDGs.

The OMP 2014-17 committed OHCHR to becoming a ‘greener’ organisation. OHCHR has reduced its carbon footprint, and its HQ footprint is now lower than the UN average. Information requirements and additional resources have so far deterred OHCHR from implementing further ‘greening’ initiatives, such as including all OHCHR field presences in the greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint, developing an Environmental Management System (EMS), buying carbon offsets and calculating waste.

OHCHR staff expressed concerns that the Office currently does not have the strategies, tools, capacity and financial resources to meet all the expectations associated with its commitments to mainstreaming priority issues in the OMP 2018-21. Most of the staff positions for this work, as well as the work itself, are funded through extra-budgetary resources. This poses challenges for the continuity of staff and working capital to implement OHCHR’s strategic priorities in these areas. The reliance on extra-budgetary support also means that OHCHR’s work on cross-cutting priorities could become increasingly ‘projectised’, based on donors’ priorities and requirements.

OHCHR’s commitment to gender equality in its organisational structure was articulated in Global Management Output 3 (GMO 3) of the OMP 2014-17. Clear targets were set to ensure that “a gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes”. OHCHR has reached gender parity in its overall organisational structure, but women are still proportionately under-represented compared to men in senior level positions. This imbalance is particularly entrenched in the field. The Gender and Diversity Action Plan 2018-21 commits OHCHR to achieving a target of 100% gender parity at all levels by 2021. It also aims to strengthen monitoring, reporting and accountability on gender equality in OHCHR’s organisational composition, culture, structure and processes. It commits OHCHR to aligning its internal gender policy to the new UN-SWAP and foresees additional annual reporting to UNSWAP.

<b>MI 2.1a: Gender equality and the empowerment of women</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of use	3
Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives	3
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets	4
Element 4: Gender screening checklists or similar tools used for all new Interventions	4
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address gender issues	3
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on gender is underway or has been conducted	3

MI 2.1a Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR demonstrates a clear and long-standing commitment to address gender equality in its normative and programmatic work, as well as its organisational structure, capacity and ways of working.</p> <p>It has well-developed policy and strategic frameworks that articulate an integrated approach to gender equality and the empowerment of women- it takes account of the intersectionality between gender, geography and other elements of discrimination and diversity. A gender perspective is also integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and relevant processes. The majority of OHCHR's partners are familiar with its gender policy and strategies, and they regard it favourably.</p> <p>A commitment to gender equality in OHCHR's normative and programmatic work, as well as its organisational structure and culture, is outlined in the OMP 2014-17 and Gender Equality Strategic Plan (2014-17). The OMP 2014-17 outlined OHCHR's strategies, activities and added value in delivering gender-related aspects of its EAs. At the time of the MOPAN review, the OMP 2014-17 was being superseded by the OMP 2018-2021. A gender perspective was systematically integrated in the process through with the new OMP was developed. It identifies women's rights as one of the issues OHCHR will be 'shining a spotlight' on during 2018-21.</p> <p>The OMP 2018-21 identifies gender equality as one of the issues OHCHR will be 'shining a spotlight' on and identifies an intersectional focus on women as vital to its efforts in assisting States to implement the SDGs and the commitment to 'leave no one behind'. As one of the pillar elements of the OMP, the Management Plan for 'Strengthening the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations' (2018-21) aligns OHCHR's work in gender equality with SDG 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls). It will also put OHCHR at the forefront of broadening the notion of gender equality and inclusiveness to LGBTI people.</p> <p>The PBRB monitors OHCHR's achievement of EAs focusing on women's human rights and gender equality through the PMS. UN Human Rights Reports contain a dedicated section on ending gender-based discrimination, but gender equality is also embedded in other aspects of these reports. OHCHR also reports annually to the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-SWAP), which include targets and indicators for the organisation as a whole. The Strategic Leadership and Direction component of the Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan 2018-21 aims to strengthen OHCHR's accountability vis-à-vis its stakeholders, primarily people affected by human rights violations.</p> <p>OHCHR has developed – and continues to develop and improve - a range of practical guidance, tools and checklists for integrating a gender perspective in all phases and aspects of its work. It has also invested substantially – and will continue to invest - in strengthening the capability of OHCHR staff, special procedures mandate-holders and Treaty Body Members to integrate a gender perspective in their daily work.</p> <p>The OHCHR Gender Equality Policy (2011) commits to allocating adequate human and financial resources for the implementation of gender integration in the organisation and its work. The OMP 2014-17 set a target to fully dedicate USD 7 million to OHCHR's work on gender equality. This target was reached. However, OHCHR is self-critical of its efforts to back responsibilities for promoting and supporting the implementation of key policies and commitments on gender equality with the requisite capacity. Securing sufficient funding for regularising OHCHR's work on gender equality remains a challenge. Most of the staff positions for this work, as well as the work itself, are funded through extra-budgetary resources. This presents challenges for the continuity of staffing. It also presents a risk of 'projectising' OHCHR's work on gender, based on donors' priorities and requirements.</p>	<p>1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 90, 104, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122</p>

The 2018-21 Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Diversity and Gender identifies limited resources for the creation of posts, which will also limit capacity to fully achieve of the Action Plan's results, as a key risk. OHCHR's commitment to gender equality in its organisational structure was articulated in Global Management Output 3 (GMO 3) of the OMP 2014-17. Clear targets and indicators were set to ensure that "a gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes". At the time of the MOPAN review, the OMP 2014-17 was being superseded by the OMP 2018-21. It commits OHCHR to aligning its internal gender policy to the new UN-SWAP and foresees additional annual reporting to UNSWAP. Targets and indicators will be aligned to the extent possible under the three processes (OEG, UNSWAP, System-Wide Strategy). OHCHR is working closely with UN Women in the discussions on the new UN-SWAP, which will include on targets and indicators, and which will generate measures on organisational culture, leadership, policy and planning, financial resources allocation, and gender architecture.

The new OMP has a dedicated Management Plan for 'Enhancing equality and countering discrimination', which deals with gender equality (amongst others), as well as an Action Plan on Diversity and Gender. The latter contains frank discussions of OHCHR's successes and challenges in implementing its previous gender equality strategies. This demonstrates that lessons from previous experiences are used to inform new strategies. However, there are still challenges around the integration of gender equality in OHCHR's activities at regional and country levels. A lack of clarity about the linkages between women's rights and gender equality also remains a conceptual and practical challenge.

Under senior management leadership, OHCHR demonstrates a clear resolve to implement its strategic commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment. At a global level, its advocacy and inputs to debates and processes that shaped the post-2015 development agenda contributed strongly to the inclusion of Goal 5 on gender equality in the final 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Within the UN, OHCHR was at the forefront of gender parity strategy discussions when, in 2017, the Secretary-General issued a policy aimed at achieving gender parity in the workforce by the year 2028. OHCHR strongly supported the use of special temporary measures and targeted efforts to increase the recruitment and retention of qualified female and male staff members where gender imbalances exist. Such temporary measures, in line with human rights norms and standards, have been retained as part of the final policy. OHCHR is also closely involved in discussions, led by UN Women, to generate measures on organisational culture, leadership, policy and planning, financial resources allocation and gender architecture.

In 2017, the Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women congratulated OHCHR for continuing to be a leader in dealing with gender equality and women's empowerment in evaluation.

At an organisational level, a 2016 gender analysis of all AWP/CPs and mini strategies found that around 78.5% of AWP units (compared to 72% in 2015) had at least one activity with gender equality as the main objective, including no-cost activities. The increase is ascribed mainly to activities in the field, where the increase went from 70% to 78%.

1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16,  
25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33,  
90, 104, 110, 114, 115,  
116, 117, 118, 119,  
120, 122

#### MI 2.1a Evidence confidence

High confidence

MI 2.1b: Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change	Score
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.5</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of use	1
Element 2: Environmental sustainability/ climate change indicators and targets are fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	2
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists/impact assessments used for all new Interventions	2
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has taken place	0
MI 2.1b Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR recognises the human rights issues related to environmental sustainability and climate change. In December 2015, the adoption of the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change marked the first time that a universal, binding climate agreement explicitly referenced human rights. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also clearly links human rights, climate change, the environment and development. This created an opportunity and demand for OHCHR's work on human rights, climate change and the environment.</p> <p>OHCHR's strategy for dealing with human rights issues related to environmental sustainability and climate change is evolving. The majority of OHCHR's stakeholders appear to know little or nothing about its policies on environmental sustainability and climate change. Those who expressed an opinion about it, consider it favourably.</p> <p>Under the Strategic Framework 2016-17, OHCHR focused on working in partnership with UN agencies and organisations that have a mandate and capacity to deal with environmental sustainability and climate change. However, there were no indicators or targets in the OMP 2014-17, or the Strategic Framework 2016-17, to monitor this. Reporting suggests that OHCHR dealt in an ad hoc manner with specific cases where people's human rights were affected by environmental issues.</p> <p>The OMP 2018-21 commits OHCHR to exploring climate change as a 'frontier issue' (an emerging human rights concern). Through mainstreaming climate change in all its work, it aims to understand the connections between climate change and human rights better. As one of the pillars of the 2018-21 OMP, the Management Plan for integrating human rights in sustainable development (2018-21) has a thematic result related specifically to environmental sustainability and climate change. It focuses on ensuring that international and national environmental and climate policies and plans are increasingly implemented in accordance with international human rights standards. One of the emerging focus areas for OHCHR relates to human rights, migration and displacement in the context of climate change and climate-related disasters.</p> <p>The Management Plan aligns OHCHR's work on environmental sustainability and climate change with relevant SDGs (13, 14 and 15). Based on a coherent Theory of Change, the Plan outlines ways in which OHCHR will deal with the related human rights-related issues in its normative and country-facing work.</p>	1, 2, 6, 7, 90, 101, 107, 109

<p>The emerging clarity of OHCHR's role and added value in environmental sustainability and climate change are not yet reflected in well-developed monitoring and accountability frameworks. The Management Plan for integrating human rights in sustainable development (2018-21) outlines the thematic results and outputs of OHCHR's work in these areas. An intergovernmental working group on the right to development, chaired by OHCHR, will be developing indicators to measure progress with implementation of the right to development. These indicators will capture OHCHR's contribution to the relevant SDGs (13, 14 and 15). At the same time, the Strategic Leadership and Direction component of the Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan (2018-21) commits to strengthening OHCHR's accountability vis-à-vis its stakeholders, primarily people affected by human rights violations.</p> <p>OHCHR staff expressed concern that they do not have the guidance, tools or capacity (funding and capability) to meet the "increasing demand and huge expectations for OHCHR to actively engage [in human rights issues related to climate change and environmental protection]" and that it "... might become a missed opportunity for OHCHR" (quote from interview). There is also concern that OHCHR may lack the capacity and wider UN support to deal with the risks associated with this kind of work.</p>	1, 2, 6, 7, 90, 101, 107, 109
<b>MI 2.1b Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 2.1c: Good governance</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.67</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on the principles of good governance and effective institutions available and showing evidence of use	2
Element 2: Indicators and targets related to the principles of good governance and effective institutions are integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect the principles of good governance and effective institutions	1
Element 4: New interventions are assessed for relevant governance/institutional effectiveness issues	1
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address the principles of good governance and issues related to effective institutions	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on the principles of good governance and effective institutions is underway or has taken place	2

MI 2.1c Analysis	Source document
<p>Good governance, as a thematic programmatic area, is fundamental to OHCHR's vision and mission; "it is about everything we do" (quote from interview). However, OHCHR has no single definition for good governance, and it has no governance strategy for its normative and country-facing work in good governance. It broadly focuses on supporting the reforms of democratic institutions in accordance with the key attributes in good governance; improving the state's capacity to fulfil its responsibility to provide public goods which are essential for the protection of several human rights; reforming legislation and assisting institutions ranging from penal systems, to courts and parliaments, to better implement legislation; and fighting corruption.</p> <p>These themes cut across all six Thematic Priorities in the 2014-17 OMP and are continued in the OMP 2018-21, which additionally emphasises OHCHR's role in empowering and enabling people to meaningfully shape or challenge policy decisions that affect their lives, as an element of ensuring accountability and good governance. It also aligns OHCHR's work in this area with SDG 16. It also identifies the fight against corruption – which is one of OHCHR's Governance focus areas - as a frontier issue.</p> <p>Despite good governance being such a fundamental aspect of OHCHR's work, there is no 'special' human or financial resources dedicated to it. Having the fight against corruption as a frontier issue in the OMP 2018-21 comes with expectations of engagement. OHCHR staff expressed concerns that the Office currently does not have a strategy for dealing with corruption as a frontier issue; nor does it have the capacity to explore OHCHR's added value and potential contribution to this. It may become a missed opportunity if financial and human resources are not forthcoming.</p> <p>A Functional Review of OHCHR (2013-15) recommended that it strengthens its organisational governance. This has been an on-going area of focus and progress for the Office.</p> <p>Since 2014, it has been implementing the Secretary-wide Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Control Framework. This increased the capability of senior management and governing bodies to make informed decisions regarding risk/reward trade-offs related to existing and new programmes and to reduce related costs. In 2016, the Office reviewed its governance architecture to strengthen effectiveness and complementarity between governance bodies. The Office now has two senior-level decision-making bodies: the SMT and the PBRB. The PAG and extended PAG (which includes P5 and P4 managers) constitute forums for senior managers to exchange views and provide recommendations to the SMT on policy and management related matters.</p> <p>Accountability was reinforced in 2017. Governance bodies now monitor their decisions systematically and undertake corrective actions when required.</p> <p>OHCHR's Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Strategic Leadership and Direction (2018-21) contains an output, indicators and targets for strengthening organisational governance further. It acknowledges that staff must be capacitated to understand and engage with the office's governance structures and aims to address this through the internal communication strategy. Implementation of the Action Plan will be monitored through the PMS and reported at mid-year and end-of-the-year. The Secretary-General's reform may also allow the Secretariat to "conduct periodic staff surveys to monitor staff perceptions of the Office's governance, and will hold accountable those who fail to uphold the principles and characteristics of UN leadership".</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 51, 52, 81, 86, 90, 101, 121</p>
<b>MI 2.1c Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

MI 2.1d: Human Rights	Score
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on human rights issues available and showing evidence of use	N/A
Element 2: Human rights indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	N/A
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect human rights indicators and targets	N/A
Element 4: Human rights screening checklists or similar tools used for all new interventions	N/A
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address human rights issues	N/A
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on human rights is underway or has been conducted	N/A
<b>MI 2.1d Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
Given OHCHR's specific mission and mandate, it was agreed to refrain from scoring and rating against this Micro Indicator (see Paragraph 1.3. of the report).	
<b>MI 2.1d Evidence confidence</b>	

## OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

*Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance agility and accountability*

KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility	KPI score
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.67</b>
<p>Availability of budget for operational management is uncertain and constrained. OHCHR receives funding from two sources: the UN Regular budget and fundraising through donors. In 2017, the regular budget contribution constituted about 47% of OHCHR's total funding, with the remaining 53% raised directly from donors. As part of the UN system, OHCHR receives funding from the UN Regular Budget. These funds are allocated for two-year periods. The Human Rights allocation from the regular budget is politicised and there have been a number of reductions resulting from General Assembly decisions recently, including across-the-board reductions of between 5% and 25% in several budget lines.</p> <p>Non-continuation of voluntary contributions is a real and acknowledged risk and OHCHR is also vulnerable to some member states' pushback against the Human Rights agenda, and the associated objections to funding OHCHR from the UN Regular Budget. Compared to the other two pillars of the UN system (Development and Peace &amp; Security), OHCHR receives only a small percentage of funding from the UN regular budget. Funding through the UN Regular Budget is allocated to OHCHR's mandated functions. For 2018-19, its appropriation from the regular budget is USD 201.6 million, which is 3.7% of the total UN regular budget. As a consequence, about 10% of OHCHR's officially mandated activities, which should be financed through its regular budget appropriation, are funded through voluntary contributions. Compared to its regular funding, OHCHR has far more authority for managing the pursuit of extrabudgetary resources.</p>	

OHCHR launches Annual Appeals to raise voluntary contributions from donors. However, OHCHR's fundraising efforts have struggled in a politically charged context, but its current resource mobilisation approach is also regarded as insufficient. It has not been very successful in expanding its donor base beyond its "top 20 donors" – mainly UN member states, and mainly from the Western Group – that contribute more than 90% of all OHCHR's extrabudgetary funding. Recently, it has also seen a decrease in member states that become first-time donors, while 13 member states discontinued their funding in 2017. In 2016, support from private donors represented less than USD 1 million (0.8% ) of its total income. The 2017 Human Rights Report acknowledges that "additional efforts will need to be deployed to establish additional partnerships with the private sector, foundations and individuals". Funding generated through humanitarian appeal processes decreased from USD 1.3 million in 2016 to USD 752 332 in 2017. OHCHR's fundraising aims to increase extrabudgetary funding - preferably multi-year, unearmarked funding. In reality, although the proportion of unearmarked funding in 2017 (43% of the total USD 142.8 million that was raised) is an increase compared to 38% in 2016, it was the fourth time since 2008 that the proportion of earmarked donor contributions surpassed unearmarked contributions.

It is essential for OHCHR to become more successful at fundraising. By OHCHR's own assessment, fundraising efforts are not well coordinated or coherent, often causing confusion for donors, particularly those who received sometimes multiple requests for resources and without a clear sense of the Office's priorities. OHCHR also acknowledges that its communication, overall, is not sufficiently crafted to 'market' its work and that its core messages, for the most part, do not convey a compelling case for support. Discussions with member states on the regular budget are not consistently and systematically undertaken at the global, regional and country levels, which may affect some member states' political support for the Office when regular budget resources are being decided. At the same time, OHCHR's internal processes are not sufficiently geared to take full advantage of decentralised resource mobilisation.

Through extensive consultations and learning from past experience, and in accordance with the recommendations from an OIOS audit of OHCHR's Fundraising Activities (June 2016), OHCHR's Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Resource Mobilisation (2018-21) outlines a concerted effort to address these challenges. Through the Action Plan, OHCHR aims to increase voluntary contributions from non-traditional donors from 0.5% in 2017 to 15% in 2020. At the same time, it aims to increase the number of member states who make voluntary contributions over a 4-year period from 63 to 100, and the number of 'other (non-traditional) donors' from 14 to 30.

OHCHR's ability to allocate resources across agency functions in line with its organisational priorities and goals, is constrained by various factors. As part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR must comply with Secretariat-wide administrative systems, procedures and guidelines and has limited authority over human and financial resource management. In general, funding from the regular budget is not keeping pace with increases in the number and scope of new mandates adopted by the Human Rights Council. Also, the presentation of approved funding requirements for new mandates to the General Assembly are often delayed. OHCHR therefore has to rely on existing resources to cover new mandated activities until regular budget funding is released. Moreover, disruptions are caused by the implementation of UN Secretariat-wide reforms, including reform of the staff selection system and mandatory mobility (UN Mobility – now on hold); the implementation of international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS); and the roll-out of the UN Secretariat's new enterprise resource planning system (Umoja).

As of 31 December 2017, the Office employed 1,302 staff nearly half of which were based in the field. In addition to its headquarters in Geneva, where 691 staff members are based (53% of total staff), UN Human Rights has an office at UN Headquarters in New York, where 53 (4%) of its staff are based. The remaining 558 staff members (43%) are based in the field. There are 12 regional offices<sup>[1]</sup>, 14 country or stand-alone offices<sup>[2]</sup>, 24 human rights advisors<sup>[3]</sup>, and 13 human rights components in UN peace operations and political missions<sup>[4]</sup>. Field Offices are created or closed upon request by host nations. Local staff in OHCHR Regional Offices are administered by the UN secretariat. Local staff in field offices are mostly administered by UNDP in-country. When Field Offices have to close, or when Regional Offices move or restructure, local staff can be vulnerable since it is not always possible to re-deploy them to other positions.

Initiatives to restructure the Office have been impeded by UN bureaucratic and political red tape. Efforts to align the organisational structure with strategic objectives started as early as 2009, but have only partly been implemented. OHCHR is finding it challenging to find the right structure to manage and coordinate its activities across headquarters and an increasing field presence amidst a constrained funding situation and limited authority over the management of its resources. In 2013, motivated by the Secretary General's Change Plan, OHCHR adopted a programme of implementation to address internal alignment, operational effectiveness, and the ability to respond flexibly to changing priorities. An office-wide functional review was undertaken in 2014 to inform, amongst other things, the establishment of an improved organisational structure. In March 2015, OHCHR announced the High Commissioner's "Change Initiative", meant to make the Office better suited to contemporary challenges, more flexible, adaptable and responsive to member states' requests and directives and more relevant to the shifting opportunities for – and threats to – the advancement of human rights. It also aimed at addressing the findings of an OIOS evaluation that OHCHR representatives in the field have an inadequate grade level compared to other parts of the UN system, which limits their access in the context of policymaking and decision-making processes.

Some of the initiatives proposed under the Change Initiative have been implemented, but the 5th Committee has deferred decisions on others, especially bolstering capacity of the New York and regional offices indefinitely. This decision is likely to impact negatively on OHCHR's capacity to mainstream human rights both globally and on the ground. The Geneva headquarters was re-structured from four divisions (Research & Right to Development Division; Human Rights Treaty Division, Field Operations & Technical Cooperation Division, and Human Rights Council & Special Procedures Division) to three. The Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division was retained, with the remaining divisions consolidated into the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures & Right to Development Division (TESPRDD) and the Human Rights Council & Treaty Mechanisms Division (HRCTM). However, after several years of discussions, OHCHR could not get the General Assembly's Fifth Committee's approval for strengthening its capacity at the New York office, or at a regional level. With no additional capacity at the New York office, OHCHR's capacity to mainstream human rights throughout the UN system will likely be affected negatively. Also, OHCHR's Regional Offices will now likely remain small – smaller than most Country Offices.

OHCHR has a relatively centralised decision-making structure. Compared to other entities of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR has limited delegation of authority for managing funding it receives from the regular budget, as well as staff positions funded through the regular budget. However, it has full delegated authority for the management of its Trust Funds, through which funding from extrabudgetary sources is channeled. Decision-making authorities and responsibilities pertaining to budgeting and financial resources management are spelled out in various internal documents. In 2016, the Terms of Reference of the Office's main decision-making body on these matters, the Programme Budget and Review Board (PBRB), which is chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner, were revised. The revisions included adjustments to some of the processes and thresholds applicable to delegated authority, including increasing the authority of Division Directors and Heads of Managing Entities to re-allocate and redeploy resources.

Centralised financial management authority is related to limited administrative capacity in OHCHR field offices. OHCHR staff in the field regard the 'administrative relationship' with UNDP as relatively responsive and supportive (with UNDP charging per-transaction fees based on Universal Price Lists), but also experience frustrations around the centralised financial management system within OHCHR, saying it discourages them to raise funds locally. Interestingly, the majority of OHCHR's partners are very positive about the extent to which staff can make critical strategic or programming decisions at a local level.

Despite this, OHCHR has stated its intention to continue to delegate more authority to the field. OHCHR's OMP 2018-21 undertakes to "bringing decision making closer to the point of delivery". The OMP 2018-21 acknowledges that OHCHR needs to realign and reinforce its internal organisational arrangements to successfully deliver its commitments. Among others, it undertakes to "enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of internal decision making to elevate further our focus on field operations, and bring decision making closer to the point of delivery"; and "enhance administrative and programmatic support to the entire Office, including field presences". No further details are provided.

OHCHR has full control over recruiting and managing staff positions and general technical assistance positions funded through extrabudgetary resources. For staff positions funded through the Regular Budget, implementation of the Secretary General's initiative to introduce a new staff selection and a managed mobility system (ST/SGB/2016/2) has been put on hold. This gives the High Commissioner greater authority over staff recruitment, while managers can also conduct recruitment. OHCHR does the recruitment for temporary staff appointments (appointments of up to 12 months) funded through the Regular Budget. Regular staff positions are for more than a 12-month period (mostly one-year fixed term positions that can be extended). It can recruit and select staff for such positions up to a D2 level, subject to the Secretary-General's approval. All other administrative HRM responsibilities are handled by the Secretariat, through the UN's Office at Geneva (UNOG). It is unclear how the roll-out of Global Service Delivery Model for the UN Secretariat will affect OHCHR's authority over the management of its extrabudgetary resources and staff recruitment.

OHCHR does not yet have a systematic approach to Human Resource Management. As such, this is seen as "missing an opportunity to benchmark organisational performance and set clear goals for its largest and most valuable resource: its people". OHCHR staff understand that its position as part of the UN Secretariat comes with an administrative burden and limits the Office's ability to improve its Human Resource Management. However, staff are also critical of practices that lead to the inefficient use of OHCHR's human resources and the loss of expertise, citing various examples: different contractual entitlements for contracted and temporary staff although they do the same work and have the same responsibility; an enforced three-month 'break' for temporary staff after two years in a position, during which time they are not allowed to work for OHCHR; the staff mobility system that "prevents new blood from coming in"; and a complicated, inequitable career advancement pathway for staff who enter OHCHR via a very competitive Young Professional Programme. These could further hinder plans to increase diversity, flexibility and efficiency in OHCHR's workforce.

Improving Human Resource Management, and talent management in particular, is one of nine organisational effectiveness action plans of the OMP 2018-21. One of the Office's key challenges lies in strengthening its staff presence at a regional and country level, a key requirement for the realisation of OHCHR's strategic objectives across all six thematic pillars. So far, OHCHR's partners generally have a very high regard for the expertise and continuity of staff to work effectively at a country level. However, staff are overstretched and unable to respond to the growing demand for OHCHR's services and support from governments and other stakeholders at the country level.

<b>MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are continuously aligned and adjusted to key functions</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.33</b>
Element 1: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganised to, requirements set out in the current Strategic Plan	2
Element 2: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, as set out in the current Strategic Plan	2
Element 3: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent, aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan	3

MI 3.1 Analysis	Source document
<p><b>HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT</b></p> <p>As of 31 December 2017, the Office employed 1,302 staff. In addition to its headquarters in Geneva, where 691 staff members are based (53% of total staff), UN Human Rights has an office at UN Headquarters in New York, where 53 (4%) of its staff are based. The remaining 558 staff members (43%) are based in the field. There four types of field presences: regional offices, country offices, Human Rights Advisors, and human rights components in UN peace operations and political missions. OHCHR has 12 regional offices/centres[5] and 14 country or stand-alone offices[6]. Field offices are created upon request by host nations on the basis of regularly renewable MoU's. Local Staff in OHCHR Regional Offices are administered by the UN secretariat. Local staff in field offices are mostly administered by UNDP in-country. When field offices have to close, or when regional offices move or restructure, local staff can be vulnerable since it is not always possible to re-deploy them to other positions. Human rights components of UN peace/political missions are currently deployed in Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Libya, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2017, Human Rights collaborated with around 700 human rights officers in these peace missions. Human rights advisers/officers are currently deployed in UN Country teams in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya, Madagascar, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, the Russian Federation, Republic of Moldova, South Caucasus (covering Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Philippines, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea.</p> <p>OHCHR also has a rapid deployment team in its Human Resource Management Department where staff members deploy to emergency situations for a period of at least two months. Further efforts will be made in 2018-2021 to enhance the effectiveness of emergency deployments in line with recommendations from JIU's 2014 Review of Management and Administration of the Office. This will involve the use of a pre-cleared roster of staff who can be deployed quickly.</p> <p>OHCHR 's human resource management is entirely geared by UN Secretariat rules and procedures. Internal reviews that informed the development of the OMP 2018-2021 suggest that OHCHR does not yet have a systematic approach to Human Resource Management, thereby "missing an opportunity to benchmark organisational performance and set clear goals for its largest and most valuable resource: its people". OHCHR staff understand that its position as part of the UN Secretariat comes with an administrative burden and limits the Office's ability to improve its human resource management. However, staff are also critical of what they regard as "outdated" and "pointless" UN Secretariat practices that lead to the inefficient use of OHCHR's human resources and the loss of expertise, citing various examples: different contractual entitlements for contracted and temporary staff although they do the same work and have the same responsibility; an enforced three-month 'break' for temporary staff after two years in a position, during which time they are not allowed to work for OHCHR; the staff mobility system that "prevents new blood from coming in"; and a complicated, inequitable career advancement pathway for staff who enter OHCHR via a very competitive Young Professional Programme. These could further hinder plans to increase diversity, flexibility and efficiency in OHCHR's workforce.</p> <p>Improving human resource management is one of nine organisational effectiveness action plans of the OMP 2018-21. One of the Office's key challenges lies in strengthening its capacity at a regional and country level, a key requirement for the realisation of OHCHR's strategic objectives across all six thematic pillars. So far, OHCHR's partners generally have a very high regard for the expertise and continuity of staff to work effectively at a country level. However, staff are overstretched and unable to respond to the growing demand of governments and other stakeholders at the country level.</p>	<p>1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 90, 91, 105, 122</p>

## RESOURCE MOBILISATION

OHCHR funds its operations from two sources: regular budget and voluntary (= extrabudgetary) contributions. Funding from the UN regular budget constituted 47% of OHCHR's expenses in 2017, while funding from voluntary contributions by donors constituted the remaining 53%. The largest proportion of funding appropriated from the UN regular budget is allocated for implementing activities mandated by the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs, including the Human Rights Council (HRC). The largest proportion of voluntary contributions is allocated to field presences, although a significant proportion of extrabudgetary funding is also allocated to Headquarters functions.

OHCHR has a contingency fund for rapid responses, which is funded from earmarked voluntary contributions. If no earmarked contributions are available, funding from unearmarked voluntary funding is allocated to the rapid response fund. Generally, about USD 1 million is held in the contingency fund, which is managed by the Emergency Response Section. Funding from the rapid response fund can be released within one day.

OHCHR's ability to allocate resources across functions in line with its organisational priorities and goals, are constrained by various factors, amongst others:

- In general, funding from the regular budget is not keeping pace with increases in the number and scope of new mandates adopted by the Human Rights Council. Compared to the other two pillars of the UN system (development and peace & security), OHCHR receives a comparatively small percentage of funding from the UN regular budget. For 2018-19, its appropriation from the regular budget is USD 201.6 million, which is 3.7% of the total UN regular budget. The human rights allocation for the regular budget is a politically charged issue and there were a number of reductions resulting from General Assembly decisions, including across-the-board reductions of between 5% and 25% in several budget lines. About 10% of OHCHR's officially mandated activities, which should be financed through its regular budget appropriation, are funded through voluntary contributions.
- The presentation of approved funding requirements for new mandates to the General Assembly are often delayed. OHCHR therefore has to rely on existing resources to cover new mandated activities until regular budget funding is released.
- Disruptions caused by the implementation of UN Secretariat-wide reforms, including reform of the staff selection system and mandatory mobility (UN Mobility – now on hold); the implementation of international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS); and the roll-out of the UN Secretariat's new enterprise resource planning system (Umoja).

1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14,  
16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24,  
25, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37,  
90, 91, 105, 122

## RESTRUCTURING

The most recent OHCHR efforts to create a fit-for-purpose organisational structure started in 2009 with an organisational effectiveness programme resulting from an OIOS evaluation of how efficiently and effectively the mandate of OHCHR was being implemented. In 2013, motivated by the Secretary General's Change Plan, OHCHR adopted a programme of implementation to address internal alignment, operational effectiveness, and the ability to respond flexibly to changing priorities. An office-wide functional review was undertaken in 2014 to inform, amongst other things, the establishment of an improved organisational structure.

During 2014-17, the Office was aligned to a common set of results that were articulated in the OMP. These results were connected to the various components of OHCHR's mandate. In March 2015, OHCHR announced the High Commissioner's "Change Initiative", meant to make the Office better suited to contemporary challenges, more flexible, adaptable and responsive to member States' requests and directives and more relevant to the shifting opportunities for – and threats to – the advancement of human rights. It also aimed at addressing the findings of an OIOS evaluation that

OHCHR representatives in the field have an inadequate grade level compared to other parts of the UN system, which limits their access in the context of policymaking and decision-making processes.

Amongst others, the Change Initiative Plan was aimed at:

- Rebalancing its HQ and field-based capacity – areas of work which it regards as mutually informing and re-enforcing.
- Re-structuring Geneva headquarters from the existing four divisions into three core areas with a view to strengthening coordination within Headquarters and between Headquarters and the field.
- Strengthening the New York Office to better support the integration of human rights concerns and approaches in the development and peace and security agendas, especially in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
- Rebalancing OHCHR's global coverage through more viable regional field presences.
- Facilitating more strategic partnerships with key stakeholders, including member states and the United Nations system.
- Shifting the location of key operations to reduce associated costs, including strengthening OHCHR's presence and capacity at a regional level to bring technical support closer to the field (e.g. desk officers, who are based in Geneva, would have been deployed to Regional Offices), where it could enable more responsive and coherent field operations.
- Change internal governance and work processes to make OHCHR more efficient and effective.

Some of the initiatives proposed under the Change Initiative Plan were implemented. The Geneva headquarters was re-structured from four divisions (Research & Right to Development Division; Human Rights Treaty Division, Field Operations & Technical Cooperation Division, and Human Rights Council & Special Procedures Division) to three. The Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division was retained, with the remaining divisions consolidated into the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures & Right to Development Division (TESPRDD) and the Human Rights Council & Treaty Mechanisms Division (HRCTM). However, after several years of discussions, OHCHR could not get the General Assembly's Fifth Committee's approval for strengthening its capacity at the New York office, or at a regional level. Staff that had been transferred from Geneva to NY while the conversations with the GA were taking place, had to return to Geneva. With no additional capacity at the New York office, OHCHR will explore alternative approaches to safeguard the mainstreaming of human rights at the NY level. Also, OHCHR's regional offices will now likely remain small – smaller than most country offices. Alternative approaches to strengthening capacity at regional offices are being explored.

Organisationally, the question for implementing the new OMP (2018-21) is: "How nimble can we [OHCHR] be, despite the challenges we face, to deliver our new four-year strategy in ever-changing world?" OHCHR staff indicated that the collaborative process through which the OMP 2018-21 was developed brought greater clarity of vision. They are confident that annual work plans and activities can be developed and tailored to deliver the new OMP. The new Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Human Resources (2018-21) further commits to better align recruitment and staff management of the Office's strategic, operational and managerial requirements. However, care needs to be taken that the existing workload and new demands are constantly managed according to capacity. There are early indications that some sections could become overloaded by dealing with new and emerging issues that do not "fit in anywhere else" in the new organisational structure, for example migration, economic, social and cultural rights, business and human rights, people with disabilities and child and youth rights.

1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 90, 91, 105, 122

<p>Another challenge in delivering the new OMP 2018-21 relates to OHCHR's alignment with the 2030 Development Agenda. This will require robust coordination between Divisions and sections to deal in an integrated manner with thematic work, e.g. Special Rapporteurs working on women's rights, OHCHR Special Procedures branch and other staff working on women's rights issues to work in a more coherent manner. Most OHCHR staff see the "boxes of the organigramme" as artificial and, while "the organisational structure is not very logical", it "does not hinder us from working together". Related to this is overcoming the 'duality' introduced by the location of OHCHR's Geneva-based office across two locations, which separates the Office's thematic, policy-oriented work and its worked aimed at supporting human right mechanisms.</p>	<p>1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 90, 91, 105, 122</p>
<p><b>MI 3.1 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI Rating</b></p>	<p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3</b></p>
<p>Element 1: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 2: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 3: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 4: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan/ relevant country plan</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 5: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support contains clear targets, monitoring and reporting mechanisms geared to the Strategic Plan or equivalent</p>	<p>2</p>
<p><b>MI 3.2 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>As part of the UN system, OHCHR submits Annual Appeals for extrabudgetary funding. These funds are allocated for two-year periods to each of the three pillars of the UN system: Human Rights; Development; and Peace and Security. Funding through the UN Regular Budget is allocated to OHCHR's mandated functions. In 2017, it constituted about 47% of OHCHR's funding, with the remaining 53% having to be raised directly from donors. In 2016, support from private donors represented less than USD 1 million (0.8% of the total income).</p> <p>The largest proportion of OHCHR's voluntary funding comes from a small number of major donors - mainly UN member states from the Western group. OHCHR's "top 20 donors" typically provide more than 90% of all extrabudgetary contributions. During the period 2014-17, only 48 member states provided an annual contribution to OHCHR, and 36 others contributed at least once. In 2017, 63 member states made contributions to UN Human Rights (three less than in 2016). No member states pledged funds for the first time, while ten renewed their support after at least one year of inactivity. Thirteen member states discontinued their funding. Almost all of the countries from the Western Group contributed in 2017, followed by 43% from the Eastern European Group; 30% from both the Latin American Group and Asian Group; and only 4% from the African Group. OHCHR acknowledges the risk of non-continuation of voluntary contributions from major donors that could undermine the capacity of OHCHR to effectively fulfil its mandate. It is also vulnerable to some member states'</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 18, 20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35, 37, 56, 84, 90, 91, 106, 122, 123</p>

opposition to the human rights agenda, and the associated objections to funding OHCHR from the UN Regular Budget. Because of its mandate, OHCHR staff believe that politicisation of the UN budget process affects the human rights pillar disproportionately, compared to the other two pillars.

OHCHR's Department of External Relations (DEXREL) has the lead responsibility for resource mobilisation in OHCHR, but the function also cuts across the whole of OHCHR, including senior management. Both field presences and headquarters entities are tasked with the responsibility to cultivate relations with donors, and are therefore encouraged to fundraise, in close collaboration with DEXREL, for their approved Annual Work Plans and Annual Cost Plans (AWP/CP). In 2014, OHCHR issued guidance for fundraising at headquarters and field presences to promote a unified effort to financing its work. The guidance was broadly aligned with resource mobilisation guidance outlined in OHCHR's 2008 Field Administrative Manual. The Field Guidance Note for fundraising was updated in 2017. Its focus is on raising more extrabudgetary funding (preferably unearmarked) from member states, intergovernmental bodies, private foundations, the private sector and individual donors, mainly to fund OHCHR's work in the field. The guidance emphasises that earmarked contributions should primarily target activities within approved Annual Work and Cost Plans, in line with the Annual Appeal and the OMP, and that earmarked contributions for activities that do not contribute to the expected accomplishments outlined in the OMP cannot be accepted.

OHCHR has a special Policy on Partnership with the business sector. It emphasises the importance of due diligence screening, which can be supported by professional screening services provided under a multi-UN agreement to examine companies' human rights records and shed light on any controversies. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre and selected NGO reports are also referred to for evidence. Finally, the human rights mechanisms can highlight any adverse human rights impacts, especially at the country level. Upon completion of these procedures, a memorandum is prepared to approve the partnership. The guidance also points to the UN Global Compact and its local networks as a useful platform to identify partnership opportunities with the business sector. In addition, a web-based databank has been established to better match proposals received from businesses with the needs of various UN organisations. OHCHR's profile is featured on: <http://business.un.org/en/partnerships>.

OHCHR requires predictability and autonomy in allocating resources to plan and implement its activities. It therefore seeks, preferentially, multi-year and unearmarked funds from donors. Although the fundraising guidance gives priority to unearmarked and broadly earmarked contributions that would allow the Office to use funds where they are most needed, multi-year funding is not specifically mentioned. Of the total USD 145.4 million in extrabudgetary contributions that was raised by OHCHR in 2017, earmarked contributions (57%) surpassed unearmarked contributions (43%) for the fourth time since 2008. However, on a positive note, the proportion of unearmarked funding (43%) is an increase compared to 38% in 2016. In 2017, a total of 102 funding agreements were signed, of which only 22 were multi-year agreements. The number of donors which have multi-year funding arrangements with OHCHR increased from 10 in 2016 to 15 in 2017. Of these 15, 11 were member states (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and 3 were institutional donors (including the MacArthur Foundation and Microsoft); the remaining 1 was the European Commission.

OHCHR's OMP 2014-17 pointed out that OHCHR had been making insufficient use of existing funding streams that are relevant to OHCHR's field work, including humanitarian funding processes, such as Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs), Flash Appeals, pooled funds and the Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF). It undertook to ensure that OHCHR staff were well informed about donor priority themes and countries, existing budget lines and funding opportunities, and that they were

1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 18,  
20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35,  
37, 56, 84, 90, 91, 106,  
122, 123

appropriately supported in liaising and engaging with donors. Still, funding generated through humanitarian appeal processes decreased from USD 1.3 million in 2016 to USD 752 332 in 2017.

OHCHR Senior managers and staff use key events such as the launch of Annual Appeals and Annual Reports to brief member states and donors on the Office's work, plans, achievements and outputs, as well as on funding requirements. A large volume of printed material is also distributed worldwide to raise awareness on substantive human rights issues, and field presences organise outreach activities to raise the awareness of stakeholders about the mandate of UN Human Rights, to garner support for its work. Regional offices, in consultation with DEXREL, are actively involved in fundraising. Heads of Regional Offices hold structured annual consultations, separate from the Annual Appeal, with donors.

As part of its fundraising efforts, DEXREL submitted a request to the OECD to allow its members to report a larger proportion of their contributions to OHCHR as official development assistance. A successful review by the OECD's DAC meant that, from 2017, donors can report 88% of their unearmarked contributions to OHCHR as official development assistance, compared to the 64% previously. In addition, donor support earmarked for OHCHR's work in developing countries, as per the OECD list of recipient countries, as well as contributions to the Voluntary Funds for Victims of Torture and for Technical Cooperation, could now be reported in full as official development assistance. This could see unearmarked funding to OHCHR increase further in the future. Meanwhile, OHCHR is also tapping into non-traditional budget lines from which donors can only provide earmarked funds.

It appears that OHCHR's internal processes are not sufficiently geared to take full advantage of decentralised resource mobilisation:

- Staff in some country offices indicate that they have no problem to mobilise resources locally, but OHCHR's 'centralised systems' make it difficult to access funding raised locally. OHCHR staff in field offices have reportedly "turned money away because it's just too complicated and takes too long" to access it. Field staff also feel frustrated by a perceived inability of staff at HQ to understand that quick access to these resources is, in many cases, very urgent.
- The fast-track procedure does not apply to recruitment and the associated delays can have major implications. For example, in June 2017 the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution directing the High Commissioner for Human Rights to send a team of international experts to investigate alleged human rights violations and abuses in the central Kasai region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Congolese government had agreed to cooperate, including by facilitating access. However, an exploratory team could only be mobilised four months later and during that time, "a lot of evidence disappeared". An example was also mentioned from Guatemala, where accessing funding for an important recruitment took over a month.
- Pro-bono agreements require clearance from the UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs, the Insurance Division, the Procurement Division and the Financial Controller; and take up to six months to be validated. Staff also feel discouraged from engaging in resource mobilisation due to what they perceive as cumbersome internal administrative review procedures.
- The financial reporting module of Umoja is not yet fully functional. This makes the extraction of financial records to produce numerous donor financial reports extremely labour intensive. The reporting requirements associated with earmarked donor funding is especially demanding and has nearly doubled the volume of reports prepared by PSMS in recent years.

A 2016 OIOS audit of OHCHR's fundraising activities found that the internal capacity was not congruent with the OMP expectation that it would (a) expand its donor base by 30 %; (b) maintain un-earmarked contribution at 50 % of yearly voluntary contributions; and (c) increase the number of users of its social media platform by 50 % annually. The audit pointed out that OHCHR had not assessed the capacity

1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 18,  
20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35,  
37, 56, 84, 90, 91, 106,  
122, 123

needed to achieve these goals; an additional resource allocation of approximately USD 2 million to strengthen resource mobilisation capacity included in the draft fundraising strategy had not been reviewed and approved by PBRB; the DEXREL budget had not increased since 2013 and it had not conducted a staff development needs assessment in the last two years to identify and address any significant gaps in skills.

By OHCHR's own assessment, fundraising efforts are not well coordinated or coherent, often causing confusion for donors, particularly those who received sometimes multiple requests for resources and without a clear sense of the Office's priorities. For example, focus areas outlined in the 2017 Annual Appeal did not align with either the sub-programmes of the Strategic Framework or the Thematic Priorities in the OMP. Instead, it included what appear to be selected activities or sub-priorities, namely (1) Strengthening early warning and effective early action; (2) Protecting and expanding civil society space; (3) Peaceful co-existence, prevention of hate and erosion of the politics of fear and (4) Protecting the rights of people on the move and countering xenophobia, as well as a specific focus on (5) Advancing the 2030 Agenda - Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, it mentions Strategic Projects that come with additional or exceptional demands on its mandate, including Human Right Up Front, Human Rights Investigations, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Global study on children deprived of liberty.

OHCHR also acknowledges that its communication, overall, is not sufficiently crafted to 'market' its work and that its core messages, for the most part, do not convey a compelling case for support. For instance, although the 2018 Annual Appeal describes the key elements of the OMP 2018-21, it does not link this to the results OHCHR delivers. The overview of regular budget allocations and extrabudgetary requirements, presented in a financial statement format, indicates where extrabudgetary funding is required but it does not provide potential donors with a compelling reason why they should support a particular area, and what the results are that they will be contributing towards. This flaw does not apply to the mobilisation of extrabudgetary funding only. Discussions with member states on the regular budget are also not systematised at the global, regional and country levels, which likely undermines political support for the Office when regular budget resources are being decided. Therefore, as part of the 2018-21 OMP, an Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan for Resource Mobilisation was developed.

In accordance with the recommendations from an OIOS audit of OHCHR's Fundraising Activities (June 2016), the Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan on Resource Mobilisation commits to expanding OHCHR's donor base through (1) clarifying a compelling "case for giving" and "value for money" to donors, and improving the way in which results are communicated to donors; (2) adopting a coherent and coordinated – one Office – approach to resource mobilisation; (3) strengthening dialogue and deepening partnerships with member states and medium-level donors, as well as non-traditional donors such as companies, high net worth individuals, foundations and digital platforms; (4) investing in staff capacity and competencies – at global, regional and country levels; (5) creating an enabling environment for staff to engage in resource mobilisation. Furthermore, the Action Plan outlines actions and outputs for each of these areas. Moreover, it aims to (1) pilot dedicated resource mobilisation staff at various field locations and in other relevant areas in the Office to help tap into local funding sources and opportunities; (2) Pilot a new private donor fundraising team focused on major donors and digital fundraising; (3) Enhance capacity in donor communications, proposal writing, and other strategic areas. It aims to increase voluntary contributions from member states from a baseline of 83% of USD 142.8 million in 2017, to 85% of USD 200 million in 2020. The corresponding increase for 'other donors' is from 0.5% to 15%. At the same time, it aims to increase the number of member states who make voluntary contributions over a 4-year period from 63 to 100, and the number of 'other (non-traditional) donors' from 14 to 30.

1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 18,  
20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35,  
37, 56, 84, 90, 91, 106,  
122, 123

<p>To foster and strengthen resource mobilisation coherence and coordination across the Office, DEXREL has redesigned and populated its intranet with a number of key resources, including templates for funding proposals, fact sheets, infographics, training packages, resource mobilisation information, such as voluntary contributions, proposals and reports submitted to donors, calls for proposals and other relevant information.</p> <p>OHCHR field staff believe that resource mobilisation at decentralised levels can be highly effective. OHCHR's work in the field is visible to donors and, depending on the donor environment in-country, funding can be attracted relatively easily. Field-based staff also believe that HQ does not have enough understanding of "what is needed and how it needs to be used" and therefore cannot lobby effectively for funding for the bulk of its extrabudgetary work. However, they acknowledge that resource mobilisation requires special skills and they would look to HQ for supporting them in this regard. Field-based staff are aware that resource mobilisation must be undertaken with care so as not to put OHCHR in competition with local human rights organisations for limited resources. Survey results suggest that partners perceive OHCHR as co-operating well with development or humanitarian partners to make sure that financial co-operation at a country level is coherent and not fragmented.</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 18, 20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 35, 37, 56, 84, 90, 91, 106, 122, 123</p>
<b>MI 3.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 3.3: Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.75</b>
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation	4
Element 2: (If the first criterion is met) The policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralised level as appropriate) regarding aid reallocation/programming	2
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level, as appropriate	2
Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on aid allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	3
<b>MI 3.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR country offices develop their own Annual Work Plans, based on the OMP. Annual Work Plans are costed by the Finance and Budget Section at HQ. Every month, actual spending overviews are prepared at unit level, and aggregated to a corporate level. Annual Work Plans / Cost Plans are reviewed at mid-year. If changes are needed, the PBRB discusses this and decides whether it can be authorised. Most items in Annual Cost Plans relate to staff expenses and are relatively fixed, so changes mainly involve activities that are funded from extrabudgetary resources.</p> <p>Compared to other entities of the Secretariat, OHCHR has limited delegation of authority for managing funding it receives from the Regular Budget, as well as staff positions funded through the Regular Budget. However, it has full delegated authority for the management of its Trust Funds, through which funding from extrabudgetary sources is channeled. Nevertheless, OHCHR has a relatively centralised decision-making structure.</p>	<p>6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 28, 31, 85, 90, 122</p>

The OHCHR Field Administrative Manual sets out guidelines for decision-making pertaining to budgeting and financial resources management. In 2016, the Terms of Reference of the Programme Budget and Review Board (PBRB), which is chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner, were revised. The revisions included adjustments to some of the processes and thresholds applicable to delegated authority, including increasing the authority of Division Directors and Heads of Managing Entities to re-allocate and redeploy resources.

Key elements of the policy/guidelines pertaining to delegation of financial authority are as follows:

- Authority for organisational financial and human resources management is vested mainly in the PBRB. OHCHR field offices submit prospective annual work and cost plans to the Chief of Programme Support and Management Services (PSMS) for review before submission to the PBRB and Senior Management Team for approval. Once approved, they are transmitted to the United Nations Financial Resources Management Service in support of the OHCHR request for authority to spend during that year.
- Approved cost plans are used as a basis for preparing quarterly allotment requests under the different project accounts for each office. The Allotment Advice constitutes official authorisation to incur expenditures for a given account. The Staffing Table Authorisation (STA) is an integral part of the Allotment Advice and it reflects the posts established and authorised for each project.
- Day-to-day allocations and shifts in non-STA funding (within the allocated total) can be done at a country level. The Head of the OHCHR office in-country can request the UNDP office to authorise requests to this effect. However, the Chief of PSMS has to authorise shifts between STA funding and non-STA funding.
- Field offices are not authorised to spend beyond amounts stipulated in financial authorisations in the Allotment Advice it receives from HQ. Any spending over this threshold requires a revision of cost plans, which must be approved by the Chief of PSMS, provided it does not exceed an amount of USD 50 000 per cost plan per year. The PBRB Chair can authorise increases to approved allocations of USD 50 000 to USD 200 000 cumulative within one calendar year for any individual programming unit. It can be referred to the full PBRB for review if deemed necessary.
- The PBRB can make recommendations to the High Commissioner for changes to approved financial allocations to programming units, requested either from the existing resources or sought through fund-raising efforts exceeding the cumulative amount of USD 200 000 to a Programming unit within one calendar year.
- Technical revisions to cost plans due to calculation errors, unforeseen charges pertaining to prior financial periods, changes in DSA rates, etc. can be covered from voluntary contributions at the country or regional level. When anticipated voluntary contributions are insufficient to meet these technical adjustments, it will be submitted to the PBRB for consideration.
- Field offices can procure activities, supplies, equipment, or other requirements for less than USD 200 000 in accordance with rules and regulations laid out in the procurement manual of the local service provider (LSP). The UNOG Committee must approve contracts for the procurement of goods and services valued at USD 200 000 or more.
- Grants made to national or international institutions, non-United Nations agencies, NGOs and partner organisations at a decentralised level are decided by the OHCHR Grants Committee, based on detailed case files prepared by the requesting Project Officers.

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28, 31, 85, 90, 122

- The PSMS can now approve additional allocations of funds of up to USD 200 000 for technical adjustments to field offices' cost plans, as well as additional allocations of up to USD 50 000 as requested and justified by the Heads of Managing Entities. It can also approve increases of up to USD 200 000 from unspent earmarked contributions for technical adjustments to approved cost plans of activities funded from earmarked extrabudgetary contributions.
- Division Directors can decide on the reallocation of funds between Managing Entities (Branches at HQ and Regional Offices), provided that they do not exceed USD 200 000 cumulative within one calendar year and provided they will not affect the organisational structure of more than one Division or require structural changes in sections and field presences that could have implications for the achievement of programmatic commitments.
- The Heads of Managing Entities can request additional allocations of funds of up to USD 50 000 cumulative within one calendar year for any individual programming unit and on re-allocation of funds within the Managing Entities (including within the regions), in consultation with the concerned Director, provided that they do not exceed USD 200 000 and will not affect the organisational structure of more than one division, or require structural changes in sections and field presences that could have implications for the achievement of programmatic commitments. They can also decide on redeployment of resources within approved cost plans to meet changing requirements throughout the year.
- The PBRB has a fast-track procedure for Humanitarian funding requests that require a rapid response. The intended turnaround time for such requests is one to three days.

OHCHR follows UN Secretariat Human Resource Management rules and procedures for both regular budget and extra-budgetary posts. For staff positions funded through the Regular Budget, implementation of the Secretary General's initiative to introduce a new staff selection and a managed mobility system (ST/SGB/2016/2) has been put on hold. This would have replaced ST/AI/2010/3 and introduced a more centralised decision-making process that would have been managed through a centralised decision-making process. With the managed mobility system on hold, the current selection process for positions funded through the regular budget complies with UN Secretariat Administrative Instructions ST/AI/2010/3. This gives the High Commissioner greater authority over staff recruitment, while managers can also conduct recruitment. OHCHR does the recruitment for temporary staff appointments (appointments of up to 12 months) funded through the Regular Budget. Regular staff positions are for more than a 12-month period (mostly one-year fixed term positions that can be extended).

OHCHR can recruit and select staff for such positions up to a D2 level, subject to the Secretary-General's approval. Once a candidate is selected, UNOG enters the candidate into the UN "entitlements" system by entering the appointed person in the UMOJA HRM system. OHCHR has no authority to enter new information in the UMOJA HRM system. In accordance with the Global Service Delivery Model for the UN Secretariat, repetitive transactional Human Resource Management functions, such as payroll, will be transferred from UNOG to Shared Services Centres in Budapest, Nairobi, Mexico and Kuala Lumpur. It is not clear yet how this will affect OHCHR's authority over the management of its extrabudgetary resources and staff recruitment.

6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16,  
28, 31, 85, 90, 122

Centralised financial management authority is related to limited administrative capacity in OHCHR field offices. Despite this, the majority of OHCHR's partners are very positive about the extent to which staff can make critical strategic or programming decisions at a local level. OHCHR staff in the field regard the 'administrative relationship' with UNDP as relatively responsive and supportive, albeit expensive (referring to the 12% management fee they levy for their services). However, the centralised financial management system is also blamed for discouraging decentralised resource mobilisation. In the words of one interviewee, "we are careful not to accept resources we cannot absorb ... I cannot follow and navigate all the hoops while looking after my day to day programmes. Steps to receive the money are too complicated to absorb".

Independent external evaluations identify a number of areas for improvement in OHCHR's operational management. An evaluation of the Programmes supported by the Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) (2016) found that there was a lack of consistent understanding between headquarters and RCOs regarding delegated authority for HRAs, including their supervision and funding. It proposed guidelines to clarify this, linked to the main role of an HRA and the duration of his/her deployment. An evaluation of OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) identified a key risk that comes with delegated authority to fundraise: i.e. tension between OHCHR's central guidance to fundraising strictly in accordance with the Office's approved work programme and the view of donors that funding should cover work beyond the office's core activities. The evaluation cautioned that heavy reliance on project funding for core strategic activities could potentially make ROCA's strategic planning process donor-driven. A key recommendation from the evaluation was that "OHCHR should devolve as many decisions about the disbursement of funds for emergency responses in the field to the field level wherever possible". This was echoed by a 2015 external evaluation of the "Combating Discrimination in the Republic of Moldova, including in the Transnistrian Region" project.

OHCHR has implemented several recommendations from a functional review that was within its purview to implement. This includes, amongst others, delegating authority for field recruitment and the electronic submission of recruitment memos. OHCHR did not get approval from the Fifth Committee for a proposal to strengthen its regional offices (as part of the Change Initiative – see MI 3.2.), which was intended to strengthen deployment of resources to the field, closer to member states, rights-holders and other key partners.

In line with the UN Secretary General's management reform priorities, OHCHR's OMP 2018-21 undertakes to "bringing decision-making closer to the point of delivery". The OMP 2018-21 acknowledges that OHCHR needs to realign and reinforce its internal organisational arrangements to successfully deliver its commitments. Amongst others, it undertakes to "enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of internal decision making to elevate further our focus on field operations, and bring decision making closer to the point of delivery"; and enhance administrative and programmatic support to the entire Office, including field presences". No further detail is provided.

6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16,  
28, 31, 85, 90, 122

### MI 3.3 Evidence confidence

Medium confidence

<b>MI 3.4: HR systems and policies performance based and geared to the achievement of results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff	3
Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically and implemented by the organisation across all staff and to the required frequency	2
Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other agencies	3
Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions, etc.	2
Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments	3
<b>MI 3.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR staff members are subject to annual performance reviews. It is compulsory for all staff to complete the e-PAS electronic performance appraisal review on an annual basis, with a mid-term review. Through the PMS, OHCHR has a clear process through which Annual Work plans for its various divisions, sections and offices are developed to contribute to the achievement of objectives in its OMP. Individual staff can use the PMS to identify areas where they are named to provide a contribution, and can develop their individual work plans accordingly. The Office has made concerted efforts to train its staff worldwide to use the e-performance tool effectively and during 2018-21 it aims to implement e-PAS for all national and international staff. The e-PAS is linked to OHCHR human resources systems and processes including staff development, mobility, recruitment and placement. "Unsatisfactory service" and "disciplinary reasons" can lead to the termination of UN Secretariat staff members' employment.</p> <p>OHCHR's senior managers are subject to the Secretariat's performance management policies and systems. A process of 360 degrees feedback for staff at D1 level and above is currently being piloted.</p> <p>Based on their work plans, Human Rights Advisers have bi-annual performance appraisals with their 'first reporting officer', the local UN Resident Coordinator. Resident Coordinators submit HRA performance reports to OHCHR and they are then subject to a second, more outcomes-focused, performance appraisal with their second reporting officer in OHCHR.</p> <p>A 2014 JIU Review of Management and Administration of OHCHR identified no specific issues concerning the functioning of, and compliance with, the performance management policies and systems. However, challenges around general accountability for individual performance were identified, especially on the part of managers. OHCHR itself expressed concern over "perennial low performance management compliance".</p> <p>To inform the development of the OMP 2018-21, all parts of the office were required to report on their contributions to the OMP 2014-17 results and to reflect on challenges and lessons learned. The results were analysed and shared by PBRB.</p>	10, 11, 18, 25, 28, 90, 105, 122

<p>One of the 2018-21 OMP outputs is to strengthen staff learning and career support aligned to Office priorities. To achieve this, managers will support staff development activities aligned to Office strategic and operational priorities, including through feedback/follow-up on e-performance development goals.</p> <p>However, OHCHR reportedly lacks a “systematic feedback mechanism to incorporate performance outcomes, collaborative learning, and developmental assignments into talent pools for succession planning, leadership pipelines, and to support diversity initiatives”. The 2018-21 OMP aims to address this through strengthening mechanisms to “better attract and manage talent, including by stepping up support in the areas of performance management”.</p> <p>The UN Secretariat has a process for dispute resolution relating to staff performance assessments. OHCHR acknowledges that “...more investment is needed ...to resolve performance issues at the earliest possible time”.</p>	<p>10, 11, 18, 25, 28, 90, 105, 122</p>
<p><b>MI 3.4 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>Medium confidence</b></p>
<p><b>KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability</b></p>	<p><b>KPI score</b></p>
<p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>	<p><b>2.83</b></p>
<p>Through its previous and current OMP development processes, OHCHR has made significant progress in establishing a common framework for the planning and reporting of its activities that has created greater coherence among its broad mandate, thematic priorities and field presences. There is a clear relationship between inputs (funding) and results, articulated and monitored through the Performance Monitoring System (PMS). In its 2017 evaluation of OHCHR, OIOS found that “all of the 17 field presences reviewed had logical frameworks, most of which (14) were assessed as being of high quality. Some of the constructive features noted in such frameworks included clear and explicit links between resources, activities, outputs and expected accomplishments and their alignment with broader organisational thematic priorities. In addition, of the staff members interviewed who discussed programme planning processes in OHCHR, most believed such processes had improved, because all field offices now planned against a global set of expected accomplishments and results. They also assessed the performance monitoring system as a generally good planning and programming tool.</p> <p>UN Human Rights Appeal documents provide detailed breakdowns of costs to deliver its OMP. Because of the unpredictability and earmarking of extra-budgetary funding, OHCHR distinguishes between a core budget (outlining the resources it must have in order to implement its operating cost plans) and a needs-based budget (what it must have, plus what it would need for existing and new activities arising from requests and demands - including responding to emerging human rights priorities and emergencies). In the politicised context within which OHCHR operates, it is challenging to systematically build ‘better’ systems for costing of management and development results.</p> <p>OHCHR does not yet have a coherent and up-to-date statement or policy that articulates its criteria for allocating resources to partners. These resources are allocated from different trust funds which are managed by OHCHR, and which are fully funded from extrabudgetary resources. Internally, criteria for allocating resources to partners are set out in OHCHR’s Field Administrative Manual and the Standard Operating Procedure for processing requests for the payment of grants and support to the Grants Committee (OHCHR/PSMS/13/07). General guidance stipulates that grant funding must be used to support implementation of OHCHR’s approved work programme. The Standard Operating Procedure OHCHR/PSMS/13/07 was last reviewed in 2012 and OHCHR has requested further amendments on two occasions. These were yet to be approved by the United National Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at the time of the MOPAN review.</p>	

For partners, funding criteria are set out in two different guidance notes on OHCHR's website, as well as on different Fund-specific pages and links on the OHCHR website. Not all the Trust Funds that are dealt with in guidance are still active, while newer trust funds are not dealt with in the guidance notes. The majority of OHCHR's partners are not familiar with OHCHR's criteria for allocation financial resources (transparency), or regard it as inadequate. The same applies to their opinion of OHCHR's provision of reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen and for how much (predictability).

As part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR is subject to external audits by the UN Board of Auditors (BoA). In 2016, the UN BoA identified OHCHR to undergo an external audit to be led by the India SAI. It is not clear whether this audit has been completed, and no management response was viewed. OHCHR's internal audits are conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IPAS). The reports of these internal audits of various OHCHR functions and management units are available on the OIOS website, since they 'own' the audit reports and decide on their publication.

The United Nations Secretariat Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework applies to OHCHR. It states clearly that combating fraud and corruption is a primary responsibility of staff, including management, and it is a responsibility that the Secretariat also applies to its relationship with third parties. The focal point for all Audits is the Chief, PSMS who updates PBRB if appropriate. All OIOS audits/evaluations that were viewed included a management response, including clearly assigned responsibility to an individual, as well as an implementation date, for dealing with recommendations. The relative importance/ priority for dealing with recommendations are also indicated. During the 2014-17 period, OHCHR implemented of over 85% of critical and important audit recommendations.

Guidance for staff to report issues of concern are set out in the UN Secretariat ST AI/2017/1 on unsatisfactory conduct, investigations and the disciplinary process, as well as the Secretariat's Guidebook on Ethics. OIOS has a dedicated hotline where cases may be reported in a confidential manner. The United Nations Secretariat is obliged to protect the confidentiality of those reporting alleged cases of Fraudulent Acts and it has a policy in place to protect "whistleblowers". Staff training and awareness raising on the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework is done through Inspira. In addition, in 2016 the UN Ethics Office's Leadership Dialogues focused on fraud awareness and prevention. All managers in the Secretariat had to host a one-hour dialogue session with their direct reports. The dialogues had to cascade down from Heads of Departments/Missions through direct reports until all managers have engaged their staff in a Leadership Dialogue. Final staff participation statistics had to be submitted to the Ethics Office.

In accordance with the UN Standard Operating Procedure on Reporting of Cases of Fraud and Presumption Fraud to the Board of Audits (30 August 2016), Executive Officers or Administrative officers must report all such cases, in writing and in confidence, to the Department of Management for onward reporting to the UN Board of Auditors. These annual reports must include updates of all pending cases that were reported in the previous year, as well as actions taken. OHCHR sends information about suspicion of financial or procurement fraud to OIOS for appropriate action. The verified details from OIOS are reported to the Department of Management. A report of presumptive fraud from OHCHR's Chief of Programme Support and Management Service to the Department of Management was viewed.

<b>MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.25</b>
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy exists which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners	2
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 3: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	2
Element 4: The organisational statement or policy is publicly available	2

MI 4.1 Analysis	Source document
<p>There is no single, coherent and up-to-date statement or policy that articulates OHCHR's criteria for allocating resources to partners. These resources are allocated from different Trust Funds which are managed by OHCHR, and which are fully funded from extrabudgetary resources. OHCHR's flexibility to allocate resourcing to partners is determined by the amount of extrabudgetary funding earmarked to specific Trust Funds, as well as the amount of unearmarked extrabudgetary funding it can allocate to Trust Funds in a discretionary manner.</p> <p>Internally, criteria for allocating resources to partners are set out in OHCHR's Field Administrative Manual and the Standard Operating Procedure for processing requests for the payment of grants and support to the Grants Committee (OHCHR/PSMS/13/07). General guidance stipulates that grant funding can be used to support national or international institutions and non-United Nations agencies such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), grass-roots organisations, professional associations and individuals to assist implementation of OHCHR's work programme as approved by Management.</p> <p>The Standard Operating Procedure OHCHR/PSMS/13/07 was last reviewed in 2012 and OHCHR has requested further amendments on two occasions.</p> <p>For partners, grants funding criteria are set out in two different guidance notes on OHCHR's website. The first is "Working with the United National Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil Society" (2008) and the second is "Human Rights Funds, Grants and Fellowships: A Practical Guide for Civil Society" (undated). Additionally, there is information about grant submissions to some of the Trust Funds on different pages on the OHCHR website. It could be confusing for partners wanting to apply for grants. Not all the Trust Funds that are dealt with in guidance are still active, while newer Trust Funds are not dealt with in the Handbook or Practical Guide. The majority of OHCHR's partners are not familiar with OHCHR's criteria for allocation financial resources (transparency), or regard it as poor. The same applies to their opinion of OHCHR's provision of reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen and for how much (predictability).</p>	28, 36, 82, 124
MI 4.1 Evidence confidence	High confidence
MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	2
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement	2
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	2
Element 3 Clear explanations are available in relation to any variances	2
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than internal procedural blockages	2

MI 4.2 Analysis	Source document
<p>Voluntary contributions to support OHCHR at headquarters and in the field are channelled and managed through 10 trust funds and 3 Special Funds. The trust funds are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Trust Fund for the Support of the Activities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</li> <li>• UN Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights</li> <li>• UN Trust Fund for a Human Rights Education Programme in Cambodia</li> <li>• UN Voluntary fund for Participation in the Universal Periodic Review</li> <li>• UN Voluntary Fund for Financial and technical Assistance for the Implementation of the Universal Periodic Review</li> <li>• Voluntary Technical Assistance Trust Fund to support the Participation of Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing Countries in the work of the Human Rights Council</li> <li>• UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Peoples</li> <li>• UN Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture</li> <li>• UN Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery</li> <li>• Special Fund established by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment</li> <li>• Contingency Fund</li> <li>• Special Fund for the Participation of Civil Society in the Social Forum, the forum on Minority Issues and the Forum on Business and Human Rights</li> </ul> <p>The Office provides modestly sized grants to partners. The processing of requests for the payment of these grants is set out in OHCHR's Standard Operating Procedure for processing requests for the payment of grants and support to the Grants Committee. The OMP 2014-17 sets a target to approve grants and allocate funds to local organisations within two weeks of the submission of their application in 85% of cases. It missed this target by 10%. No specific reasons are given for this variance, but it seems to relate to the heavy administrative procedures OHCHR, as part of the UN Secretariat, are bound by. External stakeholders are generally satisfied that OHCHR is transparent about the criteria for allocating financial resources; that it provides reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen and for how much.</p>	<p>1, 7, 27, 35, 122</p>
<b>MI 4.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 4.3: Principles of results based budgeting applied</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.25</b>
Element 1: The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 2: A budget document is available which provides clear costings for the achievement of each management result	3
Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs from activity through to result (outcome)	4
Element 4: There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)	3

MI 4.3 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR has introduced a common framework for the planning and reporting of its activities that has created greater coherence among its broad mandate, thematic priorities and field presences. In developing its OMP 2014-17, the OHCHR Senior Management Team (SMT) defined the thematic priorities and areas of focus based on relevance, feasibility and added value. Following the SMT's decision on OHCHR priorities, cross-office working groups developed thematic strategies and expected accomplishments. Individual OHCHR sub programmes and field offices developed annual work plans and cost plans that were reviewed by the PBRB, chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner. The PBRB reviewed all projects and work plans based on their current and potential contributions to the OMP's planned results for 2014-17.</p> <p>In February 2016, the Strategic Leadership Retreat committed to enhance OHCHR's "focus for impact". Accordingly, PBRB committed to reviewing all draft AWP/CPs for 2017 based on their contribution to the 2016 focus areas and adjusted these, as needed, based on emerging issues. In its 2017 evaluation of OHCHR, OIOS found that all of the 17 field presences reviewed had logical frameworks, most of which (14) were assessed as being of high quality. Some of the constructive features noted in such frameworks included clear and explicit links between resources, activities, outputs and expected accomplishments and their alignment with broader organisational thematic priorities. In addition, of the staff members interviewed who discussed programme planning processes in OHCHR, most believed such processes had improved, because all field offices now planned against a global set of expected accomplishments and results. They also assessed the performance monitoring system as a generally good planning and programming tool.</p> <p>At the time of the MOPAN review, the OMP 2018-21 was not yet costed. However, it will follow a similar process whereby priorities and targets outlined in the OMP 2018-21 will inform the development of Annual Work Plans by country offices and divisions. These will be costed by the Finance and Budget Section.</p> <p>The Performance Monitoring System (PMS) links Expected Accomplishments with Results, measured by targets and indicators. The financial requirements of each activity are linked to an expected result. Because of the unpredictability and earmarking of extrabudgetary funding, OHCHR distinguishes between a core budget (outlining the resources it must have in order to implement its operating cost plans) and a needs-based budget (what it must have, plus what it would need for existing and new activities arising from requests and demands - including responding to emerging human rights priorities and emergencies). UN Human Rights Appeal documents provide detailed breakdowns of costs to deliver its OMP.</p> <p>Due to the limitations it faces around regular funding for its mandated functions, OHCHR uses approximately 10% of its extrabudgetary resources to cover this shortfall. The approved regular budget for 2018-19 entails several reductions, including across-the-board reductions of between 5% and 25% on several budget lines. In the political context in which OHCHR operates, it is challenging to systematically build 'better' systems for costing of management and development results.</p>	7, 27, 35, 37, 90, 122
<b>MI 4.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certifies the meeting of international standards at all levels, including with respect to internal audit</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards	3
Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions	N/E
Element 3: Management response is available to external audit	N/E
Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit	N/E
Element 5: Internal audit functions meet international standards, including for independence	3
Element 6: Internal audit reports are publicly available	3
<b>MI 4.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>As part of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR is subject to external audits by the UN Board of Auditors (BoA) on an annual basis. In 2016, the UN BoA identified OHCHR to undergo an external audit to be led by the India SAI. The Annual BoA report is published in Volume 1 of the UN Secretariat Financial Statements, and OHCHR is included in that report. No separate management response is necessarily provided.</p> <p>OHCHR's internal audits are conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which provides the functions of audit and carries out audits in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IPAS). The reports of these internal audits of various OHCHR functions and management units are available on the OIOS website, since they 'own' the audit reports and decide on their publication.</p> <p>Audit requirements related to grant funding from OHCHR Trust Funds (from OHCHR Standard Operating Procedure OHCHR/PSMS/13/0) state that "All grants of USD 25 000 and above must be audited. Audit costs have to be covered by the grant and should not exceed more than eight percent of the project budget. For grants below USD 25 000 a financial report certified by the responsible person of the organisation with the phrase in paragraph 4.9.1 above is required. In addition, accounts should be reviewed by the OHCHR local accountant whenever the Office has a field presence who will report on findings to the Committee in writing. In other cases, the local UNDP office may be asked to carry out this task. Grants below the USD 25 000 threshold may also be randomly selected for audit. Organisations thus selected will be notified by OHCHR. In such a case the audit cost will be absorbed by the project cost plan. Furthermore, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) may conduct an audit of any grant at any given time. In no circumstances shall the final instalment be disbursed unless a satisfactory implementation report, a satisfactory financial report and a satisfactory audit report, here applicable, are received from the implementing partner through a cover memo from the Director of the Division to the Chief of PSMS. The Committee's consideration of grant awards to any given grantee is limited to two consecutively and three in a period of five years".</p>	
<b>MI 4.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

<b>MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) adequately addressed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how any issues identified through internal control mechanisms will be addressed	3
Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues, including timelines	3
Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified	3
Element 4: A tracking system is available which records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues	3
Element 5: Governing Body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external)	3
Element 6: Timelines for taking action follow guidelines/ensure the addressing of the issue within twelve months following its reporting	3
<b>MI 4.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The Focal Point for all audits is the Chief PSMS who updates PBRB if appropriate. The Chief of PSMS is responsible for tracking of progress of implementation of recommendations in audits and is accountable to the PBRB. All OIOS audits/evaluations that were viewed included a management response. They assign clear responsibility to an individual, as well as an implementation date, for dealing with recommendations. The relative importance/ priority for dealing with recommendations are also indicated.</p> <p>During the 2014-17 programme cycle, the basis for strategic decision-making in OHCHR was significantly enhanced, including through strengthening of the evaluation function. Evaluation and audit outcomes and recommendations were fed into the decisions of the governance bodies, particularly PBRB. In 2016, PBRB's terms of reference were amended to include the review of management evaluations and audits, and the oversight of the implementation of their recommendations against standard timelines. This has helped achieve a rate of implementation of over 85 % of critical and important audit recommendations.</p> <p>The UN Secretariat ST AI/2017/1 on unsatisfactory conduct, investigations and the disciplinary process, as well as the Secretariat's Guidebook on Ethics, provide guidance to staff who want to report any issues they identify.</p>	7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 39, 40, 122
<b>MI 4.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public	4
Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define the roles of management and staff in implementing/complying with the guidelines	4
Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted in relation to the policy/guidelines	3
Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the Governing Body	4
Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and “whistle-blower” protection policy)	4
Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities, including actions taken, ensures that they are made public	2
<b>MI 4.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The United Nations Secretariat Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework applies to OHCHR. This is a public document. It includes detailed guidance on the roles and responsibilities in the prevention of fraud in the Secretariat. It states clearly that combatting fraud and corruption is a primary responsibility of staff, including management, and it is a responsibility that the Secretariat also applies to its relationship with third parties. All staff have the duty to report possible cases of Fraudulent Acts either to the Head of Office/Mission or responsible officer, the Assistant Secretary-General of Human Resources, or to OIOS. OIOS has a dedicated hotline where cases may be reported in a confidential manner. The United Nations Secretariat is obliged to protect the confidentiality of those reporting alleged cases of fraudulent acts. A protection against retaliation policy protects staff members, interns, and United Nations volunteers against retaliation as a consequence of reporting misconduct.</p> <p>Additional guidelines on the reporting of fraud are posted in isseek (internally) as Standard Operating Procedure on Reporting of Cases of Fraud and Presumption Fraud to the Board of Audits (30 August 2016). It requires the Executive Officer or Administrative Officer to report all such cases, in writing – with all the relevant, verified information – and in confidence, to the Controller’s Office for onward reporting to the UN Board of Auditors. Updates of all pending cases that were reported in the previous year, as well as actions taken must also be provided. This must be done annually. OHCHR immediately sends information about suspicion of financial or procurement fraud to OIOS for appropriate action. The verified details from OIOS are reported to the Department of Management.</p> <p>A report of presumptive fraud from OHCHR’s Chief of Programme Support and Management Service to the Department of Management, dated 28 February 2018, was viewed. It pertained to one case of presumptive fraud in one of OHCHR’s Country Offices. It informed the Department of Management that full details on the case will be provided as soon as OIOS has completed its investigation of the case.</p>	38, 122

Staff training and awareness raising on the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework is done through Inspira, where there is a course on Preventing Fraud and Corruption at the UN (LMS-2926). In addition, in 2016 the UN Ethics Office's Leadership Dialogues focused on the role of all staff members in fraud awareness and prevention. All managers in the Secretariat had to host a one-hour dialogue session with their direct reports. The dialogues had to cascade down from Heads of Departments/ Missions through direct reports until all managers have engaged their staff in a Leadership Dialogue. Final staff participation statistics had to be submitted to the Ethics Office.	38, 122
<b>MI 4.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

## RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments)*

<b>KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility (within partnerships)</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.12</b>

OHCHR's mandate is very broad and its workload is growing rapidly. Conversely, its resources (human and financial) are limited and do not keep pace with the growing demands at both HQ levels and in the field presences. OHCHR works with international human rights mechanisms and bodies in developing and monitoring human rights standards, while contributing to national efforts to bring about the legislative, institutional and behavioural changes required to implement those standards on the ground. The OMP 2018-21 aims to strengthen the link between human rights mechanisms' results and activities to support their implementation in the field. To that effect, the Office seeks to further expand its field presences, especially its own stand-alone offices, and further engage locally in technical cooperation programmes with a variety of national stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other IO's and INGOs). The role of civil society as both a contributor and a monitor of progress, is seen as crucial. Expanding civic space, one of the 6 thematic pillars, is therefore pivotal to the successful implementation of the human rights mechanisms' recommendations.

At the field level, the Office deliberately seeks to align its priorities with national strategies and policies. Establishing and maintaining an OHCHR country presence is contingent on an explicit request from member states' governments, UN Resident Coordinators, and/or Peace Operations. The Office deliberately aims to align its priorities with national strategies and policies as much as possible. Most field presences are small in terms of staffing and budget. OHCHR works closely with national and international stakeholders, both to bolster human rights mainstreaming and strengthening of in-country human rights capacity, but also for pragmatic purposes.

All types of OHCHR interventions are informed by a (deep) analysis of local trends and realities in human rights conditions and deeper-lying causes and effects. Until recently, guidelines for operations/interventions in the field seemed to lack the necessary robustness. While OHCHR's regional and country programmes appear to be well-rooted in context analysis, risk management was perceived mostly in terms of contextual trends and developments and their impact on the human rights conditions, and less so in terms of risks to OHCHR itself (i.e., political, reputational, institutional risks to the organisation). The Office did not always routinely undertake a thorough capacity analysis of partner organisations (or itself), nor did it always develop appropriate mitigation strategies. Capacity assessments and risk management have only recently been included in corporate guidance for country and regional programming.

Of the cross-cutting issues listed in KPI 2, gender has been a longstanding priority for the Office, and it has developed various forms of guidance and templates to support staff in analysis, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Good governance is also addressed, but more implicitly. Looking at OHCHR's planning guidelines and templates, of the cross-cutting thematic issues listed in KPI 2, gender is the only cross-cutting issue that is mentioned explicitly, and for which an analysis is required as part of the programming cycle. In 2014, OHCHR issued its Gender Equality Strategic Plan, to be used by all staff members at HQs and in field presences. The Gender Equality Strategic Plan coincides with the GMO3 of the IOMP for 2014-17;

“a gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes”. OHCHR has also developed a tool for integrating gender analysis into human rights monitoring. In the latest iterations of corporate guidance for planning and reporting, at activity level, staff must indicate if gender equality is the main objective of the activity (or not). This is a compulsory action, and part of the design and approval procedure.

Intervention designs do not explicitly require an analysis of good governance or environmental sustainability issues. However, it can be argued that compliance with protection of human rights, including prevention of human rights abuses, is a core good governance issue and a justification for OHCHR interventions to strengthen institutional human rights capacity of government and civil society stakeholders. Environmental sustainability is not among the Office’s core competencies. However, in the OMP 2018-21, environmental degradation and climate change now features as one of the so-called ‘frontier issues’, an emerging human rights concern in view of its negative impact on the lives of people, putting their human rights (e.g. water and sanitation, housing, food, health and education) at risk.

Sustainability of results lies at the heart of OHCHR’s programme. Both OMPs state that the programme is geared towards the strengthening of national and international protection systems for human rights. The results framework is based on goals and objectives the Office contributes to, in order to address gaps in national protection systems identified by human rights mechanisms. OHCHR’s pillar strategies in the OMP 2018-21 identify priority areas where sustainable results are sought, e.g. increased compliance by member states with international human rights standards, improving the adoption of a human rights based approach to development in the context of the SDGs and peacekeeping, and others. In this sense, sustainability is a cross-cutting objective in all OHCHR’s operations. Similarly, at the field level, capacity-building technical assistance programmes and other interventions carried out by regional and country offices, aim to build lasting capacity of institutions – governmental as well as non-governmental – as a way to improve and protect all human rights for all. OHCHR’s contributions to UNCTs and peacekeeping operations are more indirect, seeking in first instance to contribute to the inclusion and development of human rights based approaches in a given country. Nevertheless, the limited evidence available from external evaluations does not suggest that critical aspects of sustainability of the intervention are always explicitly included in the design stages. They also point to the challenges involved, such as: the complex and oftentimes challenging realities on the ground; the fact that progress in the field of human rights is a long-term matter; the lack of adequate resources (staff and financial) to sustain an intervention, bearing in mind that most projects and programmes in the field are covered by unpredictable extra-budgetary funding; and inadequate intervention design. In one case, sustainability was achieved; in another, less so.

Institutional bottlenecks exist, some of which are beyond the Office’s control. A large part of OHCHR’s HQ-based activities/interventions involves ongoing support of the HRC, treaty bodies, special procedures mandate holders and more. The workload and “implementation speed” is determined by the growing demand from and the meeting calendar of the human rights bodies, member states, the UN Secretariat and General Assembly. The agenda is not set by OHCHR and there are no pre-determined benchmarks or operating standards for any of these. As far as field interventions are concerned, the Office benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation against the originally approved plans, monitors implementation progress monthly and makes whatever corrections necessary, if the situation requires. In its Annual Reports, OHCHR reports progress against Expected Accomplishments (EAs). Some EAs listed in the 4-year OMP had been adjusted to meet new realities. The overall performance against stated objectives is perceived as satisfactory.

In 2014, the Office identified eight Global Management Objectives to improve its organisational efficiency and effectiveness and claims to have made great strides. According to corporate Annual Reports, OHCHR has met between 80% and 97% of its objectives for given periods. This seems to suggest that internal institutional bottlenecks hindering the speed of implementation have to a large extent been overcome. Nonetheless, besides OHCHR’s self-reporting, there is little external evidence available to either support or challenge these.

External assessments pointed to slow deployment of human resources, funding constraints, Secretariat rules and regulations not being fit-for-purpose and the need to work via UNOG and UNDP, as institutional bottlenecks. Few external assessments addressed the timeliness of delivery, and those that did show mixed results. The Regional Office Central Asia (ROCA) evaluation was positive about OHCHR’s speedy deployment in Kyrgyzstan’s Osh province, through which it was able to play a critical role

<p>in conflict management and prevention. By contrast, the Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) evaluation was very critical about the long period between demand and supply of HRAs to join UNCTs (up to 24 months), a concern shared by the OIOS. The United Nations' Joint Investigative Unit (JIU) also highlighted constraints in human and financial management, impacting negatively on the development and use of a rapid response and deployment mechanism.</p>	
<b>MI 5.1: Interventions aligned with national/regional priorities and intended national/regional results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.67</b>
Element 1: Reviewed country or regional strategies make reference to national/regional strategies or objectives	4
Element 2: Reviewed country strategies or regional strategies link the results statements to national or regional goals	4
Element 3: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow investment of time and effort in alignment process	3
<b>MI 5.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR supports standard setting; monitors and reports on human rights; undertakes global and national-level advocacy to promote adoption of, and adherence to, human rights norms and standards; and provides advisory services and implements technical cooperation programmes in collaboration with a range of stakeholders at the national level. OHCHR seeks to ensure that these elements complement and reinforce each other in pursuing the realisation of its mandate. OHCHR works with the international human rights mechanisms and bodies in developing and monitoring international human rights standards, while contributing to national efforts to bring about the legislative, institutional and behavioural changes required to implement these standards on the ground.</p> <p>OHCHR implements its work at the national and regional levels. Its field presences fall into two categories: stand-alone presences and collaborative arrangements. The first category comprises those offices under the direct supervision of OHCHR, namely OHCHR country and regional offices. The second category comprises the human rights components of peacekeeping or special political missions, and the human rights advisers (HRAs) in the office of the UN Resident Coordinator. All OHCHR's field presences work with governments, civil society actors, the UN family and other concerned stakeholders.</p> <p>OHCHR supports human rights components of peacekeeping and special political missions by providing strategic and expert advice, technical assistance, operational support, and day-to-day backstopping on human rights issues. Human rights advisers are deployed at the request of UN Resident Coordinators on behalf of the UNCTs. The OMP 2018-21 aims to strengthen the link between human rights mechanisms' results and required action at country level to support their implementation. To that effect, the Office seeks to further expand its field presences, especially its own stand-alone offices, and further engage locally in technical cooperation programmes with a variety of national stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other IO's and INGOs). The role of civil society as both a contributor and a monitor of progress, is seen as crucial. Expanding civic space, one of the six thematic pillars, is therefore pivotal to the successful implementation of the human rights mechanisms' recommendations.</p>	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 90, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113

OHCHR's regional, country and stand-alone offices are established at the request of host governments, on the basis of a standard agreement between OHCHR and the host government. The mandate of each office is specifically tailored to a country situation and typically includes human rights monitoring, protection, technical cooperation activities, public reporting, and the provision of support to States in their engagement with the human rights mechanisms (human rights treaty bodies, special procedures and the preparation and follow-up of the Universal Periodic Review). Regional offices are also established on the basis of an agreement with the host government and in consultation with other countries in the region. These offices focus on cross-cutting regional human rights concerns and play an important role in supporting States in their engagement with the human rights mechanisms. The offices and centres work closely with regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organisations and civil society. In addition to the regional offices, OHCHR runs two regional centres that are established in accordance with General Assembly resolutions which outline a specific mandate.

Engagement of OHCHR with regions and countries is provided to requesting member states through mutually agreed bilateral frameworks outlining, inter alia, assistance to national systems of human rights protection, national capacity-building, technical cooperation, and human rights education and learning. Under sub-programme three in the Strategic Framework (advisory services, technical cooperation and field activities), OHCHR assists States, at their request, in the building and strengthening of national capacities to meet the challenges to the full realisation of all human rights: increasing outreach in the provision of mutually agreed assistance; and enhance capacity of UNCTs, peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding activities to assist requesting countries in their efforts to develop national human rights protection mechanisms. They support and assist Resident Coordinators, heads of UN agencies and members of UNCTs to integrate human rights in their programming strategies and operational programmes and to build and strengthen national human rights capacities.

OHCHR considers technical cooperation to be part of its overall strategy to support duty-bearers and rights holders at the country level to overcome identified gaps in the protection and promotion of human rights. Its Capacity Building Programme within the Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division is a good example, where OHCHR staff offer technical assistance and trainings to requesting member states. Through the UNCT and Common Country Assessment/UNDAF, OHCHR engages with various members of the UN family to identify the role and added value of the Office in technical cooperation. In countries where OHCHR contributes to UNCTs and peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations, human rights constitute an integral part of the strategies and programmes of UN Country Teams and/or UN Missions, based on (negotiations with host governments re.) national developments and priorities. In countries where OHCHR has established a country or regional office, priorities are determined on the basis of national strategic priorities and their convergence with the Office's global thematic priorities, engagement with host nation stakeholders, its perceived added value and cost-effectiveness. Regional and country notes (i.e. OHCHR's internal multi-annual strategic documents) include a context analysis of relevant trends and developments in the field of human right at regional or country level. In the Regional Office for Central America, projects undertaken by ROCA were assessed as relevant to the country and regional situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights holders. Despite the stated policies and practices, some criticism have been voiced with regard to OHCHR's country "entry and exit strategies". The DOHA Centre's sub-regional notes (which served as its strategic plan) for 2014-17 were aligned with the OMP's six thematic priorities, but proved less satisfactory in terms of alignment with needs and demands in the Region, and partnership opportunities with other actors. JIU (2014) concluded that the Office had an "opportunistic" approach in developing field offices without a medium or long-term vision and analysis of the human rights situation and the application of clear criteria.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,  
12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 90,  
91, 99, 100, 101, 102,  
103, 104, 105, 106,  
107, 108, 109, 110,  
111, 112, 113

According to OHCHR guidelines, regional and country notes should include background assessments, assessment of the role of other actors, definition of results and the strategy for achieving the results. Strategies set out in country notes are regularly monitored and evaluated with the assistance of the Performance Monitoring System, and the continuation of the work of a field presence and the priorities set by it are evaluated against the results as reflected in the performance monitoring system. Corporate plans and reports include sections highlighting plans and performance at the country and regional level; in the case of stand-alone country and regional offices, OHCHR interventions are linked to national or regional goals. In other field presences, i.e. where OHCHR provides staff capacity to UNCTs and/or peacekeeping operations, interventions are less visibly linked. Context analysis and needs assessments are crucial steps in the early project preparation process.

The external evaluation of the Moldova project indicates that the context analysis and the needs assessment have been properly done by the OHCHR Field presence. In the case of the Doha Centre, however, the Centre did not fully comply with the guidelines for developing sub-regional notes. There was no evidence that the Centre had conducted needs assessments or consulted stakeholders and partners in the countries covered to inform and support its strategic choices.

In 2010, based on an internal stock-taking report, and lessons from the deployment of HRAs since 2006, OHCHR issued 'Revised OHCHR Policy on Human Rights Advisers (HRAs): Standard Operational Framework' (23 December 2010). The revised policy called for RC/UNCT commitment and support, consideration of country needs and situation i.e. strategic opportunities for the UN system to make an impact (i.e. the UPR process and follow-up recommendations by other UN human rights mechanisms); priority human rights concerns and the UN's added value vis-à-vis other actors.

Responses to the Partner Survey show a high regard among all categories of partners for OHCHR's interventions and the way these are aligned with national and regional priorities and intended results. Generally speaking, field presences appear to suffer from a mismatch between stated objectives, stakeholder expectations and actual delivery capacity. Already in 2009, OIOS pointed to vulnerabilities in existing regional offices, including limited resources under current arrangements and ambiguities about role and function. OHCHR support at country and regional level to national counterparts can often be politically challenging. The assessment of NHRIs concluded that "the high quality of well-calibrated support received by American NHRIs reflects the importance of proximity, access and field offices that are finely tuned to often swiftly changing realities on the ground". In the case of HRAs, high-level support from UNCT leadership is deemed critically important for HRA effectiveness in terms of their ability to advocate for adoption of a human rights based approach in UN country strategies and programmes, and subsequently, advocacy for promotion and adoption of standards in national strategies. OHCHR puts emphasis on strengthening and expanding its field presences as a mechanism to encourage implementation of human rights standards and enhance national capacities. It has proposed to strengthen its existing regional offices and to establish two additional ones, in order to decentralise key functions that can be better performed at the regional level and, thus, bring OHCHR closer to member states and national stakeholders, making support more accessible and cost-efficient (proposed regional restructuring of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 48/14, OHCHR, 2016).

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,  
12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 90,  
91, 99, 100, 101, 102,  
103, 104, 105, 106,  
107, 108, 109, 110,  
111, 112, 113

#### MI 5.1 Evidence confidence

Medium confidence

<b>MI 5.2: Contextual analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape the intervention designs and implementation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.83</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement that positions the intervention within the operating context	4
Element 2: Context statement has been developed jointly with partners	3
Element 3: Context analysis contains reference to gender issues, where relevant	4
Element 4: Context analysis contains reference to environmental sustainability and climate change issues, where relevant	1
Element 5: Context analysis contains reference to governance issues, including conflict and fragility, where relevant	3
Element 6: Evidence of reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in context	2
<b>MI 5.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR has a very detailed understanding of the human rights context in member states, thanks to its standard setting, monitoring and reporting activities. An important OHCHR activity is its support to the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the mechanism by which the human rights situation of all 193 member states of the United Nations is analysed in depth and reviewed by their peers. In this regard, OHCHR is entrusted with the preparation of two of the documents that serve as the basis for the reviews and assists the HRC in the drafting of the UPR Working Group reports and the adoption of the UPR recommendations. The Office also organises training events and briefings to inform states and other stakeholders about the work of the UPR and assists in the preparation of the state reports.</p> <p>In addition, OHCHR provides substantive and technical support to the special procedures, the special rapporteurs, independent experts and working groups appointed by the Council to review and monitor thematic or country-specific human rights issues. OHCHR supports the full range of tasks undertaken by experts, including reporting to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, conducting visits to states and confidentially transmitting complaints from victims of human rights violations to states. Support is also provided to experts as they fulfil additional tasks mandated by the Council or the Assembly or conduct other activities, such as preparing guidelines or thematic studies that contribute to the interpretation and development of international human rights law, or engaging in advocacy and technical assistance directed at improving human rights enjoyment on the ground.</p> <p>The support provided by OHCHR to the UPR mechanism involves collaborative efforts between UNHCR and member states to assess human rights situations in a given country. Likewise, OHCHR provides substantive and technical support to the special procedures, the special rapporteurs, independent experts and working groups appointed by the Council to review and monitor thematic or country-specific human rights issues. As such, one may consider these context statements as co-productions.</p> <p>For interventions delivered by OHCHR field presences, OHCHR guidelines require regional and country notes ( 4-year strategic plans at the country or regional level) to include background assessments, assessment of the role of other actors, definition of results and the strategy for achieving the results. Analysis of a number of country notes demonstrate that interventions have been identified that</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 19, 60, 61, 62, 63, 90, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113</p>

indeed (i) address national trends and priorities (ii) build on existing partnerships and (iii) add value to desired outcomes. OHCHR's partners in the field have confirmed this, and are very positive about OHCHR's context sensitivity and agility to adapt to changing circumstances.

In the case of the Doha Centre, however, OHCHR positioning in relation to local realities was assessed as less satisfactory. In the case of OHCHR stand-alone offices, context statements/analyses are carried out by OHCHR, building on consultations with local stakeholders and partners. There is no evidence to suggest that these analyses are developed jointly as co-productions. In collaborative field presences, OHCHR staff/secondee contribute to the context analysis performed by UNCT and/or peacekeeping operations missions. These do, by definition, qualify as jointly developed context statements.

As elaborated upon in KPI 2, OHCHR is mandated to contribute to the realisation of all human rights for all people, including women. Non-discrimination based on sex is also a fundamental principle of human rights law. In addition, OHCHR is required to implement the gender integration policy of the United Nations. OHCHR demonstrates a clear commitment to address gender equality and the empowerment of women. Gender considerations were reflected in OHCHR's advocacy positions and inputs to all debates and processes on the post-2015 development agenda. This strongly contributed to the inclusion of Goal 5 on gender equality in the final 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The OHCHR Gender Equality Strategic Plan (2014-17) is the current internal implementation framework of the 2011 Gender Equality Policy. It sets out concrete actions to advance gender equality in both the institutional setting and the work of the Office. These are followed through in the OHCHR Management Plan 2014-17, which outlines clear focus areas for OHCHR's activities, based on its comparative advantage, to address gender equality and women's empowerment.

OHCHR institutional objectives pertaining to gender equality and the empowerment of women, as outlined in the Gender Equality Strategic Plan, coincide with Global Management Output 3 (GMO 3) of the OMP 2014-17. Progress towards the achievement of the targets for GMO 3 is monitored through the PMS and reported in OHCHR Annual Reports. OHCHR also reports annually to the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-SWAP). Judging by the evidence available, gender issues, trends and developments are assessed in UPR country reviews, relevant thematic documents, and OHCHR regional and country strategies' context statements.

Judging by the evidence available, governance issues, trends and developments are assessed in UPR country reviews, relevant thematic documents, and OHCHR regional and country strategies' context statements. The template used in UPR mechanism country reviews includes periodic assessments of the legal and institutional framework for the protection and promotion of human rights in a given country. The templates for country or regional office notes (i.e. strategy document) and performance monitoring, include relevant (updates on) governance issues.

Context analysis is an ongoing activity and results are constantly triangulated and verified with government, think-tanks, civil society organisations and the diplomatic community to ensure the offices are on track. Partners rate OHCHR's context analysis as very satisfactory.

1, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 19,  
60, 61, 62, 63, 90, 91,  
99, 100, 101, 102, 103,  
104, 105, 106, 107,  
108, 109, 110, 111,  
112, 113

**MI 5.2 Evidence confidence**

**Medium confidence**

<b>MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.2</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	1
Element 2: Capacity analysis considers resources, strategy, culture, staff, systems and processes, structure and performance	2
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been developed jointly where feasible	1
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability	1
Element 5: Evidence of regular and resourced reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in the wider institutional setting that affect capacity	1
<b>MI 5.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Until recently, OHCHR's templates for intervention design did not include a requirement for an analysis of the capacity of key national implementing partners, nor for that matter of OHCHR's own field presence (regional office, country office, HRAs and seconded staff in peacekeeping operations). However, noting OHCHR's considerable knowledge of the human rights conditions in a given context, and the longstanding relations it has with various stakeholders – government, NHRIs, regional human rights instruments, civil society organisations and other agencies – it is reasonable to assume that OHCHR is aware of the capacity of its partners, including their needs and gaps. Such is also the feedback from OHCHR's partners in the field, who judge OHCHR's incorporation of realistic capacity assessments of national or regional capacities as positive.</p> <p>The planning and reporting templates are based on a logical framework/theory of change approach, with obligatory descriptions of the broader context, expected outcomes, outputs, activities and the resources needed to implement the interventions. The few available assessments of performance against stated objectives of OHCHR's field-level interventions, point to a lack of OHCHR's own staff capacity to deliver. In one case, the evaluators conclude that a needs assessment had been conducted properly by OHCHR. Nevertheless, a clearer definition of human resource needs, including projected tasks and time frames, would have been useful; in another case, criticism was voiced at the absence of a needs assessment.</p> <p>The OMP 2018-21 guidelines for the country and sub-regional programmes do require an analysis of the capacity gaps, if deemed relevant. However, the guidance does not specify whose capacity gaps should be considered and in which areas (resources, strategy, culture, systems and processes, structure and performance), nor does it oblige country or regional offices to elaborate how it will mitigate or address any capacity gaps once these gaps have been identified.</p>	15, 16, 25, 54, 124
<b>MI 5.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

<b>MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	1
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk	1
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	1
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	1
Element 5: Risks are routinely monitored and reflected upon by the partnership	1
Element 6: Risk mitigation actions taken by the partnership are documented and communicated	1
<b>MI 5.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Over the past years, external evaluations and reviews called for improvements in OHCHR’s enterprise and programme-relate risk management. In 2014, the UN’s Joint Investigation Unit (JIU) reported that OHCHR had started implementing enterprise risk management in compliance with existing (Secretariat) instructions. The Office contributed to preparing a Secretariat-wide enterprise risk management framework, including assisting in the identification and documentation of risks most relevant to the Office and participated in the Management Committee meetings on enterprise risk management. Despite being a part of the Secretariat, JIU contended that OHCHR is subject to specific sets of risks which need to be addressed and for which mitigation measures must be established. Referencing earlier recommendations, JIU concluded in 2014 that for OHCHR, as part of the Secretariat, implementing its enterprise risk management framework was not sufficient. Rather, it should develop and implement internal controls within a comprehensive corporate enterprise risk management framework, taking into account and addressing the specific risks to which the Office is exposed. As such, JIU recommended that the High Commissioner should establish/finalise, by the end of 2016, and regularly update thereafter, a risk management policy for OHCHR, comprising all the elements of a comprehensive risk management framework, and report annually to the governing bodies on its implementation. Under GMO 5, “increased effectiveness in supporting field operations”, the OMP 2014-17 included the objective to “developing and implementing a security risk management strategy to facilitate effective field engagement. The strategy will be based on a careful balancing of ‘acceptable’ risk in meeting OHCHR programmatic objectives, as opposed to a strategy based on the ‘avoidance’ of risk, to enable the conduct of field operations in elevated risk environments”.</p> <p>The external evaluation of the Doha sub-regional centre also recommended the importance of developing a risk assessment and risk mitigation plan. OHCHR had not yet prepared entity-level risk assessment and risk mitigation measures in accordance with the ERM methodology. The need for the Centre and other field offices to assess and manage risks had therefore not also been addressed. It had not developed an action plan to achieve full compliance with MOSS.</p> <p>In May 2017, OHCHR published an internal guidance note for ‘Human Rights Risk Assessment and Early Warning Analysis’, with methodological guidance on how to: (i) conduct a context analysis; (ii) map key human rights concerns; (iii) carry out stakeholder analysis; (iv) identify risk factors; (v) conduct a risk assessment; and (vi) communicate the analysis. While useful as an analytical tool of contextual</p>	1, 2, 10, 44, 51, 52, 54, 81, 124

<p>trends and issues, including political and security dynamics, the guidance did not distinguish between operational, strategic, political, and reputational risk, nor does it elaborate on the need for and design of mitigation strategies. Hence, it is unclear how the guidance on risk assessment and early warning analysis can/is used within OHCHR's RBM approach, including its structured set of planning, monitoring and reporting tools and instruments.</p> <p>Until very recently, OHCHR's templates for intervention design do not appear to include an analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk. The planning and reporting templates are based on a logical framework/theory of change approach, with compulsory descriptions of the broader context, expected outcomes, outputs, activities and the resources needed to implement the interventions. Risk assessments were not an integral part of the intervention design, although ongoing context monitoring does necessarily assess the risks to human rights conditions. In the absence of systematic and comprehensive risk assessments for OHCHR's own operational, strategic, political, and reputational risk, there is no evidence to suggest that these risks were being regularly monitored and reflected upon. That said, OHCHR does have standard operating procedures for staff mobility in hazardous contexts, how to deal with armed groups, and others. Moreover, based on the interviews with staff in field presences, we can detect that risk management is taken into account, albeit mostly as part of contextual analysis/early warning.</p> <p>The Guidelines for the development of OHCHR's 2018-21 Country and Sub-regional programmes that were issued as part of the OMP 2018-21 planning process are the first to include an assessment of various risk factors and how OHCHR will respond to these. The guidelines distinguish between environmental risks (e.g. political, conflict, disaster); programmatic risks (i.e. the risk of failing to achieve aims and objectives because of targeting new groups, sensitive issues or engaging with new actors); and institutional risks (i.e. political, reputational or security risks for OHCHR and its staff). Staff are required to identify the risk, its likelihood, its possible impact, and how to respond. Given that these guidelines were only recently issued, it was not possible to assess how they have been applied to date and how this affects intervention design and implementation, or partnerships. Nevertheless, here too, OHCHR's partners assess the Office's risk management in its interventions positively.</p>	<p>1, 2, 10, 44, 51, 52, 54, 81, 124</p>
<b>MI 5.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.14</b>
Element 1: Intervention design documentation includes the requirement to analyse cross-cutting issues	2
Element 2: Guidelines are available for staff on the implementation of the relevant guidelines	2
Element 3: Approval procedures require the assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design	2
Element 4: Intervention designs include the analysis of gender issues	3
Element 5: Intervention designs include the analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change issues	1
Element 6: Intervention designs include the analysis of good governance issues	3
Element 7: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross cutting issues	2

MI 5.5 Analysis	Source document
<p>Gender has been a longstanding priority for the Office. Consequently, it has developed various forms of guidance and templates to support staff in analysis, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Good governance is also addressed, but more implicitly. Environmental sustainability is not among the Office's core competencies. However, in the OMP 2018-21, environmental degradation and climate change now features as one of the so-called 'frontier issues', an emerging human rights concern in view of its negative impact on the lives of people, putting their human rights (e.g. water and sanitation, housing, food, health and education) at risk.</p> <p>Judging by OHCHR's planning guidelines and templates, of the cross-cutting thematic issues listed in KPI 2, Gender is the only cross-cutting issue that is mentioned explicitly, and for which an analysis is required as part of the programming cycle. In 2014, OHCHR issued its Gender Equality Strategic Plan, to be used by all staff members at HQs and in field presences. The Gender Equality Strategic Plan coincides with the GMO3 of the IOMP for 2014-17: "a gender perspective is effectively integrated in all OHCHR policies, programmes and processes". OHCHR has also developed a tool for integrating gender analysis into human rights monitoring. In the latest iterations of corporate guidance for planning and reporting, at activity level, staff must indicate if gender equality is the main objective of the activity (or not). This is a compulsory action, and part of the design and approval procedure.</p> <p>Intervention designs do not explicitly require an analysis of good governance or environmental sustainability issues. However, it can be argued that compliance with protection of human rights, including prevention of human rights abuses, is a core good governance issue and a justification for OHCHR interventions to strengthen institutional human rights capacity of government and civil society stakeholders. Moreover, if a country or regional office identifies these issues as priority human rights concerns and can make a convincing case that they fit in one of the six thematic pillar strategies and align with national priorities of member states, then they may be in principle be included in the strategy.</p>	26, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 124
<b>MI 5.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including; institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate	2
Element 2: Key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment that are required to sustain expected benefits from a successful intervention are defined in the design	2
Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan	2
Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required these reform processes are addressed (within the intervention plan) directly and in a time sensitive manner	2

MI 5.6 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR's OMP 2014-17 states that its programme is geared towards the strengthening of national and international protection systems for human rights. The results framework is based on eleven global expected accomplishments which describe the typical changes the Office contributes to, to address gaps in national protection systems identified by human rights mechanisms. OHCHR's pillar strategies in the OMP 2018-21 identify priority areas where sustainable results are sought, e.g. increased compliance by member states with international human rights standards, improving the adoption of a human rights based approach in development in the context of the SDGs and peacekeeping, and others. In this sense, sustainability is a cross-cutting objective in all OHCHR's operations.</p> <p>Similarly, at the field level, capacity building technical assistance programmes and other interventions carried out by regional and country offices, for instance, aim to build lasting capacity of institutions (governmental as well as non-governmental) as a way to improve and protect all human rights for all. OHCHR's Contributions to UNCTs and peacekeeping operations are more indirect, seeking in first instance to contribute to the inclusion and development of human rights based approaches in a given country. The limited evidence available suggests that sustainability of interventions is challenging, for various reasons: the complex and oftentimes challenging realities on the ground; the fact that progress in the field of human rights is long-term matter; the lack of adequate resources (staff, financial) to sustain an intervention, bearing in mind that most projects and programmes in the field are covered by unpredictable extra-budgetary funding; and inadequate intervention design. In one case, sustainability was achieved; in another case, it was less successful.</p> <p>The limited evidence available from external evaluations does not suggest that critical aspects of sustainability of the intervention are explicitly included in the design stages. The evaluation of a project in Moldova concluded that "institutional capacity for sustainability and positive change is secured, thanks to the capacity building of the judiciary, and documentation and pursuit of over 50 emblematic discrimination cases. Nevertheless, information gathered indicates that the project design and implementation could have been more geared towards long-term impact through concrete plans for the replication of experiences with the support of other stakeholders. Achieving long-term impact and paving the way for large-scale replication of project activities and sustainability of results requires early planning and explicit inclusion in the project design. Links to other stakeholders and their programme activities should be included from the beginning, or they may never materialise as effective follow-up activities. In Moldova, ensuring the long-term impact of the project and taking activities to scale seem to be pending project challenges. There is no lack of opportunities to do so, but they don't seem to have been included in the project design, which is an important lesson learned".</p> <p>The National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) evaluation points to the challenges in determining the level of sustainability of OHCHR's efforts to support NHRIs as this issue is highly context-dependent and numerous complex factors are at play. It is difficult for NHRIs to make sustainable advances in many cases where other institutions related to rule of law remain weak, and consequently NHRIs tend to respond better to efforts that are carried out within a comprehensive programme of support to a range of national institutions key to the broader human rights situation such as those relating to the administration of justice. Among the factors that can contribute to sustainability are promoting effective partnerships with local actors, such as civil society, and international actors at a country level, such as the UNCTs, can both contribute to strengthening the national profile of NHRIs, as well as consolidating efforts to contribute to improving the human rights situation. OHCHR is seen as having contributed positively to sustainability of NHRIs through its deepening of partnerships with UNDP and the tripartite relationship with UNDP-OHCHR-ICC, productive engagement with CSOs, encouragement of NHRI engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and the</p>	<p>1, 12, 15, 99, 112</p>

development by OHCHR of a conceptual and methodological framework for human rights indicators to adopt a structured and consistent approach for translating universal human rights standards into indicators that are useful at country level.	1, 12, 15, 99, 112
Survey respondents were, on the whole, (very) positive about the consideration given to sustainability: of the 108 respondents, 8 rated OHCHR as excellent, 44 as very good, and 32 as fairly good, with 8 saying they did not know/no opinion.	
<b>MI 5.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2</b>
Element 1: Internal standards are set to track the speed of implementation	2
Element 2: Organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation across different operating contexts	2
Element 3: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed	2
Element 4: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in speed of implementation identified and actions taken leading to an improvement	2
<b>MI 5.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>A large part of OHCHR's HQ-based activities/interventions involves ongoing support of the HRC, treaty bodies, special procedures mandate holders and more. The workload and "implementation speed" is determined by the growing demand from and the meeting calendar of the human rights bodies, member states, the UN Secretariat and General Assembly. The agenda is not set by OHCHR and there are no pre-determined benchmarks or operating standards for these.</p> <p>As far as field interventions are concerned, the Office benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation against the originally approved plans, monitors implementation progress monthly and makes whatever corrections necessary, if the situation requires. In its Annual Reports, OHCHR reports progress against Expected Accomplishments (EAs). Some EAs listed in the four-year Office Management Plan (OMP) had been adjusted to meet new realities. The overall performance against stated objectives is perceived as satisfactory. In 2014, the Office identified eight Global Management Objectives to improve its organisational efficiency and effectiveness. According to corporate Annual Reports, OHCHR has met between 80% and 97% of its objectives for given periods. This suggests that internal institutional bottlenecks hindering the speed of implementation have to a large extent been overcome. Besides OHCHR's self-reporting, there is little external evidence available to either support or challenge these statements.</p>	12, 15, 101, 107, 122

Few external assessments addressed the timeliness of delivery, and those that did show mixed results. The Regional Office Central Asia (ROCA) evaluation was positive about OHCHR's speedy deployment in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province, through which it was able to play a critical role in conflict management and prevention. By contrast, the Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) evaluation was very critical about the long period between demand and supply of HRAs to join UNCTs (up to 24 months), a concern shared by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). The United Nations' JIU also highlighted constraints in human and financial management, impacting negatively on the development and use of a rapid response and deployment mechanism.

External assessments point to slow deployment of human resources, Secretariat rules and regulations not being fit-for-purpose, and the need to work via UNOG and UNDP as institutional bottlenecks. The evaluation of HRAs stated that the deployment process of the HRA was too time consuming. In some cases the HRA arrived when the requesting RC had already left the country. The time span of up to 24 months between request of RC/UNCT and deployment of HRA was seen as jeopardising efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment process, and of the HRA's work in country. The lengthy deployment process can also affect the credibility of the UN system with MDTF donors. Bottlenecks in the HRA recruitment and deployment process needed to be identified and addressed proactively, shortening completion of the process within six months. The ROCA evaluation team concluded that the existing structures and procedures to support field offices involved in human rights protection or project implementation during humanitarian crises were not efficient or effective. In particular, OHCHR's staff recruitment and deployment procedures and the procedures for the internal disbursement of funds during a humanitarian crisis appeared to be slow and cumbersome.

The JIU evaluation team reported similar concerns expressed about OHCHR's support to ROCA for the efficient delivery of projects within agreed timelines and in compliance with donors' financial reporting requirements. This could damage OHCHR's credibility with donors and diminish its ability to access future funding. The Moldova evaluation points to the negative influence of administrative rules and regulations on the efficient use of human resources. Project contracts were only issued until the end of the calendar year (2014), even though the project funding ran until 30 September 2015. JIU identified recruitment and deployment delays, difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified staff members, particularly in the field presences, lack of timely succession-planning and other human resources management practices could affect programme delivery. Not having an adequate policy to ensure the safety and security of staff in the face of urgent and real threats to field offices, especially on account of the nature of their work, has adverse implications. Member states, OHCHR staff and Secretariat staff - voiced serious concerns about the problems faced by the Office in deploying human rights monitors rapidly in emergency and crisis situations. The factors hindering OHCHR included: rules and regulations not suited to meet the Office's operational role, the slow recruitment process for rapid deployments, a lack of expertise in maintaining rapid deployment rosters and insufficient cooperation with relevant United Nations entities. The JIU recommended that the Office obtained access to existing rosters of trained and vetted experts.

12, 15, 101, 107, 122

**MI 5.7 Evidence confidence****High confidence**

<b>KPI 6: Works in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.96</b>
<p>Partnerships are fundamental to the delivery of OHCHR's mandate. As part of its Mission Statement, OHCHR commits itself to working in close partnership with numerous stakeholders at the global, regional, national and local levels, both within and outside the United Nations system, and within and outside government. Partnership work is spread throughout the Office and its operational staff regularly work with a range of partners on a day-to-day basis. OHCHR's unique mandate could bring significant value to its partnerships, but it is also a politicised mandate which requires considerable prudence and diplomacy in its engagement with partners.</p> <p>OHCHR engages in different and dynamic ways with a range of partners. OHCHR's mandated partners are governments of the countries where it operates, and NHRIs. Other partners include UN member states, civil society organisations, the private sector, foundations, regional and international organisations, UN Secretariat departments, UN peace missions and agencies, funds and programmes.</p> <p>In addition, the Office cooperates with the international human rights machinery to address global human rights issues, to develop, strengthen and monitor standards and capacity for the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with international norms. The Office participates in inter-agency networks, co-leads several thematic inter-agency coordination mechanisms; chairs and leads the work of the Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism and the UNDG-HRM, and co-chaired the UNDG in 2014.</p> <p>Outside the UN, OHCHR collaborates with partners such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IHR), the United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), the Andean Commission of Jurists and others. For example, OHCHR and OSCE have a joint office in Abkhazia (Georgia) for the purpose, inter alia, of implementing a technical cooperation project.</p> <p>The Private Sector, foundations and philanthropists are emerging as potentially important OHCHR partners, mainly as donors. However, OHCHR also brings value to private sector partnerships by assisting to address industry-related Human Rights issues, for example digital human rights in the ICT sector.</p> <p>The Office engages in collaborative working relationships with these organisations. Through the Trust Funds it manages, OHCHR funds a relatively small number of organisations and individuals for specific purposes. This is funded from extrabudgetary resources, which gives OHCHR more authority to manage partnerships established in this way, compared to partnerships it enters in the course of its mandated work.</p> <p>OHCHR's relationship with other UN agencies, especially, is important at a global, regional and country level. At a global level, OHCHR's relationship with other these agencies has become politicised and due to the power dynamics that play out in the General Assembly it struggles to get 'traction' compared to the other two UN pillars. Not all member states, or UN agencies, see OHCHR's work as helpful to their agendas. OHCHR also remains absent from DAC Peer Reviews. Moreover, even within the UN system, for which human rights are one of the three fundamental pillars, OHCHR is not always present at the table in important committees, either because of limited staff capacity, or because it is not always invited or allowed to participate. At the country level, OHCHR works UN Country Teams and peacekeeping and special political missions in meeting their human rights responsibilities. Close cooperation is particularly significant with UNDP, based on the memorandum of understanding in force between the two agencies. According to the OHCHR website, the Office is currently undertaking an Office-wide evaluation to determine how to enhance its operational support to UN country teams that are integrating human rights into their Common Country Analysis (CCA) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).</p>	

OHCHR's close working relationships with UN agencies such as **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (UN WOMEN), the Division for the Advancement of Women of the Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** are not without challenges. These relationships can become strained due to competition for limited donor support, but also because some UN agencies do not want to be seen to be working closely with OHCHR because it could affect their access to governments and interfere in their relationships with donors.

Despite the prominence of partnerships in OHCHR's daily work, and being acclaimed for the unique and critical role it plays in the field, it did until recently not have an over-arching partnership strategy that clearly conveys its value proposition to partners. The Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan on Partnerships (2018-21) that was developed as part of the current OMP (2018-21) provides timely guidance to address this gap and allow the Office to take greater advantage of potential synergies with existing and new partners in a systematic and strategic manner. This is complemented by the Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan on External Communications (2018-21).

OHCHR has systems and institutional procedures that enable managers at all Office levels to make programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change. All Country Plans must include risk assessment and management plans, which require staff to monitor the context and keep track of changes. During the 2014-17 planning period, OHCHR strengthened the effectiveness of rapid response operations, humanitarian planning processes, the allocation of grants to implementing partners on the ground and the streamlining of administrative processes. This resulted in 75% of grants and funds being allocated to local organisations within two weeks of applications being submitted.

OHCHR's partners highly value its ability to adapt or amend interventions swiftly in response to contextual changes. OHCHR staff generally believe that current systems and procedures are robust and allows sufficient – if not always swift enough – flexibility to re-prioritise and plan its work and engagement with partners. Anything more stringent could interfere with how they implement OHCHR's mandate. The Organisational Effectiveness Plan for Partnerships (2018-21), commits OHCHR to developing "friendly" rules and procedures by which to identify and manage partnerships.

OHCHR currently has no statement on how it will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement, but this should be considered against its unique mandate and the ways of working this requires. At a country level, OHCHR's close relationship with UNDP and UN country teams provides opportunities for leveraging and influencing both national planning and joint country level planning processes through participating in UNDAFs and ISFs, as well as the common Country Analysis (CCAs) that inform UNDAF. OHCHR's participation and inputs to these processes help to coordinate its work with those of other UN agencies, although independent evaluations identify challenges around OHCHR's reluctance to prioritise; often spreading its resources too thinly and duplicating what other organisations are already doing. OHCHR's partners highly value its ability to prioritise working in synergy/partnerships as part of its business practice. However, being bound by UN Secretary regulations, OHCHR does not have the authority to commit funds to a joint programme; to use joint work plans instead of separate agency work plans; or to substitute the joint UN report for its annual country report. For the same reason it can only subscribe partially to the UNGD Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for 'Delivering as One'.

OHCHR makes significant investments in strengthening country systems, including justice systems, child welfare systems, national protection systems, etc. Due to its unique mandate, it cannot work through or use country systems in the way that other development agencies would be encouraged to do. It monitors the contribution of its investments to strengthening country systems, as demonstrated by reporting against the Expected Accomplishments in its OMP 2014-17.

OHCHR is transparent in terms of public access to accurate information on its strategies, planning documents, budgeting and management information. OHCHR does not appear to be a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). It is not clear whether its mandate and the nature of its work exempts it from membership. Although OHCHR's 10-year-old website is outdated, it does not have the authority to re-design its website because the terms of contacts are managed through a centralised UN system and funding for an update has not been made available to date.

OHCHR does not have explicit standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries in ways development and humanitarian agencies do, but this should also be seen from the perspective of its unique mandate. Its end beneficiaries are all rights-holders and it works with governments, civil society and citizens or affected populations (as beneficiaries) to establish human rights compliant institutional frameworks that strengthen the accountability of those who have obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law towards rights-holders. As such, all OHCHR's work, guidance, training and tools are about strengthening government's accountability to uphold, protect and promote the rights of citizens and of any specific affected groups, as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

OHCHR is mandated to provide support to the systematic monitoring of and reporting on the compliance by member states with their human rights obligations. It supports the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process which involves reviewing the human rights records of all UN member states. The UPR is a co-operative, State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations. Currently, no other universal mechanism of this kind exists.

OHCHR sees knowledge generation as a core responsibility. It produces an extensive range of information, training and education materials on a variety of topics related to human rights (including The Professional Education and Training Materials Series) for its staff, as well as for external audiences such as Governments, HRIs, civil society, the general public and the media. These materials are available at the OHCHR Library, as well as through an online library. OHCHR staff also distribute a large amount of documents and materials in the field. According to OHCHR's 2016 annual report, 250 000 publications and materials promoting human rights were distributed around the world from headquarters and field presences. Staff and partners value these materials highly. The majority of OHCHR's staff and partners regard OHCHR's knowledge products as excellent and highly useful for their work.

The 2016 Joint Investigation Unit's report on knowledge management recommended that OHCHR develop a knowledge management strategy and take incremental steps to embed knowledge management skills and knowledge-sharing abilities in staff performance. In response, dynamic knowledge is now one of the nine organisational effectiveness action plans of the OMP 2018-21. It focuses mainly on strengthening knowledge management within OHCHR.

<b>MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.8</b>
Element 1: Mechanisms in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change	4
Element 2: Mechanisms in place to allow the flexible use of programming funds as conditions change (budget revision or similar)	4
Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at country/regional/HQ level within a limited timeframe (less than three months)	4
Element 4: Evidence that regular review points between partners support joint identification and interpretation of changes in conditions	4
Element 5: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in procedures identified and action taken leading to an improvement	3

MI 6.1 Analysis	
<p>The Office's Performance Monitoring System (PMS) has institutionalised regular – monthly, six-monthly and annual – monitoring and reporting of progress against objectives, and allows programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change. Relevant financial data (funding obtained, actual expenses vs budget, balance remaining, etc.) can be accessed real-time. In addition, six monthly narrative and financial progress reports at activity level and aggregate level (e.g. country office) enable periodic budget revisions, if conditions require.</p> <p>Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at all Office levels. This was already the case since the Field Administration Manual was introduced in 2008, and appears to have been maintained in the RBM and PMS mechanisms introduced thereafter. Changes to programmes and other elements can be made at any time. These can be made through the Programme and Budget Review Board (PBRB), the Deputy High Commissioner or Division Director on a 'fast track' basis, while field presences and section chiefs also have flexibility within their own annual work and cost plans.</p> <p>The PBRB is the main body responsible for progress monitoring against objectives. The PBRB provides office-wide guidance on and the strategic monitoring of programme, budgetary and financial issues. Under the delegated authority of the High Commissioner, the Chair of the PBRB (Deputy High Commissioner) is authorised to increase financial allocations to programming units for amounts between USD 50 000 and USD 200 000 cumulative within one calendar year. The Head of the Managing Unit decides on requests for additional allocations of funds up to USD 50 000 cumulative within one calendar year for any individual programming unit as well as reallocation of funds within the Managing Unit up to USD 200 000. The PBRB meets once a month and additionally as required. Issues requiring immediate consideration by the PBRB when no in-person meetings are scheduled, are circulated for electronic review, with a one-week deadline.</p> <p>OHCHR's partners highly regard OHCHR's ability to adapt or amend interventions swiftly in response to contextual changes.</p> <p>Requests for Humanitarian support would normally be assessed and agreed by a Board of Trustees. Humanitarian funding requests that need to be decided within very tight deadlines follow a fast-track procedure. During the 2014-17 planning cycle, OHCHR undertook steps to improve the effectiveness of its rapid response operations, humanitarian planning, processes, the allocation of grants to implementing partners on the ground and the streamlining of administrative processes. The percentage of grants and funds that were allocated to local organisations within two weeks of their application being submitted reached 75%.</p> <p>OHCHR staff note that part of their skill set is to engage with partners, and to know which partners to engage with, when, why and which tools to use for this engagement. Because partnership work requires flexibility and responsiveness to remain relevant in the often dynamic contexts where OHCHR operates, staff believe the decisions they have to make will not be helped by having 'fixed' systems and sets of rules of how to operate in different situations. According to them, the systems to get permission for re-prioritising are sufficient, and anything more stringent could interfere with how they have to implement OHCHR's mandate. In its Organisational Effectiveness Plan for Partnerships (2018-21), OHCHR commits to developing 'friendly' rules and procedures by which to identify and manage partnerships.</p>	<p>28, 31, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 100, 122</p>

<p>OHCHR staff outlined how they continuously monitor and report their work to ensure that it remains aligned with expected results. At a country level, staff continuously monitor and verify changes and emerging trends with government, think-tanks, civil society organisations, the diplomatic community, etc. to ensure that its operations remain relevant. Desk officers at HQ are usually in daily contact with staff in the field. In addition, weekly reports, weekly VTCs with deputies and regular Video-and-Teleconferences (VTCs) on an as-need basis serve to review progress and challenges (including changes and emerging priorities in the local context), and to identify steps to ensure that activities progress smoothly. This includes reflection on partnership issues and management.</p> <p>OHCHR has recently started to strengthen risk management and all Country Plans must include a risk assessment and management plan. According to staff, this is an essential part of understanding the context and keeping track of changes. Where relevant, this includes risks associated with partner engagement and their management. During 2018-21, OHCHR aims to develop an internal programme of risk management in order to meet the demands of member states and donors, since the UN's Global Enterprise Risk Management structure does not fully meet its requirements.</p>	28, 31, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 100, 122
<b>MI 6.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.2: Partnerships based on an explicit statement of comparative advantage e.g. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership	2
Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership	2
Element 3: The organisation aligns its resources/competencies to its perceived comparative advantage	3
Element 4: Evidence that comparative advantage is deployed in partnerships to positive effect	3
<b>MI 6.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR is widely acknowledged and respected as the lead agency on human rights globally. OHCHR's key assets are its staff, based in Geneva, New York and in the field. Its technical expertise is highly regarded, within the UN system and beyond. The quality and depth of support provided to the human rights mechanisms is one example, but also the support to member states in their efforts to comply with and implement international human rights standards, to national human rights institutions and civil society organisations, are often cited as unique added value. They bring comparative advantages to the table that no other UN entity can offer in terms of detailed knowledge, convening power, broad networks and partnerships.</p> <p>The Office has been assessed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) as having played a critical and highly relevant role in the field that no other actor has played. It provides added value with regard to the promotion and protection of HR in the fields, in the countries, and regions in which it has operated. The Office has demonstrated its relevance by largely meeting the needs and expectations of its stakeholders in the field (Evaluation of OHCHR – Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2017). Geneva-based NGOs working on human rights-related issues expressed overall satisfaction on their working relationships with, and the support provided by, the Office.</p>	1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 20, 100

Despite its clear comparative advantage in several areas, and despite the prominence of partnerships in OHCHR's daily work, it has no over-arching partnership strategy. OHCHR acknowledges that, currently, its value proposition to partners and potential partners is not strong. The Management Plans for Pillar Elements of OHCHR's OMP 2018-21 pillar strategies clearly articulate its added value in the respective areas. However, they are not specifically linked to organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership.

In the absence of a partnership strategy, OHCHR's approach to partnerships is opportunistic and many of its partnerships have grown organically. OHCHR's 2012 partnerships policy is in need of revision. In its OMP 2018-21, OHCHR will develop and implement an overarching, office-wide Partnership Strategy as one of nine organisational effectiveness action plans. The strategy will provide a shared vision, clarifying why, when and how the Office should partner with external actors, under what circumstances, and what messages it wants to convey internally and externally regarding its overall strategic intent with respect to partnerships. That corporate partnership framework is expected to allow the Office to take greater advantage of potential synergies with existing as well as new partners across the organisation.

OHCHR's financial resources fall into two categories: regular budget and extrabudgetary. In 2016, regular budget expenditure amounted to USD 101 million, and extrabudgetary expenditure to USD 122 million. In 2017, these were USD 110 million and USD 136 million, respectively. OHCHR has little flexibility in the allocation and expenditure of its regular funding, since it is allocated from the UN Regular Budget for mandated activities, including an increased workload related to the human rights treaties and human rights council mechanisms. The expansion of field-level activities (and staff) is covered largely through extra-budgetary sources. In 2016, OHCHR had a working budget of USD 23 million per year to mainstream human rights in partnership with others.

OHCHR has full authority for managing extrabudgetary funding through its Trust Funds. However, a large proportion of OHCHR's extrabudgetary funding is earmarked, which limits OHCHR allocation of extrabudgetary funding to self-selected priorities. Independent evaluations, amongst others those of OHCHR's Central Asia Regional Office and the Guatemala country office, identify challenges around OHCHR's reluctance to prioritise, often spreading its resources too thinly and duplication what other organisations are already doing, rather than building on its own comparative advantage.

Partnerships are fundamental to the delivery of OHCHR's mandate. As part of its Mission Statement, OHCHR commits itself to working in close partnership with numerous stakeholders at the global, regional, national and local levels, both within and outside the United Nations system. Partners include member states, NHRIs, civil society organisations, the private sector, foundations, regional and international organisations, UN Secretariat departments, UN peace missions and agencies, funds and programmes. In addition, the Office cooperates with the international human rights machinery to address global human rights issues, to develop, strengthen and monitor standards and capacity for the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with international norms. The Office participates in inter-agency networks, co-leads several thematic inter-agency coordination mechanisms; chairs and leads the work of the Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism and the undg-hrm, and co-chaired the undg in 2014.

OHCHR has mandated partners, including Governments and NHRIs. Other partners include UN agencies and civil society organisation (non-government organisations, faith-based organisations, grassroots organisations, academic institutions, human rights defenders, etc.). OHCHR could engage in collaborative working partnerships with these organisations, or it could enter into more formalised partnerships by funding them to deliver agreed results.

1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16,  
20, 100

OHCHR's engagement with governments is determined by the human rights context in a particular country. It negotiates a full mandate with the host government that includes both human rights protection and promotion. The partnership between OHCHR and a country government can take the form of a supportive and collaborative relationship aimed at addressing pressing human rights issues – for example through human rights advisers, or it could be a more about monitoring and holding a government accountable for promoting and protecting the human rights of its country's people. These relationships can co-exist. OHCHR staff 'on the ground' determine the best strategy to engage with governments to contribute to the achievement of OHCHR's strategic goals.

Development partners are an important source of funding for OHCHR. Extra-budgetary funding from development partners – unearmarked funding more so than earmarked funding - enables OHCHR to implement its mandate through partnerships. At the same time, OHCHR helps development partners to meet their human rights obligations and support their human rights work in often challenging circumstances.

OHCHR's relationship with other UN agencies is important at a global, regional and country level. At a global level, OHCHR's relationship with other UN agencies has become politicised and due to the power dynamics amongst member states it struggles to get 'traction' compared to the other two UN pillars. Not all member states – or UN agencies – see OHCHR's work as helpful to their agendas. OHCHR also remains absent from DAC Peer Reviews.

At the country level, OHCHR works with its UN partners to support UN country teams and peacekeeping and special political missions in meeting their human rights responsibilities. In this regard, the Office co-chairs the Working Group on the Resident Coordinator System and participates in the UN induction for new Resident Coordinators. Through the 'Rights Up Front' Plan of Action, OHCHR seeks to be a leader in promoting a global consensus among international actors to improve early warning and UN responsiveness to emerging situations involving violations of human rights. Enhanced collaboration with other United Nations actors in the implementation of technical cooperation activities allows for maximising their impact and more efficient use of resources. According to the OHCHR website, the Office is currently undertaking an Office-wide evaluation to determine how to enhance its operational support to UN Country Teams that are integrating human rights into their CCA and the UNDAF. This assessment will lead to a longer-term programme to identify and meet the needs of UN Country Teams in undertaking rights-based development programmes (<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/PartnershipsIndex.aspx>).

Close cooperation is particularly significant with UNDP, based on the memorandum of understanding in force between the two agencies. OHCHR continues to implement technical cooperation projects at the national, regional and global levels in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies and programmes, such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN Women, DPKO, the United Nations Staff College and UNHCR.

Some examples of these collaborative relationships include the following:

- In Afghanistan OHCHR and UN Women worked together to ensure that human rights are incorporated in all the pillars of the Afghan Peace and Development Strategy.
- OHCHR had to close its Nepal office, but through the UN Country Team it continued to play an important role – remotely from Geneva - in the transitional justice programme in Nepal.
- In Ukraine, OHCHR works within the overall UN system, and all OHCHR's analysis feeds into the work of the UN Country Team, including the UN Partnership Framework. With the Framework, OHCHR co-leads the Democratic Governance pillar with UNDP on Democratic governance, rule of law and civic partnership. OHCHR is also working closely with UNDP and others on rights-based legislation development and adoption.

1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 20, 100

<p>However, there have also been reports of strained relationships between OHCHR and other UN agencies at a country level. This can be due to competition for limited donor support, but also because some UN agencies do not want to be seen to work closely with OHCHR because it may have a negative influence on their access to governments and interfere with their relationships with certain donors.</p> <p>OHCHR's collaborative relationship with civil society organisations is mainly determined by context. It can vary from assisting CSOs through capacity development, information and technical support to keep democratic space for their participation, or to address a specific human rights issue, to funding CSOs to implement projects or activities. Through dedicated Trust Funds OHCHR's financial support enables NGOs and NHRIs to attend global HRC meeting in Geneva and New York. Here they can raise human rights issues – either verbally or in writing - independent of their states. It brings additional and independent information from government perspectives to the HRC. The same applies for OHCHR's support to civil society organisations to contribute to, monitor and assist with the implementation of UPRs.</p> <p>The private sector, foundations and philanthropists are emerging as potentially important OHCHR partners, including as donors. However, OHCHR also brings value to private sector partnerships by assisting to address industry-related human rights issues, for example digital human rights in the ICT sector.</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 20, 100</p>
<b>MI 6.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation on use of country systems</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>N/A</b>
Element 1: Clear statement on set of expectations for how the organisation will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement (as appropriate) on use of country systems within a given time period	N/A
Element 2: Internal processes (in collaboration with partners) to diagnose the condition of country systems	N/A
Element 3: Clear procedures for how organisation to respond to address (with partners) concerns identified in country systems	N/A
Element 4: Reasons for non-use of country systems clearly and transparently communicated	N/A
Element 5: Internal structures and incentives supportive of greater use of country systems	N/A
Element 6: Monitoring of the organisation trend on use of country systems and the associated scale of investments being made in strengthening country systems	N/A

MI 6.3 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR currently has no statement on how it will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement.</p> <p>At a country level, OHCHR's close relationship with UNDP and UN Country Teams provides possibilities to explore opportunities for leveraging and influencing both national planning and joint country level planning processes through participating in UNDAFs and ISFs, as well as the Common Country Analysis (CCAs) that inform UNDAFs. OHCHR's participation and inputs to these processes help to coordinate its work with those of other UN agencies, and also helps to mainstream human rights in the coordinated work of other UN agencies. As a result, UNDAFs and other UN planning documents in many countries significantly integrate human rights concepts and mainstream recommendations issued by the international human rights mechanisms.</p> <p>OHCHR is bound by UN Secretary regulations. It therefore does not have the authority to commit funds to a joint programme; to use joint work plans instead of separate agency work plans; or to substitute the joint UN report for its annual county report. For the same reason it can only subscribe partially to the undg Standing Operating Procedures for Delivering as One.</p> <p>OHCHR's OMP 2018-2021 is strongly anchored in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. It will continue to work in partnership with UN country teams, civil society organisations and the private sector to ensure that the 2030 Agenda's commitment to "leave no one behind" is grounded in the principles of equality and non-discrimination.</p> <p>OHCHR makes significant investments in strengthening country systems, including justice systems, child welfare systems, national protection systems, etc. – albeit not necessarily through "strengthening by using". Due to its unique mandate, it would be challenging for OHCHR to use country systems in the way that other development agencies would be encouraged to do. However, OHCHR does monitor the contribution of its investments to strengthening country systems, as demonstrated by reporting against the Expected Accomplishments in its OMP 2014-2017.</p>	90, 122, 129, 130
MI 6.3 Evidence confidence	
MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify synergies, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation	Score
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.2</b>
Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly recognise the importance of synergies and leverage	4
Element 2: Strategies or designs contain clear statements of how duplication/fragmentation will be avoided based on realistic assessment of comparative advantages	3
Element 3: Strategies or designs contain clear statement of where an intervention will add the most value to a wider change	3
Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	3
Element 5: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change	3

MI 6.4 Analysis	Source document
<p>Synergies and leverage are key to OHCHR's mission, mandate and strategies. Identifying and strengthening synergies and working in partnerships are a critical way for OHCHR to strengthen its leverage over stakeholders whose responsibility it is to comply with human rights norms and standards. OHCHR represents the world's commitment to universal ideals of human dignity and has been given a unique mandate by the international community to promote and protect human rights. This strategic position echoes similar statements made in previous Strategic Frameworks, Annual Appeals, the OMP and others. To optimise its impact, OHCHR works closely in partnership with others, within and outside of the UN. These partnerships generally work well, although OHCHR's mandate and its position as part of the UN Secretariat could affect its ability to work in synergy with partners. OHCHR's partners highly regard its ability to prioritise working in synergies and partnerships as part of its business practice.</p> <p>Mainstreaming human rights within the UN system at the corporate level is a key priority for OHCHR as a whole, and is the main task of the New York Office. Influencing others and helping them improve their work from a human rights angle is at the heart of the Office's approach. One of OHCHR's 11 Expected Accomplishments in the OMP 2014-17 was to improve the responsiveness of the international community to human rights issues, with another aiming at stronger integration of a HRBA in UNCT strategies. The OMP 2018-21 is even more firmly rooted in partnerships as a way to support mainstreaming of human rights. OHCHR's strategic focus on the Sustainable Development Goals is seen as critical in that regard, in view of the SDGs' human rights relevance and inclusivity. This is reflected throughout the OMP 2018-21 and elaborated in pillar strategies, as well as in the organisational effectiveness action plan on Partnerships.</p> <p>In the field, OHCHR works closely with other United Nations agencies, fund and programs. By working with them in implementing activities, the Office tries to maximise its impact and make efficient use of its financial and human resources. Through training activities and expert advice provided by OHCHR in cooperation with other agencies, more and more UN country teams are integrating human rights into their common country programming and supporting national partners in their efforts to interact more effectively with UN human rights bodies. In addition to support provided to country and regional offices, OHCHR HRAs are particularly instrumental to mainstreaming, leveraging and developing synergies. The HRAs advise Resident Coordinators on policy and strategic issues, in facilitating capacity building of UN country teams, and ensuring that human rights are mainstreamed in UNDAFs and other strategies.</p> <p>Close cooperation is particularly significant with UNDP, based on the memorandum of understanding in force between the two agencies. OHCHR continues to implement technical cooperation projects at the national, regional, and global levels in close co-operation with other United Nations agencies and programmes, such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN Women, the Division for the Advancement of Women of the Secretariat, DPKO, the United Nations Staff college and UNHCR.</p> <p>Most UN Peace Missions with a civilian approach to their intervention have integrated human rights to their mandate. Human rights units in Peace Missions have two lines of reporting: one to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (SRSG), and the other to the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Human rights components have helped mainstream human rights in the larger work of peace missions which are now reporting more and more on human rights issues to the general public - OHCHR Annual Reports provide numerous anecdotal examples of such collaboration.</p> <p>Outside the UN, the Office has also taken steps to collaborate with partners such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the</p>	<p>1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 19, 20, 70, 71, 82</p>

Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IILHR), the United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), the Andean Commission of Jurists and others. For example, OHCHR and OSCE have a joint office in Abkhazia (Georgia) for the purpose, inter alia, of implementing a technical cooperation project. OHCHR also engages a great deal with civil society actors, in accordance with its priority pillar strategy to 'enhance and protect civic space and people's participation'. Its Civil Society Unit provides information and advice to civil society on a broad range of human rights issues and provides advice within OHCHR on policies and strategies to enhance cooperation for effective human rights protection and promotion; and develops tools to assist civil society in engaging with the United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms, of which the Handbook for Civil Society is the primary example.

OHCHR accords priority to the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs. At the request of member states, tailored advice is provided to a growing number of countries on appropriate constitutional or legislative frameworks regarding the establishment of NHRIs; on the nature, functions, powers and responsibilities of NHRIs. OHCHR also acts as the secretariat of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) and its Sub-Committee on Accreditation.

There is evidence in strategies to avoid duplication of effort. For instance, in the information provided to member states about the 2018-19 Strategic Framework, the High Commissioner emphasised that OHCHR will continue its efforts to further integrate human rights into all relevant areas of work of the UN system. OHCHR's strategy in this area is to strengthen partnerships with UN agencies to raise awareness and build capacities of all UN staff members on human rights issues. This strategic position echoes similar statements made earlier in previous Strategic Frameworks, Annual Appeals, the OMP and others. Independent evaluations, amongst others those of OHCHR's Central Asia Regional Office and the Guatemala country office, identify challenges around OHCHR's reluctance to prioritise; often spreading its resources too thinly and duplicating what other organisations are already doing, rather than building on its own comparative advantage.

OHCHR guidelines for preparing the country office strategic plans ('country notes') state that the existing UNDAF should be taken into account in framing expected accomplishments. This is also addressed in the recently developed guidelines for country programmes (2018-21) and for the OMP 2018-21 pillar strategies. Further, the role of other actors inside and outside the UN should be articulated in pursuing each expected accomplishment. Within the United Nations system, OHCHR field presences are assessed as having contributed to the enhanced integration of human rights into common processes, such as common country assessments and United Nations development assistance plans. Nevertheless, there are also examples where this is/was less evident.

During interviews, it was made clear that partnering with others inside and outside the UN system to mainstream and implement a human rights-based approach, was not an easy task. OHCHR depends on the will of others to engage on human rights, which is often seen as a politically sensitive issue. Some agencies are reluctant to incorporate human rights in their work (e.g. the OECD DAC), or see regard human rights as a menu from which they can select some and ignore others ('a smorgasbord'). In the current political climate, human rights principles are no longer a given, and some agencies were believed to be concerned that engaging with OHCHR might harm their relationship with certain member states. Moreover, even within the UN system, for which human rights are one of the three fundamental pillars, OHCHR is not always present at the table in important committees, either because of limited staff capacity, or because the Office is not always invited to participate.

1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11,  
16, 19, 20, 70, 71, 82

<b>MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with other relevant partners (donors, UN agencies, etc.)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.33</b>
Element 1: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint planning exercises, such as the UNDAF	3
Element 2: Evidence that the organisation has aligned its programme activities with joint planning instruments, such as UNDAF	3
Element 3: Evidence that the organisation has participated in opportunities for joint programming where these exist	2
Element 4: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key partners (donor, UN, etc.)	3
Element 5: Evidence of the identification of shared information gaps with partners and strategies developed to address these	2
Element 6: Evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities	1
<b>MI 6.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Within the UN system, OHCHR field presences have contributed to the enhanced integration of human rights into common planning exercises, such as CCAs and the UNDAF plans. OHCHR guidelines for preparing country office strategic plans (Country Notes) state that CCAs and UNDAF should be taken into account in framing expected accomplishments. One of the core tasks of deployed HRAs and human rights experts in the human rights components of peace operations is to encourage the adoption of a human rights based approach and participate in joint planning and programming work in countries. OHCHR's partners are generally not well informed of its coordination efforts within other development or humanitarian agencies, but this could be a reflection of its unique mandate and the fact that it generally does not operate within the Official Development Assistance architecture at country level.</p> <p>OHCHR's annual reports provide ample evidence of joint planning exercises at the field level. For example, the capacity of UNCTs to apply a HRBA was enhanced in countries that began the roll-out of their UNDAFs. Human rights concepts and recommendations issued by the international human rights mechanisms were mainstreamed into UNDAFs and other UN joint programmes. The partner survey results demonstrate high levels of satisfaction among all partner categories. Nevertheless, due to its limited field capacity, OHCHR cannot participate in all UNDAF processes.</p> <p>There is also some evidence of joint programming with other (UN and non-UN) entities at the local and global level, based on documentary evidence and feedback from the partner survey. For example, since the establishment of a country presence in Tunisia, UN Human Rights has focused its programmatic attention on supporting the transitional justice process. Engagement in this area is conducted through a joint project with UNDP, in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice, the Ministry of Justice, the Truth and Dignity Commission and the Provisional Judicial Authority. The Office also helped integrate expertise on gender and women's human rights into mandates established by the Human Rights Council. In collaboration with UN Women, gender advisers were seconded to the Commission of Investigation on Burundi, the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi, the Commission on Human Rights on South Sudan, the Commission</p>	6, 7, 16, 122

<p>of Inquiry on Eritrea, the Commission of Inquiry on Syria and the OHCHR field-based presence in South Korea. Moreover, concrete tools and guidance were developed to support the integration of gender concepts and approaches into the work of the international human rights mechanisms. In the State of Palestine, OHCHR substantially contributed to the formulation of the Joint UN Strategy for Hebron, which was launched in November and outlines the human rights challenges in Hebron. Other examples include the Peace Building Fund and so-called Rapid Response Missions under the authority of Resident Coordinators.</p> <p>Monitoring and reporting are core competencies of the Office. OHCHR Annual Reports contain numerous examples of joint efforts with partners. For instance, in 2016, based primarily on information gathered in the course of human rights monitoring activities, OHCHR and UNSMIL jointly published a report, in 2016, on the human rights situation of migrants in Libya, including on abuses and violations of international human rights law committed in the course of the year.</p> <p>There is some evidence of shared analysis of information gaps and efforts to address these. In the DRC, in 2016, the UN Joint Human Rights Office provided financial and technical support to 13 Joint Human Rights Investigation Teams and six mobile court hearings for grave human rights violations. Regarding OHCHR's participation in joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities, examples include the review of human rights advisors, which make use of a multi-donor trust fund.</p> <p>There is little evidence of joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities to suggest that this is done consistently.</p>	6, 7, 16, 122
<b>MI 6.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/ implementation partners on an ongoing basis</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2</b>
Element 1: Information on the organisation's website is easily accessible and current	2
Element 2: The organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative or reports through the OECD-DAC systems	N/A
Element 3: Accurate information is available on analysis, budgeting, management and is in line with IATI or OECD-DAC (CRS) guidelines	2
Element 4: Evidence that partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are responded to in a timely fashion	2
Element 5: Evidence that information shared is accurate and of good quality	2
<b>MI 6.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The home page of OHCHR's website is dedicated to current human rights issues and developments. Its annual plans and reports are sub-categorised under "publications and resources" and therefore not easy to find. The website has a search function, however a search for "OHCHR Budget 2017" did not yield any useful result. OHCHR acknowledges that its ten-year-old website is outdated; amongst others, the homepage does not support video. However, indications are that a request to update the website should be approved before the end of 2019.</p>	10, 83, 99, 102

<p>The IATI Membership overview listed in IATI's 2016 Annual Report (<a href="http://www.aidtransparency.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IATI-Annual-Report-2016-EN.pdf">http://www.aidtransparency.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IATI-Annual-Report-2016-EN.pdf</a>) does not list OHCHR as one of its members. OHCHR has not signed up to the IATI. It is not clear to OHCHR staff whether OHCHR's mandate exempts it from being a member of IATI.</p> <p>Accurate information on OHCHR's strategies, planning documents, budgeting and management is publicly available. It is not clear to OHCHR staff interviewed whether it is in line with IATI or OECD-DAC (CRS) guidelines, or whether it is required to be. One of OHCHR's Organisational Effectiveness Action Plans for 2018-21 is dedicated to External Communications. It does not deal specifically with communicating procedural and management information to external audiences. Such information is available in OHCHR's planning documents, annual reports and Annual Appeal documents, which are in the public domain.</p> <p>OHCHR's implementation partners are generally not well informed of how it communicated criteria for allocating financial resources (transparency). The same goes for the extent to which it provides reliable information on when financial allocations and disbursement will happen, and for how much (predictability). This could reflect the fact that OHCHR does not primarily fund partners to implement core aspects of its work, and that it only provides grants from the Trust Funds it manages.</p> <p>The availability and sharing of information to partners that receive funding from Trust Funds managed by OHCHR will be strengthened during the 2018-21 period as part of the OMP. The SMT recently approved the recommendations of an internal review to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of trust funds managed by OHCHR.</p>	10, 83, 99, 102
<b>MI 6.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations e.g. Accountability to Affected Populations	2
Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	3
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within the intervention	3
Element 6: Monitoring and evaluation procedures explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries have been addressed within the intervention	4

MI 6.7 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR does not have explicit standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries in the same way development and humanitarian agencies do. However, all its work is based on applying the key elements of the human rights-based approach, including participation of affected populations, non-discrimination, and accountability.</p> <p>OHCHR works in all sectors of the human rights triangle, namely government, civil society and citizens or affected populations (as beneficiaries) with the aim to establish a human rights compliant institutional framework that strengthens the accountability of those who have duties under human rights and international humanitarian law towards affected populations (beneficiaries). As such, all its work, guidance, training, tools and approval mechanisms is about strengthening government's accountability to uphold, protect and promote the rights of citizens and of any specific affected groups, as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.</p> <p>The OHCHR Management Plan's strategy for strengthening the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations (2018-21) places the rights and needs of affected populations (beneficiaries) at the centre of its work. It identifies OHCHR's added value as its ability to foster a dynamic approach to upholding the rule of law and to addressing accountability for human rights violations through, amongst others, the UPR process of the Human Rights Council and its special procedures, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and the treaty bodies' recommendations, which guide states on how to fulfil their human rights obligations. OHCHR globally studies and analyses practices that enhance accountability. Its field presences, in particular, support the efforts in various countries in areas such as enhancing the administration of justice, developing human rights-compliant investigation techniques, establishing transitional justice processes, and developing corporate social responsibility.</p> <p>The Office will continue to work in partnership with local governments, NGOs, NHRIs and other stakeholders through advocacy, capacity building, training and the provision of technical advice, to improve the effectiveness of its work in the field, and also ensure that the protection system and accountability mechanisms are sustainable. Further, in light of the existing challenges to the access to and realisation of justice in some regions, awareness-raising and capacity building, including with regard to knowledge of international human rights law and human rights mechanisms as well as monitoring skills of local rights holders will be crucial elements of OHCHR's work.</p>	108
<b>MI 6.7 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: Evidence of participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments	3
Element 2: Evidence of participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments	3
Element 3: Evidence of engagement in the production of joint progress statements in the implementation of commitments e.g. joint assessment reports	3
Element 4: Documentation arising from mutual progress assessments contains clear statement of the organisation's contribution, agreed by all partners	3
Element 5: Surveys or other methods applied to assess partner perception of progress	N/E

MI 6.8 Analysis	Source document
<p>OHCHR is mandated to provide support to the systematic monitoring of and reporting on the compliance by member states with their human rights obligations. In that regard, OHCHR supports the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process - a process, established in 2006 through the UN General Assembly by Resolution 60/125, involving a review of the human rights records of all UN member states. The UPR is a co-operative, state-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations. As one of the main features of the Council, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every country when their human rights situations are assessed. Currently, no other universal mechanism of this kind exists.</p> <p>The UPR is one of the key elements of the Council which reminds states of their responsibility to fully respect and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ultimate aim of this mechanism is to improve the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur.</p> <p>Secondly, OHCHR supports the special procedures of the Human Rights Council. These are independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advice on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective. The system of Special Procedures is a central element of the United Nations human rights machinery and covers all human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social.</p> <p>As of 1 August 2017, there are 44 thematic and 12 country mandates. With OHCHR support, special procedures undertake country visits; act on individual cases and concerns of a broader, structural nature by sending communications to states and others in which they bring alleged violations or abuses to their attention; conduct thematic studies and convene expert consultations, contribute to the development of international human rights standards, engage in advocacy, raise public awareness, and provide advice for technical cooperation. Special procedures report annually to the Human Rights Council; the majority of the mandates also reports to the General Assembly. Their tasks are defined in the resolutions creating or extending their mandates.</p> <p>Thirdly, OHCHR provides support to the human rights treaty bodies, i.e. committees of independent experts that monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties. Each state party to a treaty has an obligation to take steps to ensure that everyone in the state can enjoy the rights set out in the treaty. There are ten human rights treaty bodies composed of independent experts of recognised competence in human rights, who are nominated and elected for fixed renewable terms of four years by State parties.</p> <p>OHCHR reports, including the Annual Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights bodies and mechanisms (A/HRC/37/37 of March 2018), illustrate clearly how it contributes to the activities and outcomes to these human rights mechanisms, and how these are undertaken together with, or in consultation with UN member states and other relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations and national human rights institutions.</p>	13
MI 6.8 Evidence confidence	Medium confidence

<b>MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support programming adjustments, policy dialogue and/or advocacy</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation's role in knowledge production	4
Element 2: Evidence of knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action	3
Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy at country, regional or global level	4
Element 4: Evidence that knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners	3
Element 5: Evidence that knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners	4
Element 6: Evidence that knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners	3
<b>MI 6.9 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR sees knowledge generation as a core responsibility. In 2010, a needs assessment on knowledge management was conducted from which a work plan was developed. It included specific outputs and activities focusing on good practice compilation, mapping of knowledge sharing tools and streamlining of work processes. Knowledge management was also a component of the 2014-17 OMP.</p> <p>The Office produces an extensive range of publications on a variety of topics related to human rights, which provides information of interest to governments, national institutions, civil society, the general public and the media. The goal of OHCHR's publications programme is to increase knowledge and raise awareness about human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to publicise ways of promoting and protecting them worldwide. OHCHR publications also aim to encourage debate on human rights issues under discussion at the United Nations. Publications include: 37 Fact sheets, 46 Special Issue materials, 28 Reference materials, 25 (Professional) Education and Training materials, and 51 Policy and Methodological materials (available online). Partners, as evidenced by the MOPAN partner survey, speak highly of these publications. OHCHR's Methodology and Training Section is responsible for developing knowledge materials such as policies and methodologies on human rights, both for the operations Office at HQ and in the field, but also for the broader UN system and external partners. It also develops training materials on human rights for OHCHR staff and national stakeholders. The Training and Educational materials consist of guides, manuals, and handbooks for specific categories of rights-holders and educational institutions. In addition, OHCHR issues an Annual publications and e-products catalogue.</p> <p>The Professional Education and Training Materials Series consists of handbooks and manuals intended to raise awareness of international standards. It is directed at audiences that are able to influence the human rights situation in their countries. Although primarily designed to support OHCHR training activities, these publications also serve as practical tools for organisations that provide human rights education to professional groups. The majority of OHCHR's partners regard OHCHR's knowledge products as "excellent" and highly useful for their work.</p>	5, 6, 7, 102, 122

OHCHR also has an online OHCHR Library collection. The Library is open to OHCHR staff members, human rights mechanisms, UN Member State delegates, NGOs as well as members of general public interested in human rights. The library contains OHCHR publications in all available languages; human rights training and education publications; Books, reports, periodicals, videos, DVDs on human rights; and UDHR translations. Knowledge generation and dissemination is seen as a tool to achieve global objectives. Staff value the access they have to these materials and regard the quality of available material as excellent.

In the field, OHCHR supports governments and other stakeholders in developing and delivering human rights training. According to OHCHR's 2016 annual report, 250 000 publications and materials promoting human rights were distributed around the world from Headquarters and field presences.

The knowledge and training materials produced by OHCHR are used widely by a range of stakeholders to inform their actions. For example:

- In Timor-Leste, persons with disabilities and LGBTI persons learned about human rights standards, including the protection mechanisms that exist at the national and international levels. In some instances, individuals submitted claims regarding alleged violations of their rights to national protection mechanisms.
- Various capacity-building activities and technical advice facilitated by UN Human Rights were aimed at helping increase judiciary's and security forces' knowledge of human rights concepts and methodologies, particularly in regards to the administration of justice, non-discrimination and human rights in policing.
- The Office promoted space for civil society actors in international human rights fora, including by facilitating their engagement with the international human rights mechanisms and building their capacity and knowledge in relation to human rights issues. Practical guides and publications were developed and disseminated to over 9 000 civil society actors.

The Office maps emerging trends in human rights and identifies lessons learned from human rights work carried out at headquarters and in the field. Based on these trends, the Office produces policy and guidance, and capacity-strengthening tools, such as methodologies and training materials, which translate international human rights law into practical approaches and procedures that can be used by the UN and other actors.

The 2016 Joint Investigation Unit's report on knowledge management recommended that OHCHR develop a knowledge management strategy and take incremental aimed at embedding knowledge management skills and knowledge-sharing abilities in staff performance. In recognition thereof, dynamic knowledge is now one of the nine organisational effectiveness action plans in the OMP 2018-21. It focuses mainly on strengthening knowledge management within OHCHR.

5, 6, 7, 102, 122

**MI 6.9 Evidence confidence**

**High confidence**

## PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning*

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	3.46

OHCHR is strongly committed to a results culture, driven by the office's leadership and applied consistently within the office. Resources have been invested to develop and upgrade OHCHR's own, bespoke corporate results-based management system, which is more fit-for-purpose than the UN Secretariat's systems. This online performance monitoring system (PMS) forms the basis for strategic and operational decision-making and is updated and refined regularly. Use of the PMS software is compulsory and applied consistently. Corporate-level strategies are based on a sound RBM focus and logic and guide lower-level planning, reporting and results management approaches. Decisions on resource allocation are made contingent on compliance with RBM processes.

The new OMP reiterates the strategic importance of a strong results-focus for OHCHR. Although the PMS is well-regarded by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), further work is needed. The Organisational Effectiveness Action Plan 2018-21 states that OHCHR will continue developing and improving its RBM tools, continue investing in monitoring and evaluation functions, revamp its RBM capacity development strategy, and reinforce learning and accountability.

OHCHR's RBM system is principally designed to link planning, monitoring and budgeting of annual work and cost plans to the overarching four-year OMP strategy's expected accomplishments at the outcome level, and global management objectives. In doing so, it also informs the biennial Strategic Framework planning and reporting process. It allows for consistent evidence-based monitoring and reporting on the achievement of results, from project through to country and corporate level. The data generated through the PMS in turn informs mid-term reviews at all levels, including OMP adjustments where necessary. Conversely, the Strategic Framework planning and reporting process does not allow for such flexibility.

Corporate-level strategies are based on a sound RBM focus and logic and guide lower-level planning, reporting and results management approaches. At the corporate level, the strategy is guided by an overarching theory of change, which forms the basis for all corporate-level outcomes. The theory of change in the OMP 2018-21 is less explicit about how the activities carried out under the six thematic pillars will contribute to the results, than its predecessor. Given the mandate of the organisation, its size and reach, and the type of activities OHCHR undertakes, many of the performance indicators identified are necessarily qualitative and focus on contribution, not attribution. The selected indicators at corporate and operational levels are relevant to the expected results and have been formulated in ways that enable qualitative and quantitative progress measurement and cost-effectiveness. Given the oftentimes political context, agility to respond to changing circumstances is necessary, and this is reflected in the RBM. Past performance data, generated internally through monitoring mechanisms and externally through external reviews and evaluations, informs planning and decision-making.

OHCHR's monitoring systems are of a high quality and are effectively used to inform management decisions. Reporting structures are coherent, time-bound and include field level monthly monitoring reports, six-monthly mid-year reports, end of cycle reports and end of year progress reports. These report on (achieved) global targets; planned vs. achieved results; implementation status; reports on activity; budget reports and mid-year expenditure. At HQ level, various staff ensure data quality when reviewing plans and reports, checking for consistency and logic, as well as for substantive quality. The end of year progress report guidelines include an element of quality assurance by integrating a review process. The reporting structures constitute an integral part of OHCHR's management information system. They inform changes to plans and budgets and/or inform subsequent planning and budgeting cycles, and enable decision-making throughout the Office.

**Significant efforts have been made to base planning and programming on performance data.** Assessments of past performance are an obligatory part of the RBM process. Equally important, is the fact that planning, costing and reporting are integrated components. On the basis of actual performance against projected targets (at activity, output and outcome levels)

presented in the mid-year and annual reports, updates/ revisions/deletions are required in subsequent annual work and cost plans. The performance monitoring system is designed in such a way that actual performance informs mid-year and mid-term reviews, as well as the next planning and budgeting cycle(s). OHCHR Management reviews corporate performance data at least once every six months (i.e. Mid-Year report). A full review/revision of the OMP is done every two years, based on progress against corporate objectives, context analysis and financial resources data. Although partners realise the complexity in which OHCHR operates, and despite the high quality of OHCHR's RBM and PMS systems, the Office faces challenges to convince some partners how it contributes to higher-level results. Results are seldom clear-cut and prone to interpretation.

<b>MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.67</b>
Element 1: Corporate commitment to a results culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	4
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	4
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and developing indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	4
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	3
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	4
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and methods	3
<b>MI 7.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR is strongly committed to a results culture, as stated in all its strategic planning documents from 2011 onwards. Its corporate policies and strategies are based on a consistent, coherent and transparent theory of change. Results Based Management (RBM) principles have been translated into OHCHR's own, bespoke online PMS, which forms the basis for strategic and operational decision-making. The PMS is updated and refined regularly.</p> <p>Senior Management supports and encourages an RBM approach and business culture. All staff must - and do, according to interview responses - comply with the RBM approach, systems and processes. Use of the PMS software is compulsory and constitutes the only way for staff to plan, budget, and monitor progress on a regular (monthly, six-monthly and annual) basis. Decisions on resource allocation are made contingent on compliance with RBM processes.</p> <p>OHCHR has developed detailed and clear guidance for different categories of staff (Field and Headquarters) for its PMS, for the drafting of country and sub-regional strategies, annual work plans, monthly progress reports mid-year reviews, end of year progress reports, and End of Cycle progress reports. Recently, OHCHR developed a 2½ hour online training course on RBM. For 2017, OHCHR's PPMEs Department has issued additional guidelines for the development of Annual Work and Cost Plans (AW/CP) and Mid-Year Reviews. This includes guidance on identifying and selecting results targets, based on a clear theory of change, against contextually relevant global Expected Accomplishments (EAs). Once these EAs have been selected, staff must define their contribution to each of these in terms of outputs, and subsequently, specify activities and enter costs. Equally, contributions to Global Management Outputs need to be specified in annual work plans (source: OHCHR AW/CP Guidelines for 2017 Annual Work and Cost Plans, 2017).</p>	1, 7, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60, 90, 91, 94, 99, 101

<p>OHCHR has developed a comprehensive IT-based tool to dynamically manage the information required to reflect the work plan, and interactively monitor and report on its implementation. The web-based monitoring system stocks all country, sub-regional and headquarters planning documents and is accessible to all OHCHR staff. This ensures exchange and communication between field offices and headquarters and encourages the sharing of experiences and learning among staff. The PMS also provides baseline information for the online staff performance assessment (ePAS). The PMS is upgraded regularly to meet new requirements, as and when necessary.</p> <p>All policy and finance staff responsible for planning and reporting use the PMS for results-based management purposes. Three staff posts are directly tied to the PMS for development and maintenance and include one information officer and one policy staff member. OHCHR staff receive a 3-4 day training in PMS, either as part of their induction training or on-the-job. The aim is to ensure that all relevant staff are trained in the RBM approach and master its tools and instruments.</p>	1, 7, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60, 90, 91, 94, 99, 101
<b>MI 7.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.2</b>
Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks	3
Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level	4
Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly	3
Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and note areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results	2
<b>MI 7.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>At the corporate level, the OMP 2014-17, the Biennial Strategic Frameworks (presented to the General Assembly), the Biennial Strategic Plans, Thematic Strategies and Annual Appeals all include results frameworks. Some are far more comprehensive and S.M.A.R.T. than others. The 2018-21 OMP is less detailed than its predecessor in terms of internal management performance and geographic outcomes.</p> <p>OHCHR's RBM system is principally designed to link planning, monitoring and budgeting of annual work and cost plans to the overarching four-year OMP strategy's expected accomplishments at the outcome level, and global management outputs. It allows for consistent evidence-based monitoring and reporting on the achievement of results, from project through to country and corporate level.</p> <p>OHCHR reports annually to its governing body, the General Assembly, on results and expenses covered by the regular budget contributions. It reports on progress made with regard to the implementation of the Strategic Framework (i.e. the plans for the four sub-programmes and six thematic priorities that are endorsed by the General Assembly every two years). The PMS provides the basis for these reports, although the format is different to OHCHR's other more comprehensive Annual Reports, which include results achieved with voluntary contributions and achievements against the global management outputs.</p>	1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 35, 55, 56, 58, 59, 84, 85, 90, 91

<p>OHCHR's Corporate Strategic Planning process consists of two tracks:</p> <p>(i) The Strategic Framework planning process, covering a two-year cycle. The SF is based on strict requirements of the General Assembly, making it a rigid and static document. The SF is not updated during the two-year cycle; and (ii) the elaborate and highly participatory (staff and external partners) OMP planning process, covering a four-year period. OHCHR regards the OMP as an operationalisation of the organisation's mission, guided by the mandate given to the office by the different intergovernmental bodies of the UN, and articulated in the Secretary General's Strategic Framework(s). The OMP is reviewed mid-term by the Senior Management Team. In the past, this has led to adjustments to global targets for Expected Accomplishments, taking changing contextual and financial circumstances into account. The 2018-21 OMP draws on lessons learned from past experience and context analysis.</p> <p>The contents of annual corporate reports vary significantly. The detailed corporate Annual Reports are based on data derived from annual reports compiled at field at HQ levels, and present global achievements against (revised) global Expected Accomplishments' targets. Corporate reports to the GA and the Human Rights Council are less detailed, less quantified, and offer largely anecdotal evidence against funding and thematic priorities only. At the corporate level, deviations between planned and achieved results are not explained. At lower levels in the organisation, however, this is compulsory.</p>	<p>1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 35, 55, 56, 58, 59, 84, 85, 90, 91</p>
<b>MI 7.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.3: Results targets set based on a sound evidence base and logic</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	3
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement	3
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new interventions	4
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	4
<b>MI 7.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>At the corporate level, the OMP 2014-17 has been built around an overarching theory of change, which forms the basis for all corporate-level outcomes. The RBM and PMS are based on a logical framework approach whereby interventions contribute to outputs, which in turn contribute to outcomes and, finally, the highest-level objectives (the EAs and GMOs). Given the mandate of the organisation, its size and reach, and the type of activities OHCHR undertakes (i.e. mostly monitoring and reporting, advocacy, support to human rights bodies, advisory services, technical cooperation/capacity building), many of the indicators used are necessarily qualitative and measure OHCHR's contribution to the targeted outcomes, not attribution.</p> <p>Generally speaking, contribution to outcomes rather than attributional causality is the foundation on which OHCHR operates. The selected indicators at corporate and operational levels are relevant to the expected results and have been formulated in ways that enable qualitative and quantitative progress measurement and cost-effectiveness. For each Global Expected Accomplishment, relevant global and national level indicators have been identified. Given the oftentimes political context, agility to respond to changing circumstances is necessary, and this is reflected in the RBM cycle.</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 43, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, 90, 91</p>

<p>At country level, baselines are mandatory and generally consist of a description of the national context and past OHCHR engagement, followed by a thematic assessment for each of the selected thematic priorities in which OHCHR intends to engage in the given country. This provides a baseline for the setting of objectives and the selection of indicators to measure progress against. Given UNHCR's tight budget and funding shortfalls, scrutiny of (new) interventions is strict.</p> <p>At field and HQ level, progress against results targets is monitored at various intervals: on a monthly basis, six-monthly, end of year, and end of cycle. Financial monitoring can be done in real-time on a 24/7 basis in Umoja. Progress is then reported, whereupon revisions to annual workplans, country and regional notes (i.e. multi-annual strategies) and, ultimately, the Global Targets (EAs, thematic targets and GMOs) are revised.</p>	1, 5, 6, 7, 43, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, 90, 91
<b>MI 7.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high quality and useful performance data</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.43</b>
Element 1: The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced	3
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome level of the results chain	4
Element 3: Reporting structures are clear	4
Element 4: Reporting processes ensure timely data for key corporate reporting, and planning	4
Element 5: A system for ensuring data quality exists	3
Element 6: Data adequately captures key corporate results	3
Element 7: Adequate resources are allocated to the monitoring system	3
<b>MI 7.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>In the OMP 2014-17 cycle, for each of the Expected Accomplishments (EAs), outcomes, outputs and activities are identified. The Performance Monitoring system (PMS), established in 2011 and refined since then, monitors all annual work plans. Everyone must work within the system and all content can be seen by everyone. It is a performance monitoring system with standard indicators for the results the office is contributing to. The PMS generates data at all three levels of the results chain. At country level, planning and reporting is undertaken at the activity and output level. These are then aggregated to the corporate outcome level and reported in an annex in the OHCHR annual reports.</p> <p>The reporting structures are clear and coherent. They include field level monthly monitoring reports, six-monthly mid-year reports, end of cycle reports, and end of year progress reports, which in turn deliver reports on (achieved) global targets; reports on planned vs. achieved results; a report on reported outputs; reports on implementation status; reports on activity; budget reports and Mid-Year Review expenditures. The reporting structures constitute an integral part of OHCHR's management information system.</p> <p>The reporting processes are time-bound and sufficiently frequent to monitor progress activity, output and outcome. The PMS enables decision-making throughout OHCHR and can inform changes to plans &amp; budgets and/or inform subsequent planning and budgeting cycles.</p> <p>The PMS is also used to inform the many reports – narrative and financial – to OHCHR's Governing board, the General Assembly.</p>	44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63

<p>At HQ level, several staff ensure data quality when reviewing plans and reports. These are checked for consistency and logic, as well as for substantive quality. The End of Year progress report guidelines include an element of quality assurance by integrating a review process.</p> <p>The PMS collects implementation data at activity levels, which is used to inform higher-level decision-making and reporting, up to the corporate level. Plans are developed for a select number of objectives, concurrent with OHCHR's overarching theory of change, thematic pillars, Global Expected Accomplishments and Global Management outputs. Progress is then monitored for each activity, output and outcome at regular intervals, which if necessary leads to changes in plans and budgets; and/or inform subsequent planning and budgeting cycles.</p> <p>The three staff posts directly related to PMS are located in the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Section (PPMES). There are no indications of resource shortfalls.</p>	44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63
<b>MI 7.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: Planning documents are clearly based on performance data	4
Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data	4
Element 3: At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate	4
Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country level	2
<b>MI 7.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>There is clear evidence that past performance informs new planning cycles and documents. This is an obligatory part of the RBM system within OHCHR. OHCHR works on the basis of multi-annual planning documents (OMP, thematic plans, country notes) that form the basis for "rolling-over" annual planning and reporting cycles, i.e. operational annual work and cost plans. On the basis of actual performance against projected targets (at activity, output and outcome levels) presented in the mid-year and annual reports, updates/ revisions/deletions are required in subsequent annual work and cost plans.</p> <p>Planning, costing and reporting are integrated components of the RBM. The performance monitoring system is designed in such a way that actual performance informs mid-year and mid-term reviews, as well as the next planning and budgeting cycle(s).</p> <p>OHCHR Management reviews corporate performance data at least once every six months (i.e. Mid-Year report). A full review/revision of the OMP is done every two years, based on progress against EAs and GMOs, context analysis and income and expenditures. This has led to adjustments in EAs and GMOs at corporate and field levels.</p> <p>Although partners realise the complexity in which OHCHR operates, and despite the high quality of OHCHR's RBM and PMS systems, the office faces challenges convincing some partners how it contributes to higher-level results, which are seldom concrete and short-term. Results are seldom clear-cut and prone to interpretation.</p>	1, 6, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 66
<b>MI 7.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied	KPI score
Satisfactory	2.73
<p>Compared to OHCHR's well-developed internal RBM approach, with systems and procedures that encourage an organisation-wide 'way of looking at results', the evaluation function is still relatively new and under construction. OHCHR has only recently begun to build an evaluation function of its own. This is partly because, as a member of the Secretariat, in the past the Office would rely on the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services' own - limited - capacity, with OIOS placing more emphasis on reviews and audits than on evaluations. The evaluation function is not (yet) fully independent from other management functions.</p> <p>In 2014, OHCHR established its own evaluation unit, as part of the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Service (PPMES). That same year, it published its first evaluation policy, drawing on common UNEG principles and approaches. The Evaluation function's financial and human resources are modest, with only one full-time evaluation officers and 0.5 full-time equivalent Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer; the biennial budget in 2014-15 was approximately USD 1 million.</p> <p>The launch of the Evaluation Policy in 2014 marked an important step forward. Based on international standards and norms, it sets out implementation guidance to ensure that evaluation becomes an integral part of (field) operations and that findings inform decision-making at the policy and strategy levels. The biennial evaluation plans concur with the principles set out in the policy, and distinguish between strategic and decentralised evaluations, in accordance with overall priorities. Judging by the evaluations undertaken, the policy guidelines are indeed being applied, with increasingly active engagement of PPMES evaluation staff in all phases of the evaluation cycle. Quality Assurance is carried out, although a formal QA process has not yet been established.</p> <p>OHCHR does not yet have an 'evaluation culture', although it does undertake efforts to build one. Aside from the two OIOS-commissioned evaluations (of field presences (completed) and human rights protection in peacekeeping operations (awaiting publication)), the number of OHCHR-commissioned centralised and decentralised evaluations is increasing, but the 2014 baseline is low. In order to build a constituency within the Office in favour of learning and reflection, PPMES has taken a highly consultative approach, bringing staff from various units and divisions on board in the OHCHR Evaluation Focal Points Network. The evaluation function does not (yet) enjoy full structural independence, with the Senior Management Team having more responsibility than its intended custodianship. Evaluation staff contribute methodologically to ad-hoc, incident-driven 'quasi-audits' of field offices.</p> <p>Serious efforts are being made to foster a learning culture internally. Increasingly, evaluation results are shared and discussed with directors and staff at the senior and operational level, and fed into new policy and programming cycles. Management responses are obligatory and dealt with professionally, although not all are published on the website. PPMES monitors implementation of the action plans flowing from these management response on a six-monthly basis and reports to senior management on progress.</p> <p>Lessons learned from evaluations have been pulled together to inform the development of the OMP 2018-2021 and country programmes, whereas tracking of poor performance of operational activities is carried out through the PMS system. Most, but not all evaluations are published on the OHCHR and UNEG website. However, OHCHR does not yet systematically and consistently disseminate evaluation findings among its donors, peers and stakeholders.</p>	

<b>MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.57</b>
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions such as planning and managing development assistance ( <i>operational independence</i> )	2
Element 2: The Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation ( <i>Structural independence</i> )	1
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	3
Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures <i>budgetary independence</i>	2
Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds	3
Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation	4
Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated ( <i>Behavioural independence</i> )	3
<b>MI 8.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>As part of the UN Secretariat, the Office for Internal Oversight and Services (OIOS) is OHCHR's formal independent evaluation function. In practice, OIOS has limited capacity to conduct external audits as well as independent evaluations. In 2014, for the first time, OHCHR established its own internal evaluation function, within the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Service (PPMES) at the HQ in Geneva. The evaluation function is not structurally and operationally independent from other management functions.</p> <p>The PPMES comprises 11 posts altogether, including 1 full-time evaluation officer. It is led at a D-1 level, who reports directly to the Deputy High Commissioner. Although the evaluation policy clearly states that the SMT is the custodian, responsible for ensuring the independence of the evaluation function, in practice evaluation plans must be endorsed by the Senior Management Team and subsequently adopted by the High Commissioner. This seems to erode the structural independence of the evaluation function, as set by UNEG's June 2016 Norms and Standards for Evaluation.</p> <p>PPMES commissions independent external (so-called centralised) evaluations on strategic and/or cross cutting issues. Decentralised evaluations are commissioned by the responsible manager, with PPMES in a quality assurance and supporting role. More recently, a third category – labelled as internal evaluations, but in practice more like management audits – has been added. These are commissioned by senior management and involve PPMES staff, thereby blurring the lines of the evaluation function's independence. Although PPMES has full discretion to prepare its biennial corporate evaluation plan independently, in order to help build support for the evaluation function, it consults with staff first. The evaluation function within PPMES is facilitated by the OHCHR Evaluation Focal Points Network, composed of representatives of each Division, the Executive Direction and Management, Programme Support and Management Services, and the NY office.</p>	1, 64, 65, 78, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101

<p>The budget for evaluations comes from a dedicated percentage of OHCHR's overall budget to implement RBM within the organisation. The HC sets the budget every two years, upon recommendation by the Programme Budget Review Board. OIOS reported in 2016 that OHCHR spent USD 1.48 million on its M&amp;E budget and USD 0.98 million on evaluation reports ("high"); these figures refer to the 2014-2015 biennium. The M&amp;E as a % of total programme budget was deemed low, at 0.31%. There is no evidence to suggest that the Governing Board (the UN General Assembly) is involved in detailed discussions of the evaluation function's budget.</p> <p>Upon completion, evaluations are submitted directly for consideration to the manager responsible for the intervention under review, who then ensures that a management response is produced within two months of the receipt of a final evaluation report. The management response is submitted through PPMES to the PBRB. Evaluation results are also discussed during SMT meetings. In the case of global and thematic evaluations the management response is prepared by the Deputy High Commissioner. All evaluation results are also discussed during PBRB meetings.</p> <p>The Evaluation Policy follows the UNEG guidelines and norms informing evaluations in OHCHR. It states clearly that "To avoid conflict of interests, evaluators need to be independent, implying that members of an evaluation must not have been directly responsible for the policy-setting, design, or overall management of the subject of evaluation, nor expect to be in the near future". Based on the analysis of external evaluations carried out, evaluators were able to conduct their work independently.</p>	<p>1, 64, 65, 78, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101</p>
<p><b>MI 8.1 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI Rating</b></p>	<p><b>Highly satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3.4</b></p>
<p>Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralised evaluations</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the organisation's Interventions, reflecting key priorities</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented</p>	<p>3</p>
<p><b>MI 8.2 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>The evaluation policy was introduced in 2014 and marks a significant step forward for OHCHR. It is based on international norms and standards (OECD, UNEG). The Evaluation policy guides implementation at HQ and field/project level. It describes seven criteria for selection of evaluation subjects: relevance, strategic importance, size of investment or coverage, demand, potential to generate knowledge, flagship programmes and evaluability. OIOS has concluded that an evaluation policy, procedures and plans are in place.</p> <p>The Evaluation policy guides implementation at HQ and field/project level. OHCHR has established procedures to ensure that M&amp;E is an integral part of operations and use of evaluation findings inform decision-making at the project and strategic levels.</p>	<p>11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 34, 64, 65, 67, 74, 75, 95, 96, 97</p>

<p>OHCHR has a 2014-17 evaluation strategy in which it states that “a detailed OHCHR Evaluation Plan is produced yearly”. In practice, PPMES presents detailed Evaluation Plans to the HC, via the SMT on a biennial basis, with descriptions of background, rationale, purpose, and how the findings are expected to inform the policy planning cycles. The 2016-17 Evaluation Plan comprises key aspects of evaluations commissioned during the previous Evaluation Plan Cycle. The evaluation plans are available on OHCHR’s intranet, but not yet on the website, as opposed to external evaluation reports.</p> <p>The biennial evaluation plans concur with the evaluation policy. They build on a clear and convincing logic and apply the seven selection criteria consistently. They also distinguish between strategic and decentralised evaluations, in accordance with priorities, and include evaluation proposals that were not included in the 2014-17 evaluation plan, reflecting evolving organisational priorities.</p> <p>Evidence from the available evaluations conducted at country level indicate that the evaluation policy is in most cases being implemented as prescribed. Evaluations were carried out by independent consultants. On one occasion, OHCHR staff participated in the evaluation.</p>	<p>11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 34, 64, 65, 67, 74, 75, 95, 96, 97</p>
<p><b>MI 8.2 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 8.3: Systems are applied to ensure the quality of evaluations</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI Rating</b></p>	<p><b>Highly satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3.2</b></p>
<p>Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data-collection, analysis and interpretation</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 3: Evaluation reports present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 4: The methodology presented includes the methodological limitations and concerns</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralised evaluations</p>	<p>3</p>
<p><b>MI 8.3 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>OHCHR is an active member of UNEG. Its policy requires that all OHCHR-commissioned evaluations follow internationally recognised norms, standards and guidelines, in particular those developed by the UNEG. The evaluations available for analysis differ in terms of their scope and depth of analysis, with some more quality-oriented than others.</p> <p>All evaluations assessed use a variety of appropriate methodologies for data collection, analysis and interpretation. However, depending on the scope of the evaluation, the quality and depth vary considerably.</p> <p>The seven evaluation reports and one review that were analysed, present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions and recommendations, with all evaluation questions presented and answered.</p> <p>Of the evaluation reports analysed, only two include a dedicated section on methodological limitations and concerns. Of the four others, two were carried out by OIOS, and two by independent consultants.</p>	<p>11, 12, 15, 64, 68, 69, 70, 114</p>

OHCHR follows UN Secretariat rules and regulations as well as UNEG Norms and Standards. PPMEs commissions, participates in, support and undertakes evaluations. It also develops and improves methods of evaluation and evaluation guidelines. Moreover, PPMEs collaborates with all corporate-level departments to ensure and improve the quality of evaluation work. From interviews, it became clear that PPMEs is responsible for Quality Assurance of centralised evaluations throughout all phases of the evaluation, and has for instance developed model TORs, guidance on preparation of evaluation reports and follow-up of recommendations. PPMEs has an advisory role for decentralised evaluations, but a QA process for these has not yet been developed.	11, 12, 15, 64, 68, 69, 70, 114
<b>MI 8.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions	3
Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into new interventions design	3
Element 3: There is evidence that lessons from past interventions have informed new interventions	2
Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions	3
Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public	0
<b>MI 8.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>It is OHCHR's declared policy to use evaluation as part of its results-based management, in order to make OHCHR's interventions more relevant, more efficient, more effective, have a greater impact and be more sustainable. OHCHR's senior leadership calls for the systematic use of evaluation findings and recommendations in new policy and programme cycles. In accordance with its declared policy to strengthen accountability and learning through evaluations, in 2017, OHCHR issued a revised submission form for project funding to OHCHR staff, with a mandatory section on the use of evaluation findings.</p> <p>OHCHR's planning and reporting cycle has been designed in such a way that progress is monitored/reviewed closely and frequently, and thus that lessons from ongoing interventions are considered to inform/adjust implementation plans. The meta-evaluation conducted internally draws lessons from external evaluations, and these have been fed into the development of the OMP 2018-2021.</p> <p>Noting that the number of independent evaluations and (internal) reviewed is relatively small, there is therefore only limited evidence of the extent to which (ex-post) evaluations inform policy and intervention design. A meta-analysis of the results of evaluations and audits was undertaken to help inform the new OMP 2018-21.</p> <p>Evaluation results are shared with directors (in the PBRB) and staff at the senior and operational level. Judging by the minutes of internal meetings and responses during interviews, serious efforts are made to contribute to a learning culture and apply lessons learnt to new interventions. This impression was reinforced during interviews.</p> <p>No evidence was found to substantiate that new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches are made public.</p>	4, 93
<b>MI 8.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

<b>MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	4
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	4
Element 3: A process for addressing the poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	4
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	4
<b>MI 8.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
OHCHR's PMS is used to monitor and assess performance against objectives at all levels, including individual interventions, on a monthly, six-monthly and annual basis. This allows for timely adjustments if and when needed. Tracking of the progress of interventions is undertaken regularly. The monthly narrative reports that field staff submit to their colleagues at HQ, enable timely corrective action to redress poor performance if necessary. A compulsory six-monthly performance tracking is carried out at HQ level. In all cases, should circumstances require, adjustments are also made. Progress is monitored at all levels. Based on reports prepared by HQ divisions, the PBRB discusses progress of all interventions at least twice a year and is the main body for corrective action, if required. Execution of measures that address poor performance are delegated to those responsible.	43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52
<b>MI 8.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.6</b>
Element 1: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)	2
Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and/or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities	2
Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed	2
Element 4: A system exists to regularly track status of implementation	2
Element 5: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public	0

<b>MI 8.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
Management responses to evaluations are now a mandatory requirement. However, of the evaluations carried out since 2014, not all management responses had been published on the website (nor could they be found easily). As per UN guidelines, OHCHR uses management responses to evaluation reports to identify corrective measures and responsibilities for follow-up actions. The three management responses made available include detailed action plans, specifying in clear terms responsibility for follow-up action, and clear timeframes. PPMES monitors their implementation, requesting an update on the follow-up status every six months. The action plans and updates are submitted to the Programme and Budget Review Board. The PBRB Terms of Reference were updated to reflect this role in the follow-up to evaluation results. So far, OHCHR does not publish an annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations in the public domain.	31, 71, 72, 73
<b>MI 8.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations and other reports</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.17</b>
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use	4
Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists	2
Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed	1
Element 4: A system is available and used to track the uptake of lessons learned	2
Element 5: Evidence is available that lessons learned and good practices are being applied	2
Element 6: A corporate policy for Disclosure of information exists and is also applied to evaluations	2
<b>MI 8.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR maintains and updates an internal repository of internal, OIOS and other evaluations and their recommendations, to be used by staff. The repository is up to date. The repository is not available in the public domain.</p> <p>Updated guidance on the follow up to evaluation reports was prepared in 2017. It addresses the revision, dissemination, publication and follow-up evaluation reports. This includes the preparation and dissemination of management responses and action plans for implementation of recommendations. Before 2017, the only mechanism in place was the PMS, which did not explicitly address lessons learned from external evaluations.</p> <p>Most, but not all evaluations are published on the OHCHR website, the UNEG website. Apart from the evaluations of donor-funded interventions that donors demand and pay for, there does not appear to be a consistent dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and stakeholders of evaluation results. Results are shared by OHCHR randomly.</p> <p>OHCHR's PPMES initiated an internal meta-evaluation of evaluations and audits conducted during the programming cycle 2014-17. The office used the findings in preparation of 2018-21 pillar strategies and country programmes.</p>	77, 93, 98

<p>In line with the 2014-17 Evaluation Plan, there is a growing tendency to apply lessons learned and good practices from evaluations, both at country level and at corporate level, although examples are still few and far between.</p> <p>OHCHR's evaluation policy states explicitly that it is based on UNEG norms and standards, which include standard 1.5., expressing that the Office should have an explicit disclosure policy for evaluations. Although a corporate policy for disclosure of information cannot be found on the OHCHR website, the Office does publish external evaluations on the website.</p>	77, 93, 98
<b>MI 8.7 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

## RESULTS

*Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way*

<b>KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results e.g. at the institutional/corporate wide level, at the regional/corporate wide level and, at the regional/country level, with results contributing to normative and cross-cutting goals</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.5</b>

Assessing the achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to human rights is challenging, given the limited and patchy evidence base. For the period under review, only one OIOS evaluation, three external evaluation reports by independent consultants on strategic/cross-cutting themes and four decentralised external evaluations were available for analysis, namely:

- OIOS evaluation of OHCHR field operations (2017)
- Evaluation of the Programmes supported by the Human rights Advisors (2016)
- Evaluation of OHCHR support to National Human Rights Institutions (2015)
- Evaluation of the OHCHR Regional Gender Advisors Structure (2017)
- Evaluation of the "Combating Discrimination in the Republic of Moldova" project (2015)
- Evaluation of the "Building Capacities for Human Rights Monitoring Protection and Advocacy in Tajikistan" project (2015)
- Evaluation of "The Impact of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building on the Human Rights Situation in the DRC 2008-2014" (2015)
- Evaluation of the Regional Office Central Asia (2014)
- Lessons Learned exercise of the Human Rights Protection in South Kyrgyzstan project.

The scores for the four Key Performance Indicators for Results are based on the limited evidence base available.

To complement the data generated by the independent external evaluation reports, we are including an overview of OHCHR's self-reported achievements against global corporate objectives. They demonstrate satisfactory to highly satisfactory levels of results performance. The 2017 Annual Report provides an overview of achievements against targets for each of the 11 global expected accomplishments, for the entire implementation period of the OMP 2014-17. These results were generated through OHCHR's performance monitoring system (PMS), which the review team assessed as highly satisfactory. Although it was not possible to validate these on the basis of independent evaluations, the review team is confident that the results are based on sound, albeit internally generated, evidence. Nevertheless, they should by no means be regarded as having been externally validated by the assessment team.

These self-reported results are displayed below.

<b>MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and attain expected results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Evaluations unanimously and consistently underscore the critical and unique role of OHCHR in the protection and promotion of human rights. They point out that OHCHR has effectively supported countries in fulfilling their commitments to meet and report on progress against international human rights standards and mechanisms.</p> <p>Key achievements included: strong support of field presences in relation to standards and mechanisms; enhanced engagement of CSOs and UNCTs in human rights mechanisms; modest increase in ratification by member states of human rights treaties (OIOS evaluation of field offices); extremely effective and timely performance of Regional Office for Central Asia and timely in the country of residence, with a positive influence on the creation of national human rights structures (ROCA); effective achievement of results in assistance to national human rights institutions (NHRIs); effective implementation with direct, tangible results (Moldova); effective contribution to realisation of global and national objectives through the work of human rights advisors (HRA evaluation); and achievement of regional level results on gender equality (Regional Gender Advisors Structure); and effective contribution to the coordination of human rights NGOs, NHRIs and international organisations, mainstreaming human rights in the UNDAF, and improved knowledge among target group agencies about human rights (Tajikistan).</p> <p>Evaluations raised concerns about inadequate human resource management, inability to secure timely funding, insufficient support from resident coordinators for mainstreaming (HRAs) and inadequate project management, harming delivery and, thus, achievements (Tajikistan). They collectively point to gaps in the geographical coverage of OHCHR field presences and the delivery of its protection mandate, which impact negatively on the Office's ability to deliver results effectively.</p>	11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 68, 69, 114, 131
<b>MI 9.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having realised the expected positive benefits for target group members</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR is mandated to promote and protect "All Human Rights for All People". As a consequence, their target group is indefinite. The combination of OHCHR's broad mandate and relatively modest resources and limited field presence necessitate direct as well as indirect interventions, by collaborating with other stakeholders. Attributing results, or the lack of results, to OHCHR interventions is risky, given the multitude of other variables at play.</p> <p>The evidence base on realisation of results for OHCHR's intended target groups is limited to field-level evaluations. The OIOS assessment of UNHCR field operations reported that "the principal stakeholders of OHCHR, namely State organs, the UN system and regional organisations with human rights</p>	13, 14, 16, 114, 131

<p>responsibilities, reported that their needs and expectations had been largely met. In meeting these expectations, OHCHR had been able, for the most part to navigate and satisfy the often-opposing needs of two of its main stakeholders, Government and civil society. Civil society tended to favour a stronger monitoring capacity of OHCHR, whereas Governments often preferred a greater focus on technical assistance”.</p> <p>In Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR’s response “has been extremely effective” and timely, contributing to greater protection for at-risk minorities by State institutions and strengthened capacity of national institutions and CSOs. The evaluation of the regional gender advisors structure appreciates it as having been a highly effective mechanism for achieving results, particularly with regard to OHCHR’s advocacy and convening roles.</p> <p>In the DRC, the evaluation of the impact of technical assistance and capacity-building on the human rights situation found that where human rights violations are widespread, it was unclear how and to what extent OHCHR’s substantial human rights programme had contributed to better protection of target groups.</p> <p>In Tajikistan, the evaluation found that activities and outputs partially met the needs of the pre-selected target groups, but would have been higher had the quality of the needs assessments been better.</p>	
<b>MI 9.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes (policy and capacity impacts), or needed system reforms</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	
<b>MI score</b>	<b>N/E</b>
<b>MI 9.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>In view of the normative nature of OHCHR’s work, which takes a long time to impact on national policies and deliver concrete changes on the ground, it has proven difficult to assess the office’s contribution to (lasting) changes in national policies and actions. OHCHR’s work on preventing violations of human rights in cases where the risks are high, is even more difficult to evaluate/assess. OHCHR’s own annual reports suggest high performance levels vis-à-vis projected outputs, with anecdotal evidence from country-level cases.</p> <p>The external evaluation of national human rights instruments recognised that in countries where change is most needed (and where political support and adherence to human rights protection is lacking) national human rights institutions are often the weakest and thus in need of sustained support. Evaluations also underscore the need for field presence; although OHCHR’s monitoring and reporting activities at HQ level are important, they are by themselves deemed insufficient. Robust programmes on the ground are regarded as critical but are hindered by OHCHR’s lack of resources for field operations according to three evaluations. This would seem to suggest that, with more resources for field operations and more systematic strategy development, OHCHR’s impact on policies and human rights conditions of rights-holders is likely to increase. Project-level evaluations did not assess the performance against these higher-level objectives/results. Therefore, lacking a sufficiently robust evidence base, it was not possible to adequately assess results.</p>	6, 12, 16
<b>MI 9.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Little to no confidence</b>

<b>MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and the empowerment of women</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Gender equality is an integral part of OHCHR's thematic priority to enhance equality and counter discrimination. The office has also made gender equality an important part of external and self-evaluations. OHCHR's Annual Reports include large sections on (self-assessed) progress towards gender mainstreaming, with many country-level examples given.</p> <p>Key results identified include an increasingly consistent effort to integrate gender perspectives in NHRI country strategy design and monitor its effectiveness, although it is still not entirely systematic or consistent. In Moldova, the OHCHR project to combat discrimination has contributed to gender equality through certain aspects of the activities, but few conscious efforts seem to have been made to plan and incorporate activities explicitly addressing gender equality. OIOS also lists examples of gender mainstreaming by field presences.</p> <p>The 2017 evaluation of the Regional Gender Advisor Structure speaks positively about the relevance and effectiveness, but points to a lack of overarching strategic direction and clarity, impact measurement, and adequate resourcing. Evaluations conclude that more efforts are required to mainstream gender in e.g. TORs, annual plans, and corporate strategies.</p> <p>The Tajikistan project evaluation found that, although the project did not include gender sensitive indicators, it was successful in the development of 10 advocacy strategies to address identified human rights violations, in particular raising gender-based concerns related to migrant women in line with CEDAW's General Recommendation No. 26.</p>	6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 88, 89, 90, 91, 114, 131
<b>MI 9.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/helped tackle the effects of climate change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	
<b>MI score</b>	<b>N/E</b>
<b>MI 9.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Until recently, environmental stability/tackling effects of climate change only marginally fell within OHCHR's mandate. Indirectly, OHCHR has, through its contribution to the UN Joint Human Rights Office in DRC, contributed to the revision of the DRC's Mining Code, but with the explicit objective to enhance the voice of employees in securing their socio-economic rights. There is no documented, externally generated evidence of OHCHR (not) having contributed to improving environmental sustainability; therefore, it was not possible to score or rate this MI.</p>	13
<b>MI 9.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Little to no confidence</b>

<b>MI 9.6: Interventions assessed as having helped improve good governance (as defined in 2.1.c)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Improving good governance by ensuring compliance with international human rights norms and standards, is a key objective of OHCHR. While member states are ultimately responsible for compliance, including the implementation of recommendations from the various human rights mechanisms, OHCHR provides follow-up support, guidance and advice to help countries fulfil their obligations. The increasingly high volume and wide-ranging nature of these recommendations, however, make it challenging to provide follow-up support, according to OIOS's evaluation of OHCHR's field operations.</p> <p>The evaluation of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) concluded that OHCHR has effectively strengthened NHRIs, whereas the DRC evaluation points to the adoption of important legislation and regulations by the Government; "the high quality of well-calibrated support provided by OHCHR to NHRIs reflects the importance of proximity, access and field offices that are finely tuned to often swiftly changing realities on the ground".</p> <p>External evaluators, including those of the NHRIs and OIOS and Regional Gender Advisors, praise OHCHR's thematic knowledge, skills and tools, but also call for a more strategic orientation, driven by a proactive, robust institutional interlocutor at OHCHR HQ level (NHRI), and a sufficiently large presence on the ground to follow-up on recommendations arising from special procedures deliberations in Geneva (OIOS).</p>	12, 13, 16, 114
<b>MI 9.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.7: Interventions assessed as having helped improve human rights</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	
<b>MI score</b>	<b>N/E</b>
<b>MI 9.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
Given OHCHR's specific mission and mandate, it was agreed to refrain from scoring and rating against this Micro Indicator (see Paragraph 1.3. of the report).	
<b>MI 9.7 Evidence confidence</b>	

<b>KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and extent to which the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<p>Evaluations and assessment perceive OHCHR's mandate and independence as highly relevant. Its mandate is vested in the Vienna Declaration and a wide range of charters, declarations, agendas, and commitments. Its ability to implement that mandate independently is assessed as being affected by various features. These include UN-internal dynamics, such as a heavy workload as a result of increased activities of the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms, OHCHR's governance structure, perceived donor influence, bureaucratic inefficiencies, gaps in coverage of field offices, and (most importantly) funding gaps.</p> <p>But also external factors play a significant role, such as the willingness and capacity of member states to comply with human rights and facilitate OHCHR and the Human Rights Council's subsidiary bodies to perform their duties in-country, and the level of commitment and support from other UN agencies and country teams. Although OHCHR itself, in its annual reports, publishes information about the outputs and outcomes of international human rights mechanisms, independent external evaluations thereof are lacking.</p>	
<b>MI 10.1: Interventions assessed as having responded to the needs/priorities of target groups</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<b>MI 10.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR is the UN's leading entity for human rights. All evaluations underscore its unique role and mandate to promote and protect all human rights for all people, and the fundamental need for independence of the High Commissioner and his office.</p> <p>The Office is assessed by OIOS as "having played a critical and highly relevant role in the field that no other actor has played". It is assessed as providing added value with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights in the countries and regions in which it operates. OIOS also found that the Office has demonstrated its relevance by largely meeting the needs and expectations of its stakeholders in the field. It states that field presences have contributed in several ways to the advancement of human rights, including by improving the compliance of national laws, policies and institutions with human rights standards; promoting the ratification of international human rights treaties; supporting the establishment and functioning of protection and accountability mechanisms; supporting institutions and laws aimed at combating discrimination; encouraging the use of national protection systems by rights-holders; and integrating the HRBA into the work of other UN agencies.</p> <p>NHRIs constitute a fundamental pillar in national HR protection mechanisms, and OHCHR is credited by the evaluators for having contributed to their growth and influence by the evaluators of the National Human Rights Institutions evaluation.</p> <p>Human rights mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming is the explicit task of Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) and Regional Gender Advisors (RGA), and OHCHR's contribution been assessed as either having remained constant or improved in the countries and regions where HRAs and RGAs are deployed. According to the evaluators of the Regional Office for Central Asia, ROCA's work is assessed as "highly relevant and effective", although OHCHR's role as a project implementing agency in areas that fall outside its mandate (peace-building) has been questioned.</p>	11, 12, 14, 16, 114, 131

The project in Moldova is assessed by the evaluators as highly relevant in terms of selection of target group and location, even though its size was modest. The project in Tajikistan is critical of the selection of some of the target group members, claiming that the selection of some partners was not always optimal and that it would have been better to work with existing networks than trying to establish new networks of human rights defenders.	11, 12, 14, 16, 114, 131
<b>MI 10.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 10.2: Interventions assessed as having helped contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<b>MI 10.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>External evaluations of the Regional Office for Central Asia and OHCHR field presences recognise that strengthening compliance with human rights standards at the national level is by definition a long-term objective and that in countries where change is most needed, national human rights capabilities are often the weakest, and thus in need of sustained support.</p> <p>External evaluators emphasise that, while OHCHR’s monitoring and reporting activities at HQ level are important, they are by themselves insufficient to help realise national human rights and related objectives. Robust programmes on the ground are critical but are hindered by OHCHR’s lack of resources for field operations. Field presences have contributed in several ways to the advancement of human rights, including by improving compliance of national laws, policies and institutions with human rights standards; promoting the ratification of international human rights treaties; supporting the establishment and functioning of protection and accountability mechanisms; supporting institutions and laws aimed at combating discrimination; encouraging the use of national protection systems by rights-holders; and integrating the HRBA into the work of other UN agencies (OIOS). The Tajikistan project evaluation concludes that the project contributed significantly to the development of a human rights sensitive UNDAF in Tajikistan.</p> <p>OHCHR’s own annual reports suggest high performance levels vis-à-vis projected outputs, with anecdotal evidence from country-level cases.</p>	12, 14, 16, 131
<b>MI 10.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 10.3: Results assessed as having been delivered as part of a coherent response to an identified problem</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>N/E</b>
<b>MI 10.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
OHCHR’s strategic plans and frameworks highlight the gaps that exist between articulation of human rights norms and standards on the one hand, and the actual improvement of human rights on the other. It emphasises the indivisibility of the three UN pillars, the indispensable role human rights play in the achievement of the SDGs, and the importance of pursuing a coordinated, coherent, and responsive approach to combating impunity and strengthening the rule of law. This includes both standard setting to address normative gaps and emerging challenges, and efforts to support and ensure compliance with existing norms and standards.	16

<p>Assessments of coherence are few and far between, and only OIOS has looked at the results of field operations in their totality. Their findings indicate that OHCHR has made good overall progress against the Expected Accomplishments, that they are supporting human rights outcomes in a variety of areas at the country and regional level, and that they have contributed to the mainstreaming of human rights in UN Country Teams. All results at the country level are linked to one or several recommendations of the human rights mechanisms.</p> <p>OIOS concluded that the Office has effectively supported countries in fulfilling their commitments to international human rights standards and mechanisms but has provided more limited support to member states in following up on recommendations. Moreover, gaps exist in the geographical coverage of field presences and the delivery of the Office's protection mandate, partly as a result of resource constraints, insufficient field presences and a growing portfolio on the one hand, and what OIOS identifies as the lack of an overall plan and strategy for the deployment of its field operations on the other. Lacking other independent sources of evidence, it was decided not to score and rate this Micro-Indicator on the basis of 1 source only.</p>	16
<b>MI 10.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Little to no confidence</b>
<b>KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>
<p>Despite noticeable progress in results-based management and performance monitoring, inefficiency remains a structural challenge for the office. Evaluations/assessments find that inefficiencies originate from various sources, including the UN Secretariat bureaucracy (OHCHR is part of the UN Secretariat and hence subject to its accountability, governance and oversight structure, including its human resource and administrative processes); centralised decision-making as opposed to delegation of authority to field offices; lack of project implementation experience; coordination shortcomings; inconsistent decision-making; and the use of two (parallel) planning processes, documents and performance monitoring systems.</p>	
<b>MI 11.1: Interventions assessed as resource/cost efficient</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>MI 11.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>OHCHR has come a long way in terms of improving its strategic leadership, results-based management and cost-efficiency. It has achieved meaningful results with relatively modest means. That said, OIOS audits as well as evaluations have raised concerns with regard to OHCHR's management, and administrative structures and systems, pointing to inefficiencies in <i>inter alia</i> monitoring and reporting, as well as cross-OHCHR coordination, cooperation, and communication.</p> <p>The ROCA evaluation identified inefficient procedures and arrangements creating delays and increasing costs; significant opportunity costs due to onerous processes and procedures; centralised decision-making on project-level issues; the lack of adequate policies and tools to ensure efficient delivery of project interventions; and concerns about duplication of efforts. The Moldova project evaluation concluded that complicated bureaucracy and inadequate financial and human resource systems have hampered efficient project delivery. Likewise, the HRA evaluation highlighted the time-consuming deployment process and funding insecurity of HRAs. Finally, the OIOS evaluation concluded that "the office has introduced a more uniform structure for the implementation of its activities, but lacks an overall plan for the efficient deployment of its field operations. Insufficient priority-setting, inconsistent decision-making and limited standardization of work methods remain".</p>	11, 14, 15, 16, 114, 131

Human resource management was also seen as insufficiently systematic and methodologically sound. The Tajikistan project evaluation is critical of OHCHR's management of the project, pointing to high staff turnover, lack of necessary skill-sets among foreign staff, as well as inadequacies regarding follow-up of activities, communication with other agencies and the donor, internal coordination among OHCHR offices in the region, and internal monitoring.  In its management responses OHCHR acknowledges these shortcomings, and has addressed some in areas it controls, as it continues to plan for improved organisational efficiency.	11, 14, 15, 16, 114, 131
<b>MI 11.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 11.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
In its Annual Reports, OHCHR reports progress against Expected Accomplishments (EAs). Some EAs listed in the four-year OMP had been adjusted to meet new realities, but the overall performance against stated objectives is perceived as satisfactory.  Few external assessments address the timeliness of delivery, and those that do show mixed results. The ROCA evaluation is positive about OHCHR's speedy deployment in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province, through which it was able to play a critical role in conflict management and prevention. By contrast, the Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) evaluation is critical about the long period between demand and supply of HRAs to join UNCTs (up to 24 months), a concern shared by OIOS. An assessment carried out by the Joint Investigation Unit (2014) highlights constraints in human and financial management, impacting negatively on the development and use of a rapid response and deployment mechanism.	5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16
<b>MI 11.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>KPI 12: Sustainability of results</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Assessing OHCHR's contribution to sustainable improvements is particularly challenging, not only because of the complex context dynamics and characteristics of OHCHR's work streams (normative, monitoring, advocacy, support to human rights mechanisms, and in-country capacity building) and its relatively small size, but equally because of a lack of (robust) evidence. Hence, any conclusions drawn from the available documentation must be caveated as such.	
<b>MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project or programme completion or there are effective measures to link the humanitarian relief operations to recovery, to resilience and eventually to longer-term developmental results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>

<b>MI 12.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Very few external assessments have addressed long-term sustainability of OHCHR intervention benefits.</p> <p>The evaluation of the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) points to the challenges in determining the level of sustainability of OHCHR's efforts to support NHRIs as this issue is highly context-dependent and numerous complex factors are at play. It is difficult for NHRIs to make sustainable advances in many cases where other institutions related to rule of law remain weak. OHCHR is seen as having contributed positively to sustainability of NHRIs through its deepening of partnerships with UNDP and the tripartite relationship: UNDP-OHCHR-ICC, productive engagement with CSOs, encouragement of NHRI engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and the development by OHCHR of a conceptual and methodological framework for human rights indicators to adopt a structured and consistent approach for translating universal human rights standards into indicators that are useful at country level.</p> <p>The evaluation of the Regional Gender Advisor structure warns that institutional sustainability will suffer should short-term budget planning by donors and OHCHR itself continue to be the norm. OHCHR should develop contingency plans during periods of unstable funding and staffing to ensure continuity.</p> <p>The Tajikistan project evaluation points to a series of successful interventions that will be continued after completion, either by OHCHR's own Regional Office for Central Asia, or by other local and international partners.</p>	11, 12, 13, 15, 114, 131
<b>MI 12.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 12.2: Interventions assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability, or have been absorbed by government</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 12.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Although a key part of OHCHR's mandate and programmes are about long-term capacity building for implementation, again, independent evidence is scant. Of the 8 documents available, only 2 assessed against sustainability criteria. Both OIOS and the Moldova evaluation team drew positive conclusions in that regard. Thus, despite the limited evidence, this Micro Indicator has been rated as satisfactory.</p> <p>OIOS assessed that "... through its field presences, OHCHR has contributed to sustainable human rights outcomes in the countries and regions in which it has worked, including through the creation and strengthening of human rights institutions, the drafting and passing of laws that are consistent with international standards, the provision of direct assistance in the implementation of constitutional reform and the development of national human rights plans and policies".</p> <p>The Moldova assessment suggests that institutional capacity for sustainability and positive change is secured, thanks to the capacity building of the judiciary, and documentation and pursuit of over 50 emblematic discrimination cases.</p>	15, 16
<b>MI 12.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Little to no confidence</b>

<b>MI 12.3: Interventions assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 12.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Integral to OHCHR's mandate and its overarching theory of change described in the OMP, lies the assumption that all its work is meant to strengthen an enabling environment for equitable development: as the entity in charge of implementing the human rights programme, the Office "plays a crucial role in safeguarding the integrity of the three interconnected pillars of the United Nations - peace and security, human rights, and development" (Annual Report 2015). This is illustrated in global, regional, and national plans and programmes, e.g. Human Rights Appeals 2016 and 2017, which include key references to OHCHR's support to the 2030 SDGs. The OMP 2018-21 is even more explicitly linked to the achievement of the 2030 Global Agenda and the Global Compact. Nevertheless, none of the available external evaluations or assessments have considered these broader effects. Therefore, this Micro indicator has neither been scored nor rated.</p>	1, 6, 88, 89, 90, 91
<b>MI 12.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

<b>OHCHR Self-reporting OMP Achievements against Targets for 11 Global Expected Accomplishments</b>			
<b>Global Expected Accomplishments</b>	<b>Global indicators</b>	<b>Target 2017</b>	<b>2014-17 achievements</b>
EA 1: Increased compliance of national legislation, policies, programmes and institutions, including the judiciary and national human rights institutions, with international human rights standards	1.1 No. of countries of engagement where NHRIs have been established or improved their compliance with international standards (Paris Principles).	51	50
	1.2 No. of countries of engagement where the level of compliance of legislation/policy with international human rights standards in selected human rights areas has significantly improved.	54	39
	1.3 No. of countries of engagement where the level of compliance of selected State institutions and programmes with international human rights standards has significantly improved.	29	18
	1.4 No. of countries of engagement where human rights trainings have been institutionalized in one or more selected human rights areas.	27	24
	1.5 No. of countries of engagement where the use of international human rights law in court proceedings and decisions has increased to a significant extent.	18	13
EA 2: Increased ratification of international and regional human rights treaties and review of reservations of international human rights treaties	2.1 Total no. of international human rights treaties ratified. Baseline: 2,041 outstanding ratifications to reach universality.	200	192
	2.2 Total no. of reservations withdrawn from international human rights treaties.	20	10 withdrawals, 2 partial withdrawals
EA 3: Establishment and/ or functioning of protection systems and accountability mechanisms in compliance with international human rights standards to monitor, investigate and redress the full range of human rights violations	3.1 No. of countries of engagement where oversight, accountability or protection mechanisms have been established or improved compliance with international human rights standards.	40	33
	3.2 No. of countries of engagement where transitional justice mechanisms which conform to international human rights standards have been established or improved compliance with international human rights standards.	22	15
	3.3 No. of countries of engagement where systems/procedures put in place by UN Human Rights at the national level have contributed to protection from human rights violations.	5	4
	3.4 No. of countries of engagement where the number of human rights violations' cases raised by UN Human Rights positively addressed by governments has significantly increased.	13	10

EA 4: Increased compliance of national legislation, policies, programmes and institutions with international human rights standards to combat discrimination, particularly against women	4.1 No. of countries of engagement where the level of compliance with international human rights standards of legislation and policies to combat discrimination has significantly improved.	40	34
	4.2 No. of countries of engagement where selected State institutions and programmes combating discrimination have significantly improved their compliance with international human rights standards.	16	8
EA 5: Increased use of existing national protection systems and participation in public processes by rightsholders, especially women and discriminated groups	5.1 No. of countries of engagement demonstrating significant improvement in the level of meaningful participation in selected public processes.	38	37
	5.2 No. of countries of engagement where the use of national protection systems has increased significantly.	15	11
EA 6: Increased compliance and engagement by States with UN human rights mechanisms and bodies	6.1 No. of countries of engagement where mechanisms for integrated reporting and/or implementation of outstanding treaty bodies, special procedures or Human Rights Council recommendations are in place or have improved functioning.	57	49
	6.2 Percentage of countries that submit treaty body reports on time. Baseline: 33 per cent	40%	32%
	6.3 No. of countries of engagement with an improvement in the proportion of reports submitted to the treaty bodies/UPR that substantially or fully conform to reporting guidelines.	23	21
	6.4 No. of countries which have issued a standing invitation to special procedures mandate-holders. Baseline: 108	123	118 plus 1
	6.5 No. of countries for which requests for visits of thematic special procedures have resulted in at least one visit.	62	Visits to 121 countries
	6.6 Rate of responses from governments to special procedures communications. Baseline: 40 per cent	50%	58%
EA 7: Increased no. and diversity of rights-holders and other stakeholders making use of UN human rights mechanisms	7.1 No. of countries of engagement with a significant number of substantive submissions or submitting actors to UN human rights mechanisms.	58	65
	7.2 Total no. of substantive submissions from NHRIs, civil society organisations, UN entities and individuals to UN human rights mechanisms	13000	>15000

EA 8: Progressive development and strengthening of international and regional human rights institutions, laws and standards	8.1 No. of regional human rights institutions strengthened or established in compliance with international human rights standards.	2	2
	8.2 No. of thematic areas where international and/or regional human rights law or standards have been developed or strengthened.	12	21
EA 9: Enhanced coherence of UN human rights mechanisms and bodies	9.1. Percentage of treaty bodies and special procedures recommendations taken up by the Human Rights Council in the context of the UPR.	50%	N/A
	9.2 No. of countries which have submitted or updated common core documents.	56	64
	9.3 Degree of progress made in improving the harmonization of the work of the treaty bodies.	Medium	Medium
	9.4 Degree of coordination among the special procedures.	High	Substantive
EA 10: International community increasingly responsive to critical human rights situations and issues	10.1 Percentage of critical human rights issues/situations raised by UN Human Rights which have been taken up in international fora in a timely manner.	60%	N/A
	10.2 No. of countries of engagement where the international community has objectively engaged on specific issues raised by UN Human Rights.	18	13
	10.3 No. of international and regional fora which have included human rights issues and/or established standing mechanisms/procedures to address human rights situations on an ongoing basis.	10	11 mechanisms
EA 11: A human rights-based approach, including gender equality and the right to development, increasingly integrated into UN policies and programmes	11.1 No. of countries of engagement with UN peace missions which have integrated international human rights standards and principles, as well as the recommendations of the human rights mechanisms, into their work to a significant extent.	15	14
	11.2 No. of countries of engagement with humanitarian operations which have integrated international human rights standards and principles, as well as the recommendations of the human rights mechanisms, into their work to a significant extent.	19	20
	11.3 No. of countries of engagement where UN guidelines incorporating a human rights-based approach have been applied to a significant extent by a number of UN entity programmes.	31	32
	11.4 No. of countries of engagement where UN common country programmes (i.e., UNDAFs) have satisfactorily integrated international human rights standards and principles, as well as the recommendations of the human rights mechanisms.	47	53
	11.5 No. of UN policies and programmes at the global level which integrate a human rights-based approach to a significant extent.	10	26

## Annex 2. List of documents

All document listed below are OHCHR publications or official open access documents, unless indicated otherwise.

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21. OHCHR (2012), *Proposed strategic framework for the period 2014-2015, Part two: Biennial programme plan for Programme 20 (Human Rights)*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
22. OHCHR (2014), *OMP Mid-Term Review and MTR Thematic discussion (Rule of Law)*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right, Geneva, Switzerland
23. OHCHR (2016), *Programmatic update presented to OHCHR Strategic Leadership Retreat, 2 February 2016: Implementation – two years into the OHCHR Management Plan 2014-2017*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
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45. OHCHR (n.d.), *OHCHR PMS User Guide End of Cycle Field (internal document)*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
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
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## Annex 3. Results of Mopan’s Partner Survey


### Response profile

**Number of survey responses: 126**

#### Number of survey responses by country:




#### Respondent type:




## Staffing


### OHCHR has sufficient staffing to deliver results




### OHCHR has sufficiently skilled and experienced staff



### OHCHR has sufficient continuity of staff to build relationships




### OHCHR staff can make critical strategic and programming decisions locally




### Managing financial resources


#### OHCHR provides transparent criteria for financial resource allocation




#### OHCHR provides predictable financial allocations and disbursements



### OHCHR financial cooperation is coherent/not fragmented




### OHCHR has flexible resources




### Interventions (programmes, projects, normative work)


#### OHCHR interventions are fit national programmes and results of partner countries




**OHCHR interventions are tailored to the needs of the local context**




**OHCHR interventions are based on a clear understanding of comparative advantage**




**OHCHR interventions take in to account realistic assessments of national/regional capacities**



### OHCHR interventions appropriately manage risk in a given context




### OHCHR designs and implements its interventions to sustain effect and impact over time




### Interventions (cross-cutting issues)


#### Familiarity with gender strategy of OHCHR



#### Familiarity with environmental sustainability strategy of OHCHR, including addressing climate change




#### Familiarity with strategy for setting out how OHCHR intends to engage with good governance




### Interventions (cross-cutting issues, organisational performance)


#### OHCHR promotes gender equality



#### OHCHR promotes environmental sustainability/addresses climate change




#### OHCHR promotes principles of good governance




## Managing relationships


### OHCHR prioritises working in synergy/partnerships




### OHCHR shares key information with partners on an ongoing basis




### OHCHR uses regular review points with partners to identify challenges




### OHCHR provides high quality inputs to country dialogue




### OHCHR views are well respected in country policy dialogue




### OHCHR conducts mutual assessments of progress with national/regional partners



**OHCHR channels resources through country systems as the default option**




**OHCHR knowledge products are useful for my work**




## Performance management

### OHCHR prioritises as results-based approach




### OHCHR bases its policy and strategy decisions on robust performance data




### Evidence base for planning and programming


OHCHR has a clear statement on which of its interventions must be evaluated




Where required, OHCHR ensures that evaluations are carried out




OHCHR participates in joint evaluations at the country/regional level




### OHCHR intervention designs contain a statement of the evidence base




### OHCHR identifies under-performing interventions




### OHCHR addresses any areas of intervention under-performance



**OHCHR follows up evaluation recommendations systematically**



**OHCHR learns lessons from experience rather than repeating the same mistakes**





For any questions or comments, please contact:

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